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It is generally accepted that jus cogens norms are recognised to be non-derogable, and to bind all States because they protect the interests of the wider international community.  If this is correct, it is incongruous that States could breach jus cogens norms with impunity.  This thesis approaches this statement from two angles.  Firstly, it questions whether States do in fact enjoy impunity; or whether there is a formal, or even ad hoc, practice of holding States accountable.  Secondly, this thesis asks what it means to hold States accountable - whether the changing conception of international law, that accommodates jus cogens norms, is also developing to recognise a changing conception of State accountability.

In order to answer these questions this thesis conceptualises State accountability as an interpretive framework, with which to analyse relevant State practice and identify juridical support for State accountability.  In addition, consideration is given to how a theoretical concept of State accountability relates to existing doctrines of public international law and illustrates why it is that State and juridical support for a conceptual principle of accountability exists when there is already an established principle of State responsibility.
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1.	RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This thesis seeks to determine the extent to which the premise that States must be held accountable for breaching jus cogens has in fact evolved to be a legal norm of international law.

In the North Sea Cases, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) considered what would be required for an emerging legal principle to evolve​[1]​.  Brownlie interpreted the decision to imply that a principle ‘may crystallise in a first stage, even though the basic elements thus recognised need a consequential apparatus of rules dealing with related problems’​[2]​.  The question here is whether State accountability has crystallised as a norm of public international law.

This question can be further split into two research questions.  First, is the concept of State accountability at the first stage of legal development; in other words, is it lex feranda (what the law should be)?  And, second, can a norm of State accountability be identified in current international jurisprudence and/or practice; in other words, is the concept lex lata (what the law is)?  It is argued here that the greatest understanding of what is meant by State accountability will be found in determining where along the continuum, from lex feranda to lex lata, the concept sits.

In order to answer the thesis a suitable analytical framework is required, which will be introduced in this Chapter.  An overview of the relevance of the subject, methodology, and the chapter topics used in order to answer the research questions is also explained.  The aim of this Chapter is to outline the main points from the discussion and to develop the argument, rather than to summarise the thesis contents, which is set out separately at the start of each chapter.

2.	THE RELEVANCE OF STATE ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE STUDY OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
2.1	State Accountability as a Function of International Law
International law sets the normative boundaries against which a State’s acts and omissions are assessed; thus it is declaratory​[3]​.  If a State fails to comply, and breaches international law, other States are entitled to respond accordingly, provided that the response is also within the scope of international law; thus the instruction as to how to respond to a breach means that international law is also functional.  If there is no capacity for response or redress under the law then States breach international law with impunity; but there can be no finding of impunity without a clearer comprehension of how States are bound by international law, and the means available for responding to States and holding them accountable when they breach international law.

It is the functional quality, in that public international law is constructed to deal with the breach of the law rather than the substance of the law, which is the primary focus of this thesis.  To a lesser extent, the arguments made here also relate to the declaratory nature of international law, because it is breaches of jus cogens norms, which are part of the substantive component of international law, that are being considered.  Clearly, the question of State accountability can be located in the broader study of international law.  The special relevance of this thesis, however, is that the analysis specifically focuses on jus cogens norms to create a contrast with other works that relate to State accountability​[4]​.

This research follows a great deal of previous academic study relating to what the International Law Commission, in its work on the State responsibility doctrine, termed ‘serious’​[5]​ breaches of international law: in other words, breaches that affect the interest of the entire international community​[6]​.  This thesis makes an original contribution while engaging with three common themes shared in previous studies.

2.2	Placing the Thesis in the Context of Related Studies
Firstly, ‘the assertion [of] State prerogatives in the face of universally-recognised norms is increasingly dubious’​[7]​ when used to justify the current limitations on redress when States breach international law, such as the nature of the response.  This thesis, likewise, adopts the view that the complexities in holding States accountable, including the perception that State sovereignty cannot be infringed in the process, must be overcome.  Issues relating to how a response can be effective without impinging upon the State’s autonomy​[8]​; how to distinguish the State from the actions of its organs and agents in order to identify the separate breach of each party​[9]​; what form of redress will reflect the gravity of the breach​[10]​, and more, will be considered here.

Secondly, the point that distinguishes this thesis is that although there is already extensive work considering the consequences of breaching jus cogens, this is usually subsumed within a broader inquiry relating to breaches of international law generally. This work, however, focuses on accountability as a form of answerability distinguishable from what is already provided under public international law, and on accountability for breaches of jus cogens.  The extensive debate surrounding the content, source, definition and even existence of jus cogens is explored, but not resolved, and a working definition will be based on what can be identified as a definitional consensus.

By focusing solely on jus cogens norms, this thesis is based on the assumption that that there are different considerations when jus cogens norms are breached, or that the nature of redress is unique.  This is a particularly difficult assertion to make where non-jus-cogens norms relate to the interests of more than just a few States, such as human rights protections, but are not recognised as jus cogens.  However, international law does draw a distinction between the consequences when the law in question is jus cogens, for example, Article 71 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states a treaty that violates jus cogens is void​[11]​.  It is submitted that the best way to determine whether or not a breach of jus cogens can be distinguished, and, specifically, how the response is either different or the same, is therefore to give a separate assessment of jus cogens breaches.

The third commonality between previous work and the research is that while previous work examines the extent to which holding States accountable is feasible, this is done within the context of established principles of international law, most notably the State responsibility doctrine and international criminal law.  The contribution of this work is that accountability is not conceptualised here as an established legal, political or even moral principle.  Instead, accountability will be conceptualised as an interpretive framework that can be employed to identify and analyse what is meant by accountability in terms of practice and, potentially, as an emerging norm.

Accordingly, the goal of this thesis is to identify the status quo in terms of whether States are held accountable and whether accountability in the particular context is legal, rather than political or moral.  In addition, any relevant practice or juridical support will be assessed from the perspective of whether there is evidence of momentum toward State accountability crystallising as a principle of public international law.  While there are three ways in which accountability could have been treated, in this thesis only the approach selected here allows both research questions to be answered.

2.3	Adopting a Quasi-Legal Methodology in the Study of Public International Law
The first approach in determining whether or not accountability is already an established principle of international law would be to look for evidence to support or dispel the proposition.  This would require an analysis of State practice and black letter doctrine, which has already been undertaken​[12]​.  Furthermore, without any evidence of consistent practice, any finding that accountability is an established legal principle would have to add the caveat that the principle is continuing to evolve, which warrants further investigation and speculation anyway.  And, finally, this approach does not allow for consideration as to future development as it focuses on the status quo.  The arguments as to whether there is currently a legal principle of accountability are not bypassed in this thesis, indeed they will be covered in Chapter One, but in light of the two research questions in this thesis, it is inappropriate to only consider accountability in these terms.

This thesis could have argued that there is an established non-legal principle of accountability, closer to political or moral accountability.  This approach would, likewise, require the thesis to prove the existence of accountability, but the scope of consideration would have expanded to consider not only State practice in international law but analogies as diverse as corporate governance, victim restorative justice programmes and media responsibility that arguably would be relevant.  This thesis is concerned with breaches of international law by States therefore, in order to ensure sufficient analytical depth in answering the research questions, the focus must remain on the accountability of the State and the extent to which accountability is legal in nature.

This is not to say that political and moral forms of accountability are not relevant.  Indeed, to the extent that it is shown that there is no established principle of legal accountability, evidence of political and moral accountability may be seen to influence current practice and the content of any emerging accountability norm.  The ideal approach, and the one adopted here, is to conceptualise accountability in a way that takes political and moral factors into account, but allows these factors to be analysed through a legalist lens: a quasi-legal methodology.  Adopting an interpretive framework means both the current scholarly narrative (for example, is accountability currently sought as legal redress or are the responses when the law is breached primarily political?) and future normative development (for example, does practice show that some form of moral redress is essential when seeking accountability that is likely to be characteristic of an emerging norm?) can be examined.

Support for mixing legal and non-legal methodologies in this study on public international law will be considered, but it is noted that there is opposition to the practice, most notably from Kelsen who is known for his works on legal theory.  In Kelsen’s pure theory of law ‘to comprehend something legally can only be to comprehend it as law’, and ‘mental processes or physical events’ or any non-legal factor that has a bearing in seeking to ‘cognize [legal] norms’ is irrelevant​[13]​.  However, this work is concerned with the potential evolution of public international law rather than its creation.  A pure theory of law and legal cognition is concerned with how the law actually is created by the law maker, and thus any issues with employing Methodensynkretismus in legal studies does not apply to this work.

It is not only a mix of methodologies that is employed in the analysis – it is a mix of perspectives.  Preference is given to the opinion and practice of States as the creators of international law but the focus here is on the evolution of State accountability and not the creation.  Thus, a Foucauldian approach is useful because the views and contribution of States, individuals (such as international law experts or special rapporteurs), NGOs (such as Human Rights Watch or Amnesty), law monitoring bodies (such as the Human Rights Council) and notable dignitaries (such as the UN Secretary General or heads of State) may all be taken into account.  It is submitted that all these parties have the potential to influence the evolution of international law and play a role in holding States accountable.  Thus, in order to understand whether State accountability is situated closer to lex feranda or lex lata, the opinion and practice of more than just States will be taken into account when applying the interpretive framework.

There are three things an interpretive framework and the research presented here will not do.  This thesis does not seek to provide a magic solution where established commentators have failed, or traverse ground that has already been covered in the many previous studies of how to hold States accountable; in particular, this thesis does not argue in favour of criminal State responsibility, collective security or international intervention as a means to hold States accountable.  Furthermore, this work is not intended to provide commentary on instances when States have breached international law or the reasons why.  And, as already noted, no new normative conception of jus cogens will be attempted.  The working definition that is adopted here will be based on an analysis of current consensus (if found to exist) and discussion on the topic.

This thesis will give an overview of current application and juridical thinking and provide a further perspective in the ongoing debate of whether States are held accountable, specifically, for breaching jus cogens norms.  With this in mind, the methodology used is set out below.

3.	METHODOLOGY AND THESIS
The thesis advanced here is that States can be, and are, held accountable for breaching jus cogens norms and the concept of State accountability presented here is just one way to label and analyse its occurrence.  Based on increasing juridical support and evidence of State practice, it will be argued that a concept of State accountability is moving from lex feranda to lex lata.  Thus, the term State accountability used throughout this thesis is a normative conception, rather than a unitary definition.

Three methodological steps are used to prove this thesis.

Chapters One and Two construct an interpretive framework.  While an overview of the directly applicable law and practice would soon establish that there is little express evidence of State accountability as lex lata, an interpretive framework allows consideration of law and practice that is indirectly related and may provide evidence of State accountability as lex feranda.  Under traditional theories of custom, a relative lack of practice to opinio juris would frustrate any argument that accountability is a rule of customary international law.  However, since its adoption in 1899 at the Hague Peace Conference​[14]​, the Martens Clause has led to the ‘laws of humanity’ and the ‘dictates of public conscience’ being placed on par with State ‘usage’ or practice in identifying legal principles​[15]​.  It will be argued in Chapter Three that despite the controversy that surrounds jus cogens norms, there is State consensus that these norms seek to protect the interests of the entire international community, which run parallel with the ‘public conscience’ and the ‘laws of humanity’.  It is therefore reasonable that the non-traditional approach to identifying customary international law in the Martens Clause provides a precedent for a non-standard approach to analysing State accountability (even though the Martens Clause specifically relates to humanitarian law as shown in the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons​[16]​).  Therefore the evolution of a principle of accountability is not to be discounted on the basis of inconsistent State practice alone.  Juridical opinion is equally relevant for these purposes.

The second step is to determine exactly how novel the concept of State accountability is. Chapter Three will contrast State accountability with established principles of international law that also relate in the broader context of seeking redress from States, such as the immunity doctrine.  Chapters One, Two and Three set the scene for analysis by clarifying the relationship between the theory of State accountability and public international law.

The final methodological step applies the interpretive framework to determine how far removed the theory of State accountability is to current practice and jurisprudence.  These findings are then applied to the research questions in order to conclude identification of the current status and future potential of State accountability.

3.1	The Interpretive Framework
The first step in the thesis is to conceptualise accountability as an interpretive framework, drawing on critical theory and especially the work of French philosopher Michel Foucault, best known for challenging the nature of knowledge and his analysis of the knowledge/power nexus in regard to government and the self​[17]​. This is a framework for the interpretation and analysis of data.  In other words, accountability is to be understood in a broader, conceptual sense, which in turn establishes an analytical structure for the thesis.  State practice and international jurisprudence will be interpreted within that structure, and evidence of overlap with, or opposition to, conceptual accountability can be identified.

The benefit of conceptualising accountability as an interpretive framework is that it allows for inconsistencies to be taken into account in the analysis.  The inconsistencies referred to arise in relation to how accountability is implemented​[18]​ that may influence the normative evolution of accountability - the ‘functional and formative role’​[19]​ of both State and non-State actors in this process.  Furthermore, developments in international law, including the recognition of jus cogens norms and other social, political and cultural factors that will inevitably influence the practice of accountability, are recognised​[20]​.

It may initially seem ironic to develop a methodology for legal analysis by referring to Foucault, who, as Hammer notes, argued that legal doctrine is just one factor at work in constructing normative frameworks​[21]​.  But it is precisely because Foucault was instrumental in ‘demonstrating methodologies that were decoupled from a formalised legal system’​[22]​, that the interpretive framework model is ideal.  A broader analysis is required, than is possible through the lens of legal formalism, in order to determine whether current practice and juridical support illustrate momentum toward normative recognition.

3.1.1	Discounting Legal Formalism
There are three reasons why legal formalism​[23]​ as a methodology that utilises strict legal reasoning is an inappropriate interpretive tool for this thesis.

Legal formalism focuses on States, with the presumption that States construct, and are the primary subjects of, international law.  Traditionally international law has managed inter-State relations, but the role of non-State actors cannot be bypassed. This is conspicuous in the growth of human rights law.  The recognition of jus cogens also takes into account more than State interests, and as this thesis is concerned with accountability for jus cogens, it is inappropriate to adopt an analytical approach that minimises the role of non-State actors in international law.

Legal formalism addresses established legal doctrine, rather than normative and policy concerns.  It treats law as a discrete scientific discipline, rather than as part of an integrated discourse that includes politics and morals.  These reasons mean that legal formalism is unsuitable for the purposes of the present work.  If no established legal principle of accountability is identified through practice and juridical support (Research Question One), then the analysis turns to identify the potential that a norm of accountability will emerge, or is in the process of emerging (Research Question Two).  A formalist approach would reject much of the evidence that is relevant to the argument here, in particular the second research question which looks to future normative development beyond the strict legal context.  It also fails to take account of the political reality, in which international law is implemented, and how this may affect its interpretation and application.  In the words of Ratner and Abrams ‘an abstruse elucidation of the law and process, all too common in legal discourse, seems insufficient to demonstrate in any useful way either the complexity of the endeavour or its promise’​[24]​.

3.1.2	Support for a Foucauldian Approach to Studying International Law
There is support for discounting a formalist approach and adopting a broader methodology in the study of international law.  The interpretive framework advocated by Foucault has relevance here as his thinking was particularly influenced by Nietzsche and both explored the idea that objectivity and truth were themselves subjective and open to interpretation​[25]​.

There is a growing opinion that international law should be interpreted in relation to its practice, or ‘concreteness’​[26]​, rather than its juridical expression.  Commentators such as Koskenniemi, Hammer and Berman argue that the study of international law cannot be undertaken by doctrinal analysis alone.  ‘The overall vision of the international community is not solely a unitary State choice regarding rational choice’​[27]​ and social policy and moral concerns influence States in both the construction and implementation of international law.  Such concerns are just as relevant, and thus influential, in relation to seeking accountability when the law is breached.  Thus, a framework that draws on the broader context of practice is more likely to be of benefit in determining the distance between accountability as lex feranda and accountability as lex lata.

An investigative methodology has been used in studies on human rights​[28]​ and was used by Schwarzenberger in his study on sovereignty and the relationship between the doctrine at a conceptual level and international law.  In Schwarzenberger’s opinion ‘so long as the phenomenon remains amorphous, it may prove impossible or difficult to understand its character and implications.  Once the various sides of the problem are separated, the phenomenon as a whole becomes easier to comprehend’​[29]​.  This provides direct support for deconstructing the amorphous phenomenon that is State accountability, to then reconstruct it as an interpretive framework for analytical purposes.

Foucault is often linked with Jürgen Habermas and other theorists from the Frankfurt School, who argue that the analysis of practice should not be undertaken to the exclusion of theory.  To ‘combine textualism with universalism’ gives greater scope for interpretation​[30]​; which, in turn, means that the analysis of a system of chaos can still provide insight even if no definitive conclusion can be reached.  This provides reassurance that in the study of international law, likewise described as ‘chaos’​[31]​, a consideration of the broader factors that influence the implementation and development of the law (universalism) and an analysis of the precise doctrines of law (textualism) are important to any analysis.  In Byers’s words, international law is not simply a set of prescribed rules; it is ‘the collective notions of States based on their consensus of what is legally relevant’​[32]​. It is thus important to interpret accountability in relation to practice, juridical recognition and doctrinal expression.

3.1.3	Support for a Foucauldian Approach to Studying State Accountability
In Foucault’s thesis on the decentralised spread of power​[33]​ he championed the interpretive framework, viewing analysis as a consideration of any factor that is relevant to a particular context regardless of rationality​[34]​.  In order to argue, as Foucault did, that power was not embedded in structure or hierarchy but was ‘a dynamic or network of non-centralised forces’​[35]​ associated with knowledge, it was necessary for Foucault’s own methodology to eschew analysis as a pure science or analysis undertaken in disciplinary isolation.

Accordingly, Foucault’s work has interdisciplinary application.  Taking international law as an example will illustrate both the point being made and why this author chooses to adopt a Foucauldian methodology.  Any study of the development and implementation of international law cannot escape, and is bound to focus on, the role of the State.  Foucault was of the opinion, however, that the State should not be seen as central to such analysis, but should instead be viewed as ‘part of a matrix of power assertions that allows for the incorporation of a variety of actors and their contributions to the development of international law’​[36]​.

Foucault’s view that the State is only one factor influencing the development of international law​[37]​ (or its declaratory quality) certainly applies to this thesis, and applies equally in the context of implementation (or the functional quality of international law).  In light of the question: whether State accountability is developing lex lata, this thesis will need to consider whether practice is in strict accordance with established legal doctrine or whether other factors are influencing normative development.  Adopting a Foucauldian methodology means that practice and theory are equally relevant.  Where accountability is conceptualised as an interpretive framework, all positions are relevant and the concept’s indeterminacy is dealt with, in Koskenniemi’s words, through the language that is international law​[38]​.  

3.1.4	Constructing the Interpretive Framework
Chapter One breaks down State accountability to define the constituent elements – the State and accountability - before the concept is built back up in Chapter Two. 

In defining the State, the complex façade that surrounds it and creates difficulties in identifying the State as the entity to be held accountable can be broken down.  In assessing the question of State accountability, it is not enough to define the State in terms of ‘apparatus alone’​[39]​, which would reduce accountability to an automatic response because there had been a breach by those organs said to comprise the State.  Instead the State must be seen as a ‘mechanism of power’​[40]​ which when abused can lead to the State, rather than its organs, having breached the law.  This is the key to understanding why, at a conceptual level, the liability (and thus accountability) of the State is separate to the liability (and thus accountability) of the State’s individual organs, even if the two overlap at a practical level.

A similar approach will be taken to understand accountability, not in terms of a strict legal definition, but in referring to a range of legal and quasi-legal standards.  For example, any relationship between accountability and impunity, and the overlap with responsibility, will be explored.  In addition to comparing definitions, there will be a comparison with the interpretation of accountability in other disciplines to determine whether there is any consensus as to what the literal term means.  Thus, accountability is not to be understood in a strict definitional sense, but in terms of the similarities and differences to other forms of answerability.

Conceiving of accountability as an interpretive framework does not mean that accountability cannot also be seen as an evaluative standard. In fact this additional step is necessary in Chapter Two where State accountability is discussed as a conceptual whole.  The research questions state that this thesis will consider the future normative development of accountability.  In other words, whether there is a practice of accountability that ‘reflects accepted social behaviour and that brings to the fore a social obligation and normative objectivity’​[41]​.  The interpretive framework will be used to identify the social behaviour, or practice of accountability but in order to determine whether there is a norm of accountability, there needs to be some form of evaluative, ‘objective’ standard.  A ‘tentative set of [accountability] criteria’​[42]​ will be attempted here, to provide a threshold against which the evidence of an emerging norm may be measured.

The word ‘tentative’ is used consciously because, in keeping with Foucault’s philosophy, the attempt to develop objective criteria will not be able to escape subjective influences​[43]​.  Objective criteria are based on widely held subjective opinions and the very interpretation of objective criteria requires the subjective perspective of the interpreting party.  For example, the very notion of customary international law is extracted from a consensus of State opinion and practice, but how the law is then implemented depends on the interpretation of the State.  With these points in mind, the approach that will be taken in determining objective criteria is that State consensus is the determinative, rather than authoritative, factor.

In order to develop a set of ‘tentative’ evaluative criteria to answer the question ‘was the State held accountable?’, Chapter Two includes an overview of State practice with the aim of identifying any consensus that can be used to establish a measurable threshold for evaluating accountability throughout this thesis.  This also has its risks because consistency in practice does not necessarily equate to consensus.  For example, a trend whereby larger States seek accountability cannot be taken to mean that accountability must always be sought on such terms, or that the methods used by larger States are determinative.  Therefore, to mitigate the risk in solely relying on practice, there will also be an overview of how accountability is dealt with at a doctrinal level under international law.  It is at that point that the question of whether there is an express legal obligation to seek accountability will be considered.

The main point in Chapters One and Two is that as great a degree of specificity as possible is required in conceptualising accountability in this thesis, given that it is not considered to be either an established principle or a legal standard.  The interpretive framework forms the basis of the subsequent analysis of relevant practice and juridical support, while the evaluative criteria allow ‘tentative’ conclusions to be drawn about the future normative standing of the State accountability concept.

3.2	The Relationship Between State Accountability and Established Principles of International Law
The purpose of Chapter Three is to determine how conceptual State accountability relates to established principles of international law that are also relevant in the context of seeking accountability, namely, the doctrines of immunity and criminal accountability.  In addition, Chapter Three will explore the debate surrounding jus cogens to determine the status of these norms under international law and as a link between conceptual State accountability and established legal doctrine.

The Chapter seeks to determine if and how the need to ensure that States are held accountable has influenced the current framework for responding when States breach international law.  To the extent that there are developments, then an argument starts to emerge that State accountability is, at a minimum, lex feranda.  But any conclusions must be treated with caution because, at this stage of the thesis, the treatment of accountability is generic to all breaches of international law.  In order to determine whether any developments in immunity and criminal accountability are because the breach was jus cogens will require greater insight into exactly what jus cogens are.

The focus on jus cogens breaches excludes breaches of standard norms of international law from the discussion.  However, it is not enough to simply state that a norm is jus cogens, given that there may be a reciprocal distinction in the nature of accountability that is due to the inherent characteristics of jus cogens.  This has yet to be tested, but, in anticipation of such an eventuality, greater clarity is needed as to why jus cogens are different from other norms in order to understand why, in turn, accountability is not necessarily a single standard of answerability.

A preliminary finding, and the main point in Chapter Three, is that the need to hold States accountable for breaching jus cogens norms has influenced established doctrines of international law that also relate to accountability.  The analysis shifts to consider whether the influence of accountability has translated to juridical feasibility, or a sustained practice.

3.3	Applying the Interpretive Framework
Having constructed an interpretive framework in Chapters One and Two, and considered the relationships between State accountability and other principles of international law in Chapter Three, the third methodological step is to apply the interpretive framework to determine juridical support and State practice for the concept. Fundamental to this analysis is the interpretation and implementation of law and policy that can be associated with accountability, in a broader sense of the word, before political bodies (such as the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council) and other organs and juridical bodies whose function is to identify and apply international law (such as the ICJ and the European Court of Human Rights). 

Chapter Four will determine whether there is any overlap between the concept of State accountability formulated in this thesis and State responsibility as an established principle of international law.  It is pertinent to identify whether the process or outcome in codifying the doctrine in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility​[44]​ was influenced by what the first three Chapters identify as characteristics of State accountability.  To the extent that there is an overlap or evidence of influence between State responsibility and conceptual State accountability then there is a legal basis to argue that a principle of State accountability is viable: that it is lex feranda.

Chapter Five then assesses whether there is an informal practice of accountability by measuring the current responses when States breach international law against the evaluative criteria established in Chapter Two.  Where State accountability is shown to occur in practice, then it reinforces the argument that the concept may shift to lex lata.

The reference to State practice includes not only conduct, but statements and other expressions of opinion.  The belief of States is not given the same interpretive weight as action, which is the case with international law interpretation generally, for example in the context of treaty interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  Yet, where a concept, like accountability, is nebulous then there will not be a body of consistent practice from which to make judgments; any claims of normative consolidation are likely to be based on conjecture.  By adopting the precedent set in international courts​[45]​, and referring to as great a variety of sources as possible, the findings can at least be more informed, if not determinative.

Due to the complex and highly theoretical approach of this thesis, there is a heavy reliance upon practical and hypothetical examples.  Isolated examples cannot provide comprehensive insight nor assist in reaching definitive conclusions, but they do assist in illustrating the arguments and explaining the relationship between State accountability as a concept and how it is treated within international jurisprudence.  Furthermore, the use of isolated examples throughout the analysis is justified because the observations, which will also be supported by more in-depth case studies in the final section, ultimately illustrate that if accountability is emerging as a norm of international law, then it is in a sporadic fashion.

To give an example, the formalising of humanitarian protections in the Hague and Geneva Conventions may be interpreted as a development in State accountability, as States are required to satisfy legal obligations for the protection of certain rights of individuals.  Despite the potential normative achievement of these Conventions, the inconsistencies in upholding the protections and seeking redress as a result show that the isolated potential of one such development is not enough.  The evidence that is sought of normative development will therefore be cumulative and representative, rather than comprehensive.

3.3.1	Juridical Support for State Accountability in the State Responsibility Doctrine
In this thesis, State accountability is not treated as either a legal doctrine or an established non-legal standard.  Rather than arguing that a principle of State accountability exists, the focus is on determining if a practice of State accountability occurs, which may then crystallise as a norm in the future.  Before considering any informal responses, Chapter Four looks to the formal framework that already exists for the purposes of holding States accountable under international law, the doctrine of State responsibility.

In contrast to the speculative conceptualisation of State accountability in this thesis, the State responsibility doctrine is the product of interpretation over many decades by international and domestic courts, codification by the International Law Commission, contemplation by jurists and implementation in a range of legal contexts, from international human rights to trade law. It is submitted that, as it stands, there are limitations on and characteristics of the doctrine that mean a finding of State responsibility does not necessarily mean the State is held accountable.  In order to justify this argument, Chapter Four will consider both the extent to which the doctrine can be viewed as giving support to a concept of State accountability and what restrictions exist that prevent a finding of State responsibility being interpreted as holding the State to account.

Clarification is required as to what the term ‘juridical support’ means in this thesis.  Synonyms include ‘juridical feasibility’​[46]​ and ‘legal viability’. All three expressions seek to convey that evidence exists where international law either expressly acknowledges, permits by implication, or is evolving in such a way as to accommodate the concept in question.  For example, in Chapter Four it will be argued that the traditional scope of the State responsibility doctrine, which was concerned with bilateral obligations, has been expanded upon to include erga omnes obligations.  This in turn can be viewed as international law facilitating a broader approach to seeking redress from States.

The main point to be covered in Chapter Four is that the established doctrine of State responsibility may seek to hold States accountable; however significant limitations mean that this will not always happen, especially when the breach is of a jus cogens norm.

3.3.2	State Accountability in Practice
Chapters Three and Four employ the interpretive framework constructed in Chapters One and Two, but also remain true to traditional studies of international law by taking into account the doctrinal context.  Chapter Five can be said to truly reflect the Foucauldian flavour of the methodology used here because the issues identified throughout the thesis as hindering accountability will be discussed with regard to how redress is sought in practice.  This might include legally mandated responses, (such as invoking the State responsibility doctrine), but it may also include high profile criticism by an NGO (such as Amnesty International) who cannot directly bring a claim before an international court.

Given that the analysis has to take into account not only legal but historical, political and, sometimes, sociological perspectives, the case studies that comprise the final section of the thesis draw widely on non-legal sources.  The case studies will be used to illustrate how the complexities in holding States accountable, which hinder any normative development, are (or are not) dealt with in practice.  The issues include what would be an appropriate response, which party should implement that response, and who decides that there has been a breach in the first place.  Two priorities have guided the choice of case studies.

To the extent that this is possible, both high profile and less well-known case studies are included.  With ‘high-profile’ case studies the threshold is breaches of international law that are known at a global level.  Whereas case studies of ‘less well-known’ breaches, readily identifiable in the particular geographic or temporal context in which the breach occurred, have a lower global profile.

The second priority was to include case studies where the response to the breach typically would not be seen as seeking redress from the State, as when a claim is brought before the ICJ.  An atypical response may be the restrictions imposed on Japan in relation to military capacity following the Second World War​[47]​. An example of an arguably indirect response, is the implied criticism of China without apportioning blame; the UN General Assembly has issued a series of Resolutions condemning the ongoing ‘violation of the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people’ due to ‘events’ and ‘practices’​[48]​.

Being guided by these two priorities compensates for the impossibility of giving a breadth of coverage within the confines of this work, instead providing a depth of analysis and a representation of practice.  With that in mind, the selected case studies are: the Armenian massacres starting in 1915 that have been ex post facto claimed by some States and scholars to have amounted to genocide as it was subsequently defined; the allegations of crimes against humanity throughout the Soviet regime, including the Holodomor famine in 1932; apartheid in South Africa and a comparison of the responses to acts of aggression by North Korea when it invaded the Republic of Korea in 1950, Israeli air strikes on nuclear installations in Iraq in 1981 and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

To address the research questions, the case studies are looking for evidence that both the response per se and the specific form of redress reflect the objective of holding the State, in a particular context, accountable.  In addition, the analysis will consider whether the choice of response was influenced by the fact the breach was of a jus cogens norm.
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Holding States accountable for breaching international law is a difficult issue as it relates to the complicated relationship that exists between the power of States and the authority of international law.  In seeking accountability, the State is usually treated as a manifestation of its organs and forms of collective liability are relied upon. These include criminal organisation theory​[49]​ and the State responsibility doctrine​[50]​, which uses the principle of attribution to establish the State’s liability.  Yet the State is seldom identified as an autonomous entity in terms of the State’s own acts and omissions that led to a breach of international law, and in terms of accountability for those own acts and omissions.

The spread of transitional justice mechanisms and the development of international criminal law suggest that the model for seeking accountability has shifted away from collective liability​[51]​ to redress based on active contribution rather than mere association​[52]​.  Accordingly, while the focus after the First World War was on punishing the German people as a whole for their collective liability​[53]​, the focus shifted after World War Two to individual criminal liability, with both the Nuremberg Trials and the trials under Control Council Law Number 10​[54]​.

There has not been a similar degree of progress in public international law in relation to seeking accountability from the State, as a separate entity.  Instead, diplomacy and the closely linked doctrine of State responsibility remain the principal mechanisms for seeking redress from the State.  There have, however, been developments in international law generally which mean the issue of separate State accountability remains live.  In particular, there is said to be a body of jus cogens norms that are recognised as being in the interests of the international community as a whole​[55]​ and not just States.  Thus, because the international community as a whole is potentially affected when these norms are breached, the international community as a whole must have a direct interest in accountability when jus cogens norms are breached.  To the extent that diplomacy and the doctrine of State responsibility cannot satisfy any interest held by the international community as a whole, then the question of how to hold States accountable continues.

In order to identify any developments in international law that may have been inspired by the interest that the international community as a whole has in holding States accountable for breaching jus cogens norms, the term ‘accountability’ must first be understood.  From the outset, it is stated that accountability is not identified for the purposes of this thesis as an established legal or non-legal principle; indeed, the very indeterminacy of accountability would make such a claim unsustainable.  Instead, accountability will be conceptualised here as both an interpretive framework and an evaluative standard for analysis.  Once the framework is established and the standard for analysis set, the juridical and practical implementation and interpretation of accountability can be considered, and contrasted with how the concept is constructed here.

Chapter One breaks the concept of State accountability down to its constituent elements and discusses each in turn.  ‘Accountability’ is examined from the perspective of whether it is legal, political, moral or a combination of all three, whether there is any difference to responsibility or other synonyms for answerability, whether accountability would prevent impunity and how accountability is more broadly conceived in international relations.    The ‘State’ is considered from the perspective of how it may be distinguished as a separate entity to the various organs or representatives of the State, to then focus on its accountability, vis-à-vis the accountability of other parties who may play a role in the breach​[56]​.

2.	‘ACCOUNTABILITY’
2.1	The Approach to Interpreting ‘Accountability’
The issue of holding parties in power to account, when that power is abused, is of contemporary relevance beyond the context of State accountability.  Corporate accountability is topical in the context of the current financial recession, and as seen with the Enron Scandal in 2001 that involved allegations of accounting fraud and led to the collapse of the professional services firm Arthur Andersen that had been responsible for auditing the Enron Corporation​[57]​.  Environmental accountability is a key agenda item in many domestic and global political forums, as seen with the compliance mechanism for the Kyoto Protocol which is comprised of a Compliance Committee represented by 10 Member States that determine the consequences when States fail to satisfy their responsibilities under the Protocol​[58]​.  Furthermore, an epoch in individual accountability dating from before the Nuremberg trials has meant that national leaders are no longer able to hide behind political institutions.  This can be seen with the 2009 expenses scandal requiring British MPs to resign or repay overpaid expenses claims.  Likewise, heads of State increasingly find that they can not hide behind the government amid public scandal, as with former US President Richard Nixon who ultimately resigned his presidency, or find they cannot exercise immunity, as with former Presidents Milosevic of Serbia and Charles Taylor of Liberia who were both indicted before international courts.

However, it is ‘premature to speak of a revolution in favour of accountability’​[59]​ under international law, when the term is indeterminate.  Without some agreement as to meaning, accountability has the potential to traverse a number of related, but distinct, forms of answerability.  For example, the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is certainly a development in terms of individual criminal accountability, but this development has little relevance in arguing that there is an emerging norm of State accountability unless accountability has the same meaning regardless of whether the object is an individual criminal or State.

Thus, a study of accountability, in relation to States and in the broader framework of international law, is topical because it has parallels with the increasing cross-disciplinary emphasis placed on accountability.  An initial study of accountability is necessary in this thesis because it will help to clarify what accountability means, specifically in the context of public international law and then in conceptualising State accountability.

In order to understand the current and, it will be argued, evolving relationship between accountability and international law, it is first necessary to understand what accountability means, and whether accountability is a constant or a discipline-specific phenomenon.  On the one hand, international law may be described in terms of having certain entrenched normative characteristics, such as State sovereignty; while on the other hand, international law is dynamic and redefines itself as it interacts, influences and is influenced by disciplines, such as politics​[60]​.  It can be said that international law is both independent and co-dependent with respect to international relations.  Thus, it is rational to anticipate that the way that accountability is conceived in the framework of international law could be as a discrete concept and as a concept that draws on related disciplines.

To the extent that accountability is shown to be discipline-specific, then this study can analyse accountability as the term is conceptualised and implemented in State practice and juridical forums such as the international courts, to identify whether State accountability is an established or emerging international legal principle.  To the extent that accountability is understood in a cross-disciplinary sense, even though it applies in the context of international law, then the focus shifts.  The question then becomes whether accountability is a constant objective, which applies when States breach international law, individuals contravene corporate governance rules or organisations infringe industry environmental standards.

Without understanding what accountability is there cannot be a determination of the current normative standing of State accountability.  It is not enough to draw a conclusion based on points of compatibility between conceptual accountability and established principles of international law; for example by arguing that holding States accountable strengthens rather than undermines the principle of sovereignty, although this point will be made in the thesis.  Furthermore, it is unlikely that the way that accountability is understood, in relation to international law, can be gleaned solely from the ad hoc interpretation given by States or political bodies, like the UN organs, although both are relevant.

Instead, the approach taken in this Chapter in establishing an interpretive framework for the subsequent analysis of State accountability is to see how accountability is perceived in a variety of contexts.  Firstly, a linguistic interpretation will be given to consider what accountability means from an etymological perspective.  Part of this discussion will include consideration of how relevant cultural perspectives are influential and whether accountability is universally understood or if Western conceptions of answerability predominate.  A comparative view with responsibility will also be undertaken, given that the terms are used interchangeably in international law.

Secondly, the relationship between accountability and impunity will be explored. Specifically it will be determined whether calls to end impunity for breaches of international law, such as those by the Commission on Human Rights as part of the Vienna Programme for Action​[61]​, have the same meaning as a call to hold all culpable parties accountable.  If accountability and impunity are shown to be each other’s opposite then, to the extent that combating impunity is either lex feranda or lex lata, then so is accountability.

Finally, the way that accountability is interpreted in the context of international relations is examined.  The human rights context is appropriate as although it cannot be said that there is sufficient State recognition to conclude that these norms are recognised as jus cogens​[62]​, there is an overlap because human rights also relate to the interests of more than just States.  Regard to how accountability is interpreted in international trade law, as another framework that States participate in, also applies.  Given that established international law draws from disciplines as diverse as sociology and politics​[63]​ it is just as rational that emerging principles of international law, would also be multi-disciplinary in origin.

The discussion of accountability in this section is from the perspective of its application to all parties that breach international law, although an emphasis is given to States where possible.  And it is also clarified that it is accountability, rather than State accountability, that is being discussed at this stage.

2.2	Linguistic Interpretation
There is no universally agreed definition of either the word accountability or accountability as a legal expression, on which to base an interpretive framework that will allow accountability as an analytical concept to be assessed​[64]​.

2.2.1	The Influence of Western Perspectives
Lister notes that the word ‘accountability’ is not easily translated into many languages​[65]​, which links the etymology of accountability with the constructs and traditions of justice in Anglophone, usually Western, countries.  Western associations with accountability are said to emphasise ‘individualistic values and the emotional state of guilt’​[66]​, rather than collective fault that is seen for example in Asian and African cultures​[67]​.  The potential for a clash of cultural perspectives, as relates to any normative development of accountability in the context of international law, is therefore apparent​[68]​.

‘Democratic government, corporate governance, and social order’ are key organizational mechanisms in Western society and are all underpinned by the belief that parties ‘who exercise the power of government or corporate office have to be publicly accountable for their actions’​[69]​.  Thus, in the democratic model, the right to seek accountability from parties that abuse power is conditional on the right being granted, rather than assumed.  If a Western construct of accountability were to be effective in the context of international relations, then it is assumed that the power structure underlying international relations would also need to embrace a democratic model.  In particular the right to seek accountability from States would have to be granted by States and could not be assumed, for example, if a State chose to act unilaterally.

It can be seen that international relations do draw on a democratic model, as illustrated by the United Nations (UN) that adopts a representative framework and emphasises the promotion of democracy in its work (despite the word democracy never appearing in the UN Charter).  Thus, adopting a Western construct of accountability is appropriate in light of the organisational structure of international relations.  In turn, a Western construct would also overcome the influence of cultural relativity when interpreting the notion of accountability.

This is not to say that cultural relativism is not relevant to the study of accountability under international law or that cultural relativism in any way inhibits the study of international law.  Indeed, the meaning of human rights differs widely between States​[70]​, but this does not mean that States are not committed to some form of human rights system and this commitment is evident in the adoption of instruments like the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.  Instead, a Western interpretation (or indeed a non-Western interpretation if it was more compatible with the structure of international relations) of accountability can provide a baseline for studying accountability, even if only to determine that in practice accountability is understood in a completely different way.  On that basis the first point is that accountability is a means of regulating power.

2.2.2	A Consensus in Definition?
There is no universal consensus as to what accountability specifically means in the context of international relations, but as with human rights there is affirmation of accountability at a broader, conceptual level.  Non-Western States are party to the 1998 Rome Statute of the ICC, which is a commitment to holding individual’s accountable for international crimes; are party to instruments such as the 1973 Apartheid Convention​[71]​, which criminalises racial discrimination that constitutes apartheid to thus imply that there must be a suitable response when the Convention is breached; and are party to establishing accountability processes in their own communities that meet with international standards, as with Cambodia and Sierra Leone that established courts to deal with breaches of the law recognised as international crimes​[72]​.  Given that there is a generalised agreement amongst States that certain breaches of the law warrant consideration beyond the domestic framework, it seems likely that some form of consensus could be identified as to what accountability means in relation to those breaches.

The word accountability requires a party to answer for its actions, which in the context of legal accountability would be an account for breaching the law.  Put another way, where a party is determined to be liable it must provide redress, which rationally will be to the party with the right to seek redress​[73]​.  In terms of holding individuals criminally accountable, redress is linked to punishment, and the party with the right and power to impose punishment is the State.  But redress may in fact take many forms, as seen with the increasing number of transitional justice mechanisms that eschew any form of punishment, because in those cases the objective is justice, rather than accountability​[74]​; which confirms that accountability and justice are discrete objectives.

The investigation of UN staff over allegations of abuse is one example of how individual accountability is comprised of a determination of liability followed by punishment as a form of redress.  Resolution 62/63​[75]​ demanded due process in the investigations but once it was established that the abuse had occurred, the General Assembly considered that the individuals in question could not be ‘exempt from the consequences of [their] criminal acts’​[76]​.  Resolution 62/63 illustrates that what is required in terms of accountability is both a determination of liability and redress based on liability; or in Keohane’s words ‘information and sanctions’​[77]​.

The above example leads this discussion to the idea that accountability is also viewed as ‘relational’​[78]​, that is that the ‘information and sanctions’ (determination of liability and redress) are context specific.  Approaching accountability as a context specific determination of liability and redress means that the interpretation applies regardless of whether the perpetrator was an individual, State or other party​[79]​, accommodates Western and non-Western perspectives of what is required to hold a party accountable, the nature of accountability may be legal, political or moral and the approach is suitable for business, social, and international relations​[80]​.

2.2.3	The Difference Between Accountability and Responsibility
In the context of international relations between States, the word accountability is used interchangeably with responsibility, although responsibility also has a distinct meaning under the doctrine of State responsibility.  Analysis will show that there is both a semantic and substantive difference between the two, which will in turn provide greater clarity about the meaning of accountability.  As accountability is a broader category of answerability that includes responsibility, so it will be argued in this thesis that State accountability is a broader concept than State responsibility, and the latter may be used for seeking the former.

The Merriam-Webster (non-legal) dictionary defines accountability as ‘an obligation or willingness to accept responsibility or to account for one’s actions’.  In contrast, responsibility is defined as ‘being the cause or explanation; able to answer for one’s conduct or obligations’​[81]​.  Thus, while responsibility seeks to determine liability, accountability requires a further step to be taken.  In other words, accountability does not just seek to identify the responsible party; accountability seeks to make the responsible party, responsible​[82]​. Accountability not only seeks to determine liability, it also requires that the breaching party account for its actions.  It is apparent that accountability will ‘ensure the discharge of responsibility’​[83]​ but the reverse does not necessarily apply.

The idea that accountability is a step beyond responsibility is likewise seen in legal dictionary definitions.  For example, the Merriam-Webster Legal Dictionary defines accountability as the breaching party being ‘obliged to accept responsibility’​[84]​, which implies that a determination of liability is not enough; the breaching party has to accept that determination.  Bassiouni likewise highlighted the relationship between the two notions to define accountability as an ‘acknowledgment of responsibility’​[85]​.

The associations that each term has in the context of international relations are different, and illustrate the utility of adopting the term accountability rather than responsibility in this thesis.  For example, in the context of the State responsibility doctrine responsibility is associated with reparation for the breach of an obligation owed between States.  It is not just States that are bound to the ‘principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation’​[86]​ but this assumption is easy to make because the word responsibility is used in relation to the principle of State responsibility.

In contrast, accountability is associated with the rule of law that is universal​[87]​, and which includes obligations owed between States, but also norms and principles that bind more than just States.  This was the view of the UN General Assembly in defining the rule of law as requiring that all parties ‘including the State’ (but not limited to) are ‘accountable to the law’​[88]​.  Even in associative, rather than definitional, terms, accountability is broader than responsibility.

The distinction between responsibility and accountability is also seen in relation to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which is to decide on matters of State responsibility rather than breaches of international law generally.  In 2007, the ICJ entered judgment in the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide​[89]​ (the Genocide Convention Case), which concerned State responsibility for alleged breaches of obligations owed under the 1948 Genocide Convention.  Ultimately Serbia was found responsible for breaching Articles 4 and 5 of the Convention​[90]​, while closer analysis shows that finding Serbia responsible was different to holding Serbia accountable.

2.2.3.1	Distinguishing Between Accountability and Responsibility in the Genocide Convention Case
It is trite to say that Serbia was not held accountable as even the Court notes that its jurisdiction is restricted to findings of responsibility, and relies on the referral of a dispute​[91]​ so that jurisdiction is conditional on and limited by the terms of that consent​[92]​.  Prima facie, there is the risk that States will refuse consent to avoid any judgment by the Court.  If the Court was granted the right or power to determine accountability it would be nonsensical that States could then choose whether or not jurisdiction was to be exercised.  This, in turn, implies that the Court’s function is not to seek accountability, although accountability as an unintended consequence in finding the State responsible is not discounted.

Furthermore, the Court itself highlighted that applying the State responsibility doctrine may leave a gap in answerability, when it noted that the Genocide Convention contemplates other sources of international protection ‘at the political level rather than as a matter of legal responsibility’​[93]​.  There was nothing to indicate that the gap alluded to by the Court was considered to specifically be a gap in accountability.  What this statement does explicitly establish however is that the form of answerability need not be legal, even though the breach in question related to the prohibition on genocide.  This recalls the earlier finding that accountability is viewed as ‘relational’​[94]​ in the context of international relations.

A final point in the discussion of the Genocide Convention Case, at this time, does not show the difference between responsibility and accountability so much as it raises an issue that pertains to both.  In this case, the Court’s jurisdiction rationae materiae was clearly to determine responsibility for breaches of the obligations owed under the Genocide Convention.  Yet until the Court was able to identify the Respondent State, this was not possible.

The proceedings were instituted by Bosnia and Herzegovina against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which at that time constituted the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro and since the independence of Montenegro in 2006​[95]​ is now the Republic of Serbia.  After communication with all three States​[96]​, being Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, the Court continued proceedings with Serbia identified as the Respondent.

Bosnia and Herzegovina agreed that the international community had recognised that Serbia was the continuing State of the Former Yugoslavia but argued that both Serbia and Montenegro were liable as a matter of State responsibility​[97]​.  When the Court considered the issue it noted that Serbia had ‘accepted “continuity between Serbia and Montenegro and the Republic of Serbia” and… responsibility for “its commitments deriving from international treaties concluded by Serbia and Montenegro”…including the Genocide Convention’​[98]​.  Unlike Serbia, the Republic of Montenegro did not continue the ‘legal personality of Serbia and Montenegro’​[99]​ and the Court concluded that while any breach was by Yugoslavia comprising both Serbia and Montenegro, only Serbia as the continuing State could be held responsible​[100]​.  The point made here is that in terms of the answerability of States for breaching international law, whether in terms of responsibility or accountability, there is an issue of determining who or what the State is​[101]​.

The Genocide Convention Case highlights the disparate use of responsibility and accountability in the context of the State responsibility doctrine, which, in addition to the semantic difference noted earlier, justifies the approach that is taken in this thesis to treat the two separately.  There will be ongoing discussion of the Case and the doctrine, but this initial coverage raises some of the issues that will have to be considered subsequently, in terms of holding States accountable.  

Interpreting accountability from a linguistic perspective has shown that the origins of accountability lie in Western constructs of the concept as a mechanism for regulating power.  Accountability is part of a broader category of answerability, but in addition to determining that a party caused or was liable for the breach, something more is required.  What that something more is will depend upon the particular context because there must be some form of redress or account for the particular infringement.  In other words, accountability is both a finding of responsibility and recognition of that fact.  The discussion now turns to consider whether the result of failing to ensure accountability can be described as impunity.

2.3	The Relationship Between Accountability and Impunity
Calls to end the impunity of individuals certainly have influenced international law, as can be seen with the development of international criminal law, and the Preamble of the Rome Statute that states the parties to the Statute are ‘determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of crimes’​[102]​.  Likewise, the need to prevent State impunity has been noted in international relations.  For example, former UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar argued that ‘the principle of non-intervention could not be used as a protective barrier’ by States if it meant that human rights violations were ‘perpetrated with impunity’​[103]​.  Whether the desire to end impunity has proven influential in terms of the normative evolution of State accountability is not as clear cut as it is with individual accountability.

The ‘Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity’​[104]​, which were adopted under Resolution 2003/72 by the Commission on Human Rights, is a useful reference because the document is part of a wider discussion seeking an end to human rights abuses by States.  Although non-binding, the Principles were drafted as part of the Vienna Programme for Action, which in turn was the outcome of the World Conference on Human Rights that involved participants from over 171 countries and 8,000 NGOs, and therefore is representative of the opinion of the broader international community​[105]​.

These Principles define impunity as the failure to provide ‘appropriate penalties’​[106]​, which are described in the First Principle as ‘effective remedies’ for the victim or the party that is affected by the breach in question​[107]​.  There is thus the link with accountability because the Principles link the prevention of impunity with redress, rather than just determining liability.  There is a second association because the Principles also envisage that redress will be determined contextually rather than according to an inflexible doctrinal precedent​[108]​.

The wording used by the Special Rapporteur Louis Joinet, preceding the Principles in his report on ‘The Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations’​[109]​, likewise suggests a link between how impunity is understood at the international level and the interpretations of accountability covered here.  The Special Rapporteur considered that ‘appropriate penalties’ includes a variety of responses including reparations​[110]​, disarming paramilitary groups​[111]​ and ‘measures repealing emergency provisions, legislative or otherwise, which are conducive to violations’​[112]​.  The extent to which any of these measures are penal in nature is arguable so that, once again, the particular circumstances of the breach are relevant in determining the nature of the redress.  Preventing impunity is less about punishing the violator as it is about ensuring there is an appropriate response to the breach, thus establishing a link  to accountability​[113]​.

The argument here that there is a link between accountability and impunity is not taken up in academic isolation.  Some commentators can even be described as vehement in their claim, such as Bassiouni who described accountability as the ‘antithesis of impunity’​[114]​, and Cohen who stated that impunity ‘was conceived as the opposite’ to accountability​[115]​.  Furthermore, when impunity is considered in the context of international relations, the same parallels between accountability and impunity emerge.  For example, scholars cite the 1915 Armenian massacres as an example of State impunity​[116]​ because, even though other States label the violence as genocide​[117]​ (a quasi determination of liability), there has never been any form of redress.  Indeed, it cannot even be said that a penalty can be inferred because other States condemn the violence as genocide, given that there is no consensus amongst States and due to the fact that the Turkish Government has never officially acknowledged that the massacres in 1915 amounted to genocide.

More recently, the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe is also described in terms of State impunity​[118]​, despite acknowledgement by UN bodies that breaches of international law occurred.  In 2008, the World Health Organisation and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs noted the failure of the Government to respect ‘civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights’​[119]​.  At the same time the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, Anand Grover, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, and the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, Margaret Sekkagya collectively brought to the attention of UN Members the closure of public hospitals, the failure to provide infrastructure for the distribution of health care, the lack of clean water supply, hyperinflation that meant people did not have money to buy food, the unjustified use of force and civil rights abuses​[120]​.  And, other allegations included breaches of Articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 and Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights​[121]​.

In response, and having noted the ‘failure of the leadership in Zimbabwe to address the political, economic, human rights and humanitarian crisis’​[122]​, certain members of the Security Council sought to introduce a resolution to condemn Zimbabwe’s actions, but this was blocked by South Africa​[123]​.  Sanctions were imposed by the USA and the European Union (EU), but these were directed at the Mugabe Government rather than the State generally​[124]​, while sporting sanctions imposed by States, such as Australia, primarily affected Zimbabwe’s individual citizens​[125]​.

The lack of response expressly directed toward the State, despite acknowledgment by members of the international community of the breaches occurring, suggests Zimbabwe’s impunity.  But closer consideration is required because without a clearer understanding of who or what Zimbabwe is, for accountability/impunity purposes, it is difficult to determine whether redress was in fact sought from Zimbabwe.  In which case, it may not be accurate to state that Zimbabwe has escaped with impunity due to the lack of effective penalties available.  Instead, it might be more appropriate to say that Zimbabwe has not been held accountable, due to the inability to determine who the liable party was.

While there may not have been any redress sought specifically from Zimbabwe for breaching international law, widespread sanctions were imposed against individual government ministers and certain individuals in positions of authority​[126]​.  For example, in 2009 sanctions were expanded by the EU​[127]​ to target Robert Mugabe, as the head of State, and his associates​[128]​.  A list of these individuals, their position and the reason for the sanctions was provided by the EU.  For example, the individual Al Shanfari had ‘ties to the Government and [was] implicated in activities that seriously undermine democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law’, while sanctions were also imposed against the present and former Police Commissioner and Minister for Industry and International Trade.

Two points must be made.  Firstly, and in relation to accountability, it is problematic to argue that accountability is not being sought from the State when sanctions are imposed on every individual that comprises the regime that is liable for the breaches in question (if that was in fact the case here).  Secondly, and in relation to impunity, if ‘appropriate penalties’ are available but cannot be imposed (as when the State cannot be distinguished from its organs) the outcome is not one of impunity – it is a gap in accountability.

The conceptual difficulty in deciding where the liability of the State’s organs ends and the liability of the State begins is clearly an issue that must be overcome in order to prevent impunity and seek accountability.

It has been shown that in the opinion of States, scholars and various UN bodies, there is a link between accountability and impunity and that the achievement of the former and the prevention of the latter requires more than just a determination of liability.  It cannot be said however that, in absolute terms, achieving accountability eradicates any trace of impunity or vice versa.  There may be issues in seeking accountability that are unrelated to the availability of effective redress.  Furthermore, if accountability is an amalgamation of responses then partial accountability is a possibility, which does not necessarily deal with the issue of impunity.  Finally, accountability may be political or quasi-legal while the nature of penalties that prevent a party escaping with impunity are legal; thus potentially there can be political accountability but still legal impunity (although it is acknowledged that this distinction is conceptual and not substantive in terms of how just the outcome is).  It is therefore more appropriate to describe the relationship in cautious terms at this stage, while continuing to determine whether a link with impunity is characteristic of how accountability is interpreted in other disciplines and in practice.

2.4	How is Accountability Interpreted in the Context of International Relations?
Before considering how accountability is interpreted in discrete disciplines, some comments will be made about accountability in the broader context of international relations.

Historically any response to a breach of international law (in terms of legal accountability) has been by States and so from the ‘top down’​[129]​; whether horizontally, between States, or vertically, when imposed by States.  Although the approach to legal accountability in international relations has traditionally been top down, the influence of Western constructs of accountability is still apparent.

It was noted earlier that in the Western, democratic accountability model the right to seek accountability from parties that abuse power is conditional on the right being granted, rather than assumed.   In the top down model of accountability in international relations, States certainly have the political power to impose legal accountability.  In addition, the right (or legal power) of States to seek legal accountability either hierarchically (States regulate the power of non-State actors) or horizontally (States regulate the power of other States) still derives from the law itself​[130]​.

The traditional reliance on a top down approach to legal accountability meant that some of the issues already identified here in seeking accountability from States, such as determining what the State is for accountability purposes, did not need to be considered.  Instead top down legal accountability primarily sought redress from those individuals ‘within the State’​[131]​ that were responsible for ensuring the State complied with the law or State responsibility was engaged by attributing the State with the acts of organs.  There was no consideration of whether the State could be liable irrespective of the acts and omissions of those organs.

Developments in international law, notably the increasing recognition of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations that are discussed in depth in Chapter Three, have encouraged a shift away from a top down imposition of legal accountability.  The broader interest in accountability implied pursuant to these concepts has required a greater range of mechanisms for seeking accountability.  Thus, accountability is increasingly interpreted, in the context of international relations, as being implemented from the ‘bottom up’​[132]​, as can be seen at the European Court of Human Rights where individuals have the right to bring claims against a State​[133]​.  It is submitted here that accountability from the bottom up is perceived as being not only legal, but also political and moral.

Brown Weiss describes State accountability from the bottom up as occurring when ‘individuals, NGOs and private entities are able to hold States accountable for their actions’​[134]​, which she links with a global trend seeking ‘to hold leaders accountable’​[135]​ and developments in trade and corporate responsibility​[136]​.  The principal difference between top down and bottom up accountability is that the power relationship is no longer described in terms of actual power, which had meant that States were able to hold individuals accountable but not vice versa.  Instead bottom up accountability views the maintenance of the law as being so crucial that the capability to seek accountability is extended beyond the most powerful party – there is de facto power for accountability purposes.  The stakeholder in accountability is the broader community affected by that law - whether it is the community of shareholders, voters or the international community as a whole – and accountability is just as likely to come from the bottom up, as it is the top down.

Even if practice shows that Brown Weiss is correct and that accountability is increasingly being sought from the bottom up, this is not a guarantee of progress in holding States accountable.  Indeed the greater the number of parties with an interest in accountability, the more burdensome the task could be, given the number of views that need to be taken into consideration.  If, as was discussed earlier, accountability is relational, then a variety of perspectives will be brought to bear on what is the appropriate response.  Furthermore, the issues that have already been noted in the specific context of State accountability, such as identifying the State as well as its specific breach, will likewise be more difficult to resolve.  And finally, there are certain practical limitations that are brought to bear in those situations where accountability is specifically legal in nature.

The difficulties in trying to accommodate a number of perspectives by interested parties in the process of seeking legal accountability emerge in practice.  International law has seen the emergence of a number of forums, such as the Inter–American Court of Human Rights that allow individuals to seek redress from States.  The reality is however that progress is somewhat limited in practical terms.  For example, as of 2007 the European Court of Human Rights was faced with more than 20,000 cases pending against Russia alone​[137]​.  This  illustrates that even where a specific forum exists theoretically to facilitate legal accountability, there is no guarantee that this will occur.

A second illustration of the difficulties in trying to accommodate a number of interested parties in seeking accountability can be seen in the 2008 application brought by Germany against Italy to the ICJ​[138]​.  The circumstances related to Italy’s attempts to enforce judgment against Germany in Italy’s courts and, it is argued here, can be seen as part of a broader attempt to hold Germany accountable, after accountability had been achieved.  Germany has applied for declarations that Italy violated its sovereign immunity firstly, by allowing individuals to bring civil claims against Germany, seeking compensation for damage caused during the First World War, and secondly, by attempting to enforce those claims​[139]​.  Both the claims for compensation and Italy’s assistance to those individuals were in response to Germany’s actions during the First World War but the Entente Powers had already responded to those same acts and omissions in 1919.

The issue in this case is whether the claims for compensation supported by Italy and the reparations and terms of the Versailles Treaty imposed by the Entente powers are in response to the same breach, in which case could there be a doubling up of accountability?  This in turn poses the question of whether a State is to be held accountable once, for the specific breach, or multiple times, because accountability is owed to every party with a stake in the relevant law.  Furthermore, is preference to be given to legal accountability (which is what an award of compensation would be) as opposed to a mix of legal, political and moral accountability as imposed by the Entente powers?

It is apparent that while there might be a trend toward bottom up accountability throughout international relations, the exact implications in terms of holding States accountable for breaching international law, need to be further understood.  In examining the interpretation and implementation of accountability in the field of human rights the questions are whether accountability is legal or a mix of political and legal responses, and if it is accurate to describe accountability as being from the bottom up.

2.4.1	Accountability as Interpreted in the Context of Human Rights
2.4.1.1	Approach to Interpreting Accountability in the Field of Human Rights
A large number of international conventions and treaties deal with human rights both as a body of rights, such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and individually, such as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.  Cumulatively, these instruments provide a comprehensive human rights code, yet there is no equivalent universal code that determines how parties that breach human rights are to be held accountable.

In assessing how accountability is interpreted in the context of human rights, two approaches will be taken.  First, there will be consideration of normative developments in the wider context of human rights protection, which are relevant to understanding what is meant by human rights accountability.  Second, a more focused consideration will be given to the interpretation of accountability by the organs that make up the UN Office for the High Commission of Human Rights and in the conventions and treaties referred to above.

2.4.1.2	Normative Developments in Human Rights Relevant to the Interpretation of Accountability
Like accountability, 'human rights' is an indeterminate term that is subject to cultural and disciplinary relativity, to name just two interpretive lenses that may be influential.  It is submitted that the lack of definition has not prevented several normative developments in the field of human rights that relate to, and can be used to ascertain the meaning of, accountability.

Certain human rights are recognised as so fundamental that a breach is deemed to be criminal, and accountability for that breach is likewise differentiated and dealt with under international criminal law.  Human rights crimes include torture, genocide and the arbitrary deprivation of life​[140]​.  Distinguishing between criminal and non-criminal breaches of human rights shows that human rights accountability can likewise be both criminal and non-criminal and that the form taken will depend on the content of the specific right.

The second development also relates to international criminal law, but from a procedural rather than substantive perspective.  The extradite or prosecute principle and extension of universal jurisdiction to all States are increasingly used as a means to ensure that individuals are held criminally accountable for international crimes on the basis that certain norms, including those arising from human rights, represent the interests of the international community as a whole.  This development illustrates that the stakeholder in human rights accountability may be both the direct victim, who can bring an independent claim for damages, and the international community as a whole, in which case criminal accountability is sought.

The third normative development is the proliferation of forums that seek human rights accountability in a variety of ways ranging from the legal, such as the European and Inter-American Human Rights Courts; to the quasi-legal, such as truth and reconciliation commissions including the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons established in Argentina in 1983​[141]​; to the political, such as the Universal Periodic Review mechanism for reviewing the fulfilment by UN Member States of their human rights obligations as introduced by the Human Rights Council in 2008​[142]​.  At the normative level, Ratner and Abrams argue that these forums illustrate an obligation to ensure accountability for human rights infringements, which will be pursued in more depth below​[143]​.  But in terms of providing insight for the interpretive purposes here, these forums illustrate that accountability is understood to be context specific, to require more than mere recognition of the breach and is not always legal in nature.

2.4.1.3	Human Rights Accountability
There are clear parallels between the three normative developments noted above and the discussion of accountability thus far, however these remarks have primarily focused on accountability for human rights that enjoy the widest recognition in international law, in the sense that most States recognise these human rights as fundamental and arguably even jus cogens.  This does not necessarily assist in further understanding of the broader concept of  accountability.  Accordingly, the discussion now turns to consider accountability as it is viewed in relation to the broader corpus of human rights, which does not benefit from the protection of international criminal law, and thus necessitates an alternative form of answerability.

Human rights are comprised of a significant body of norms, which makes a consensus in definition hard to achieve and is one of the reasons why the term ‘human rights’ is, also, indeterminate.  This discussion will focus on the interpretation given by the bodies that comprise the Office for the High Commission for Human Rights, as more broadly representative of the opinion of both States and experts, before turning to briefly consider how human rights accountability is interpreted under regional human rights instruments.

Through the oversight of the Office for the High Commission for Human Rights there have been two recent developments that are relevant to this discussion of accountability.  The first is mentioned as part of the wider discussion in this thesis of potential modes for holding States accountable: the introduction of the Universal Periodic Review​[144]​ mechanism by the Human Rights Council in 2008.  The express objective is not to seek accountability but to review the ‘normative and institutional framework, for the promotion and protection of human rights’ established by individual States​[145]​.  However, ‘after exhausting all efforts to encourage a State to cooperate with the universal periodic review mechanism’ the Council does reserve the right to ‘address, as appropriate, cases of persistent non-cooperation’.  It is submitted here that, ultimately, Universal Periodic Review may come to be viewed as a mechanism for seeking political accountability from States.

For the purpose of determining what accountability means in the context of human rights protection, however, it is the establishment of the Human Rights Council itself that is the more important development.  The Human Rights Council was established to ‘assume, review and, where necessary, improve and rationalise all mandates, mechanisms, functions and responsibilities of the Commission on Human Rights’​[146]​, thus rather than being seen as a replacement, the Human Rights Council can be viewed as an improvement in the UN framework for human rights protection.  On that basis, it is the way in which accountability has been interpreted since the establishment of the Human Rights Council that is referred to here.  Several observations about how the bodies that come within the oversight of the Office for the High Commission for Human Rights refer to ‘accountability’, both confirm and expand upon the earlier discussion of what the term means.

2.4.1.3.1	Overlap in the Interpretation of Accountability
Human rights accountability overlaps with the more general interpretations, cited earlier, because it, too, is viewed as a two stage process that requires both ‘information and sanctions’​[147]​.  For example, having expressed concern ‘at the fact that perpetrators of past and ongoing serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Darfur have not yet been held accountable’, the Human Rights Council urged the Sudanese Government to ‘thoroughly investigat[e] all allegations’ and then to seek ‘justice’ from ‘the perpetrators of those violations’​[148]​.  Similarly, but in the context of protecting human rights in countering terrorism, the Human Rights Council stated that both ‘a proper judicial review and reparation for the victims of violations of economic, social and cultural rights is crucial to ensure the accountability of States’​[149]​.  The two limbs have even been broken down into ‘indicators’ of accountability in the work of the Human Rights Council.  The ‘number of investigations; number of prosecutions [and] number of convictions’ are used to indicate if there has been an investigation (information).  And, the ‘findings of investigation committees made public; number of compensated and rehabilitated victims’ are indicators of redress on the basis of liability (sanction)​[150]​.

The second point of overlap in how accountability is interpreted is that the Human Rights Council views the form of redress as relational and context specific.  Furthermore, redress may be ‘through legal or political means’ provided that the steps taken are ‘in accordance with the Charter of the UN and applicable international law’​[151]​.  Provided that accountability is within the bounds of what is legally permissible then the human rights bodies appear to adopt both flexibility and pragmatism as to the form accountability takes.

An illustration of where flexibility was employed provided the bounds of the law were complied with was when the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, thus distinct from the Human Rights Council, recommended to both the USA and Canada that they ‘explore ways to hold transnational corporations registered in Canada accountable’​[152]​.  This recommendation was on the basis that no accountability mechanisms were then available but that these companies should not be able to escape with impunity.  Meanwhile, in a totally different context, which was the prevention of extrajudicial executions, the Human Rights Council was pragmatic in considering that an accountability framework already existed through a combination of ‘the universal ratification of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 [and] human rights law’​[153]​.  Yet, the Council were ‘dismayed’​[154]​ that even with an established framework for accountability, a practice of arbitrary and summary killings continued.

2.4.1.3.2	Expanding on the Understanding of Accountability
The first observation drawn from the human rights context to expand upon our understanding of accountability is the link that is made with transparency.  In particular, this association occurs when accountability is referred to as a prerequisite for good governance, as in Human Rights Council Resolution 7/11 on ‘The Role of Good Governance in the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights’.  The link between accountability and transparency in achieving good governance expands upon the point that accountability in Western cultures is viewed as a tool to regulate power structures.

Accountability may be a tool to regulate power structures, but transparent accountability implies a tool with which to improve power structures.  The infringing party is required to account both for the breach and the reasons for the breach, which can then be applied to prevent future breaches.  For example, where a loophole in the law needs to be closed, or a particular scenario should be taken into account by way of exception to the law.

The link between accountability and transparency has not been made solely in the context of good governance.  More broadly, in General Comment No 19, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, stated that the ‘effective implementation of all human rights’ relied on ‘the principles of accountability and transparency’​[155]​ – a view supported by the fact that the Human Rights Council made three similar references to ‘accountability and transparency’ solely in its Eighth Session Report​[156]​.  From the perspective of the human rights enforcement bodies at least, accountability is more than just responding to the breach, it is to understand why the breach occurred.

The emphasis placed on transparency by the monitoring bodies is key to understanding how accountability is constructed in this thesis as a concept that will be assessed with reference to State practice.  Evans describes the work of these bodies as not ‘to hold States to account for wrongs’ but to ‘assist the State in the fine tuning of its internal apparatus, scrutinising compliance and indicating deviance’​[157]​.  It is argued here that these roles in fact contribute to the State’s accountability when the concept is considered more broadly than just finding that there had been a breach, which is the task of the international courts.  The monitoring bodies can thus criticise the State, which can count toward redress, but its work will perhaps lead to moral accountability as the reasons for the breach, an acceptance of the State’s fault, and even steps taken to prevent future breaches, may all occur.  Accountability is clearly much broader than mere response.

The second point expanding on our understanding of accountability is that even though this thesis does not argue that an established norm of State accountability exists under international law, there are references to accountability as a principle of international law in the human rights context.  General Comment No 19  describes accountability as a ‘principle’, and more explicitly in Resolution 4/5, the Human Rights Council recognised ‘that globalization should be guided by the fundamental principles that underpin the corpus of human rights, such as…accountability’​[158]​.  To the extent that accountability is recognised as a principle of international law, when the discussion shifts to consider State accountability specifically, there is already evidence that the concept has normative standing.  Thus, this point will be explored further by considering whether accountability is also recognised as a legal principle.  This discussion turns from the interpretation given to accountability by the UN human rights monitoring bodies, that States participate in but that have no legal weight, to consider regional human rights instruments that are consensually adopted by States and thus express public international law.

2.4.1.4	Interpreting Human Rights Accountability at the Regional Level
Article 2(3) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides that parties must ‘ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognised are violated shall have an effective remedy’, while Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights cites the active steps that must be taken to ensure ‘the right to an effective remedy’, including the provision of ‘competent national tribunals’ ‘by the constitution or by law’.  These provisions express a legal obligation on States to ensure there is redress when human rights are breached but the question is whether the right to redress is the same as a right to accountability, which would strengthen the argument that accountability is an established legal principle.

This question of a legal obligation to ensure accountability is relevant to the discussion of accountability, beyond the context of human rights, and will be considered in greater depth later by referring to juridical evidence at the international level.  At this time it is sufficient to reach a conclusion solely in the context of this discussion on human rights, and the focus here is on evidence at the regional level.  The approach is to determine whether there is a universal right to redress and if both information and sanctions are required to satisfy this duty, which would infer a link with accountability.  If the right to redress is not comprised of these two limbs, but includes something more, then it is pertinent to investigate whether that something extra is relevant to and expands upon our understanding of accountability.

Article 1(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights requires States to ‘respect’ and ‘ensure’ that the human rights contained therein are upheld.  Within the Convention there is provision at Article 25 for ‘the right to simple and prompt recourse’ ‘to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights’​[159]​.  Article 25 has been interpreted by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in a way that requires both an investigation of the breach through access to a judicial forum and fair trial protections and redress​[160]​.  In addition, the Inter-American Commission requires that the court or tribunal set out reasons for its conclusion​[161]​, which recalls the earlier reference that associates accountability with transparency.  A reasoned judgment will necessarily have to determine both how and why the breach occurred, a priority that has been emphasised in a series of claims relating to enforced disappearances​[162]​.

In contrast to the American Convention on Human Rights that expressly refers to both remedies and recourse to a court or tribunal, the European Convention on Human Rights does not.  Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights simply provides that ‘everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy’​[163]​.  A series of decisions by the European Court of Human Rights expand upon the brevity of Article 13, by finding that the right to ‘an effective remedy’ was breached where the State in question failed to both investigate the abuse and provide compensation​[164]​.  Thus the European system, too, associates the right to redress with the requirement for information and sanctions that characterise accountability in the broader human rights context.

Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights provides that ‘every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard’ which gives the right to access to the courts, rather than a right to redress or a remedy.  Article 7 is narrower than the European Convention on Human Rights but the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, likewise, has sought to compensate for the lack of express direction as to what is intended under Article 7 in terms of whether it provides a right to redress.  In interpreting the broader requirement under Article 1 of the African Charter to ‘recognise the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined [therein] and to give effect to them’, the African Commission referred specifically to the decision in Velasquez Rodriguez​[165]​ where the Inter-American Court of Human Rights interpreted the equivalent provision in the American Convention​[166]​.  The African Commission found that States would breach their obligations under the Charter by failing to either investigate or provide redress for human rights abuses, including either punishment or compensation​[167]​.

A brief overview of the right to redress in regional human rights instruments shows that both investigation and redress are required in answering for breaches of human rights, but that there is no express duty to ensure accountability.  Thus it cannot be argued that accountability is recognised as a legal principle and there is an insufficient basis to argue a legal principle by implication.  Indeed there is not even consistency amongst the instruments as to what an entitlement to redress means​[168]​.  In terms of furthering the understanding of accountability in this thesis the recurring theme is that accountability is associated with information and sanctions that are determined contextually.  However, even at this early stage of the discussion, it seems that in terms of being lex lata, the indeterminacy of accountability means that the concept has some way to go.

2.5	Bottom Up Accountability
Two questions were posed in considering the interpretation of accountability in the context of human rights: whether accountability is legal or a mix of political and legal responses, and whether it is accurate to describe accountability in terms of arising from the bottom up.

This discussion has shown that the way the human rights monitoring bodies interpret accountability overlaps with the earlier findings that accountability involves both a determination of liability (generally classed as an investigation in the human rights context) and some form of redress (which in the case of individual perpetrators will be punishment if the breach of the particular human right is criminalised and generally compensation or a declaratory judgment otherwise).  It was also shown that both the human rights monitoring bodies under the auspices of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the regional human rights courts consider the form that accountability will take is context specific, depending on the right that was breached, the stakeholder in that right and the purpose of accountability.  Furthermore, it was clear that accountability was not perceived as only legal in nature.

The responsibility for human rights protection and promotion is certainly decentralised, as seen with the right of individuals to access human rights courts and the influence of UN monitoring bodies, which suggests accountability is sought from the bottom up in the human rights context.  However, what is missing at this stage of the inquiry is any reflection on the role of States and the extent to which they are fundamental to the process, in which case it may not be accurate to refer to human rights accountability as coming from the bottom up.

The discussion of State practice is largely deferred to Chapter Five, but one example is given here.  The utility in including isolated examples throughout this thesis is that although such analysis of State practice is unlikely to present any consistency on which to formulate firm conclusions, the unique circumstances cumulatively provide a broader picture of how accountability is interpreted by States and implemented in practice.  In the context of human rights accountability, even though international courts and UN human rights bodies prioritise accountability to the extent that it is both expressly referred to as a legal principle and acknowledged by implication through the right to redress, State practice is inconsistent.

The imposition of amnesty laws is one example where State practice appears contrary to the views of UN monitoring bodies and human rights NGOs that condemn the practice​[169]​.  But, to conclude that States hold differing views on human rights accountability to the ones canvassed here would be inaccurate after regarding the context in which amnesties are adopted.  In both Chile​[170]​ and Argentina​[171]​ amnesties were used to help rehabilitate the national community after the collapse of oppressive governments in each country.  Arguably in those examples, amnesty can be interpreted as facilitating accountability for the broader community, rather than denying individuals the right to redress​[172]​, which in turn highlights that the way that States interpret accountability may differ.  Of course, it is possible that amnesties may provide both information and sanctions, and be in accordance with the interpretation of accountability given above.  For example, South Africa’s amnesty for confession scheme​[173]​ did not give rise to trials and punishment, but the individuals were required to acknowledge their role, provide information and were subject to public exposure.

This discussion has not sought to define accountability as it is interpreted within the human rights context, which is impossible without having considered State practice in any depth.  Instead the objective was simply to gain an alternative perspective in which case focusing primarily on how accountability is understood by the human rights monitoring bodies was appropriate.  A brief reference to accountability in the context of trade law now seeks to confirm the initial finding  that, in the broader international relations context, accountability is a form of answerability that determines liability but also seeks some form of redress.

2.5.1	Accountability as Interpreted in the Context of International Trade Law
The more substantial discussion of accountability in the context of human rights is not to be replicated here.  Instead this section will briefly consider the field of trade law from the perspective of whether accountability is more than just recognition that the party in question is responsible.  International trade law is selected because, like human rights law, these fields have ‘historically evolved in response to abuses of government powers’​[174]​.

It is argued that international trade law has developed in awareness of the effects that trade may have on the rights of individuals and that in order to offer some protection from any negative impact, international trade law uses accountability to regulate the acts of States and corporations.  Free trade and investment liberalization mean that the impact of trade policy is truly global, which, in turn, has led to accountability being understood in terms of universal answerability.

Accountability is not a bilateral phenomenon in international trade, as it is, to some extent, in human rights, where individuals can bring direct claims.  Instead accountability is multilateral and owed to the broader community affected by a particular policy, including States, corporations and individuals.

The potential issues when accountability is owed to a broader community that were noted above are addressed, in the context of international trade law, because accountability is sought when trade policy is being negotiated and implemented ​[175]​.  For example, international trade law must respect principles of non-discrimination in ensuring certain groups are not excluded from trade, and must ‘take into account the needs and rights of individuals and communities, particularly those who could lose out as a result of the reform process’​[176]​.  Similarly ‘the promotion of corporate social responsibility initiatives a[re] an integral part of trade and investment liberalization.  As traders and investors benefit from freer trade, it is important to ensure that free trade is also fair and that business enterprises respect human rights, labour standards and environmental standards when trading and investing’​[177]​.

Accountability in trade is less about answering for the abuse of power as it is about preventing an abuse of power.  It can be seen that there is an overlap with the approach to accountability in the context of human rights to the extent that what is sought is a regulation of power.  However, while accountability is reactive in responding to the abuse of power that leads to breaches of human rights, accountability is proactive in preventing the abuse of power in the context of international trade.

2.6	A Working Understanding of Accountability
This discussion of accountability, as a broader notion that applies regardless of whether the subject is a State, individual or other party, did not seek to define the term.  Instead, the goal was to identify any consistency in the way accountability is interpreted from a linguistic, cultural, legal and international relations perspective.  What emerges from this analysis is that while the form of accountability is context specific (including both disciplinary context as well as factual context), the objective of accountability appears to be consistent.  Accountability is distinguished from other forms of answerability because some form of response or redress is required in addition to determining the party’s responsibility (or potential responsibility if accountability is pre-emptive).  Where accountability is not possible in the legal sense, then political, and even moral, forms of accountability are possible.

Accordingly, this thesis proceeds on the understanding of accountability for breaching international law as not just legal in nature, and seeking more in terms of answering for the breach than just a determination that the breach occurred.

3.	THE ‘STATE’
3.1	Approach to Identifying the ‘State’
An emerging theme from the above discussion is that accountability is viewed as a means to regulate, and prevent the abuse of, power.  In seeking to identify the State for the purpose of seeking accountability, the power theme continues.

It is easier to conceptualise that States may be held accountable as a separate entity, when the State is distinguished from its organs and agents and viewed as a ‘mechanism of power’​[178]​ rather than an ‘apparatus’​[179]​ for the organisation of international relations.  Accordingly, this analysis starts with a legal definition of the State before focusing on those characteristics that give the State its power; or in other words the discussion considers what aspects of Statehood can only be expressed by a State, as opposed to any other party?

3.2	Legal Definition and Political Reality
The word’s derivation is from the Latin statvs and implies both physical attributes, such as territory, and non-physical attributes, such as sovereignty, which is also the approach taken by theorists such as Machiavelli​[180]​, Locke​[181]​ and Weber​[182]​ when defining the State.  ‘The most widely accepted formulation of the criteria of Statehood in international law’​[183]​ is found in the Montevideo Convention​[184]​.  Article 1 defines States as having ‘(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other States’​[185]​.  The indicators of Statehood in the Montevideo Convention thus identify the ‘modern State’​[186]​, but the focus here is on identifying the accountable State.

In practice, the legal definition of the State adapts to take into account the political reality, which in turn supports the contention here that the State, for accountability purposes, cannot be identified by strictly applying the express elements of the Montevideo Convention.  One indication that the Montevideo Convention definition is authoritative​[187]​, rather than definitive, is that States do not cease to exist just because there is a lack of effective governance​[188]​, as seen with the grant of UN membership to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992​[189]​, despite the ongoing conflict in the State that was considered to affect the authorities’ capacity to govern effectively​[190]​.

Another example where the absence of effective governance has not lead to the extinction of Statehood, is in the case of Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence that has been recognised, for example, by a majority of the Member States of the EU and the USA​[191]​.  In anticipation of the declaration, the UN adopted its Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, which recommended that the international community supervise Kosovo’s ‘independence’​[192]​.  The Special Envoy to the UN Secretary General concluded that ‘Kosovo’s capacity to tackle the challenges of minority protection, democratic development, economic recovery and social reconciliation on its own is still limited’ and that ‘international supervision’​[193]​ was required​[194]​.  From the perspective of the Special Envoy and those States that adopted the findings, the Government of Kosovo is merely a constituent element of the State so that the capacity to govern was unrelated to whether Kosovo could be recognised as a State.

A second illustration of the legal definition bending to the political reality when identifying the State is in the rise in regional forms of governance such as the African Union and the EU.  States confer certain competencies to these organisations​[195]​, including aspects of their sovereign prerogative, rather than delegating Statehood​[196]​.  Indeed, membership of a regional organisation can be seen as an indicator of Statehood because  the Copenhagen criteria​[197]​ that sets out the accession criterion for the EU, provides that only a ‘European State… may apply to become a member of the Union’​[198]​.  Thus, while there may have been questions on the extent to which, for example, Macedonia is fully sovereign given the ongoing financial and political support provided by Serbia​[199]​, the State of Macedonia was acknowledged as a candidate for membership in 2005​[200]​.

The illustrations given above of where the legal definition of State under the Montevideo Convention has adapted to the political reality does not mean that the Convention definition is not useful in identifying the State for the purposes of accountability.  Indeed, the requirement that a State be able to enter into international relations is particularly useful in identifying the State as a ‘mechanism of power’​[201]​, because the State’s ability to enter international relations necessarily depends on other States perceiving that the State in question has the power to do so​[202]​.  This is illustrated in the case of Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China.

For several decades, Taiwan enjoyed protection and recognition as the Government of China from States such as Japan and the USA.  With regard to the four elements of the definition under the Montevideo Convention it can be seen that Taiwan had – and still has – territory, a population and some form of government.  What is less clear is the extent to which Taiwan has the ability to enter into relations with other States​[203]​.  This was significantly impacted upon in 1971 when the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 2758, which recognised the People’s Republic of China as ‘the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations’ and expelled the representatives of Taiwan​[204]​.  The shift in support away from Taiwan occurred as the People’s Republic of China has assumed an increasingly powerful position in international relations.  This is apparent in China’s relations with other States, which in turn was predicated on its improved human rights record and adoption of democratic institutions​[205]​.

This example illustrates that while the requirements under the Montevideo Convention are the main indicators of Statehood, the respective weight given to each criterion will depend on the specific context.  It also highlights that an objective perception of political power is very relevant in State identification.

Certainly for the purpose of the State immunity doctrine a much broader approach is taken than simply referring to the Montevideo criteria.  The United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property provides States with immunity from the courts of another State.  For this purpose, the ‘State’ includes ‘organs of government’; ‘constituent units of a federal State or political subdivisions of the State’; ‘agencies or instrumentalities’ and ‘representatives of the State acting in that capacity’​[206]​.  This definition portrays the State as an aggregate of its structural components​[207]​.

3.3	The State as a Systemic Framework
The four Montevideo elements can be used to ‘qualify’​[208]​ the entity as a State, but it is argued here that, in terms of seeking accountability, it is more useful to view the State as a systemic framework in which individuals, society and government exist.  This approach is rational because it gives the State a distinct form, and for accountability purposes this form can then be referred to and the question asked: whether, but for the State, the breach would not have occurred.

In other words, can it be shown that the breach could only be that of the State, rather than its individuals, government or other organs?  For example, accountability was sought from Germany after World War Two for breaches of international law, regardless of any changes in government and in addition to the crimes for which individuals were held accountable​[209]​.  Adopting Pella’s words, ‘the natural persons who decided upon and ordered the commission of the crimes’ were punished at the Nuremberg trials, while the ‘passive element’, or structural support for the crimes, was to ‘be reached by imposing suitable penalties on the State’​[210]​.

A further reason that, in terms of accountability, the State should be viewed more as a framework of inter-related parts rather than four discrete elements is that the extent to which any of those parts plays a role in the breach may change.  The source of the State’s power may alter and one or more of the four Montevideo elements may not therefore be complicit in the breach.  For example, it is unlikely that the general population of a State will be implicated in human rights violations, which instead tend to be associated with the government.  It could not be said that the majority of the population of South Africa was complicit in apartheid – or that the population passively acquiesced, as was the case above with Germany​[211]​.  Similarly, while it may be the State that is subject to scrutiny under the Universal Periodic Review mechanism before the Human Rights Council, it is primarily the acts and omissions of the respective government rather than the population that are being assessed.

In the Genocide Convention Case, which involved a determination of State responsibility, the ICJ considered that ‘the degree and nature of a State’s involvement in an armed conflict…can very well, and without logical inconsistency, differ from the degree and nature of the involvement required to give rise to that State’s responsibility for a specific act in the course of the conflict’​[212]​.  This is not to say that the State has legally altered, but that for the purposes of holding the State responsible (but equally when the broader term ‘accountable’ is applied) then it is not simply a matter of applying the four elements of the Montevideo Convention.

In the Genocide Convention Case, the Court was concerned with the responsibility of Serbia and Montenegro for the acts of the Republic of Srpska, a secessionist movement that was established with the assistance of both States when they comprised the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but that also had a degree of de facto independence​[213]​.  The Court considered that holding Serbia and Montenegro responsible for the activities of the Srpska Republic within the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or indeed to equate any entity with a State ‘when they do not have that status under internal law’, was ‘exceptional’, but justified if the States exercised ‘effective control’​[214]​ over that entity.

Talmon notes that the ‘effective control’ test that is used by the ICJ is not to ‘determine whether a person or a group of persons qualifies as a de facto organ of the State’​[215]​, rather the test seeks evidence of dependence on the State.  Where there is a link between the activities of the entity and the dependence that entity has on the State, then the State must answer for those activities.  In such cases, and for accountability purposes, applying the definition under the Montevideo Convention may be of little use in identifying the State.

3.4	The State for Accountability Purposes
In the Introduction to this thesis, Foucault’s description of the State as a ‘mechanism of power’​[216]​ was adopted to identify the State as an entity that is separate from its constituent parts for the purposes of seeking accountability, and illustrate why a distinction is made.  This discussion has not overlooked the Montevideo Convention, which is often cited in defining the State under the international law.  Instead this analysis has acknowledged that the four indicators of Statehood in the Convention merely identify the State as a legally autonomous actor.  In terms of seeking accountability, however, it is submitted that it is necessary to determine where the power lies within those constituent parts.  This is because it is the abusive exercise of power that represents the separate role played by the State, and distinguishes the breach by the State from that of the State’s organs.

Given that the approach advocated here is not a formulaic application of the legal criteria set down in the Montevideo Convention, there is doubt as to the normative value in identifying the State in this way.  However, because this thesis is not arguing that accountability is an established legal principle or that it will necessarily be legal in nature, then there is no irrationality in contending that the State, for accountability purposes, might likewise accommodate political and quasi-legal factors.  The State is a reflection of how the various institutions that comprise the State, such as the government and legislature, exercise their functions, rather than the State being seen as the consequence of establishing those institutions.  The approach to identifying the State for accountability purposes does not need to have normative standing because accountability does not​[217]​.

4.	CONCLUSION
Chapter One broke down the constituent elements of State accountability to consider how ‘accountability’ and the ‘State’ may be defined, or at least understood, for the purpose of determining whether the concept has any normative standing in international law.

Accountability is only one form of answerability but can be distinguished because there must be a determination of liability and, in addition, there must be redress – the phrase ‘information and sanctions’ was adopted from Keohane.  In order to overcome the indeterminacy of accountability regard was paid to linguistic, cultural and cross-disciplinary interpretations to establish a consensus.  The theme that emerged was that accountability is a tool for regulating and responding to the abuse of power, and that in order to do so the concept is relational and context specific.  What is clear, without this thesis even having to note that accountability is not argued here as an established legal or non-legal principle, is that the concept lacks definitional clarity.  This does not discount its relevance to this thesis; rather this thesis will attempt greater specificity by narrowing accountability down in Chapter Two to ‘State accountability’.
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Having broken down the constitutive elements of State accountability, this Chapter now aims to bring some clarity to the concept as a whole.  The concept of State accountability constructed here can be used both as an interpretive framework for the analysis of relevant juridical opinion and State practice in the balance of this thesis, and as an evaluative standard against which both opinion and practice may be measured. 

Chapter One established that accountability is a means for both regulating and responding to breaches of power, thus the emphasis is on what accountability achieves rather than the method by which it is achieved.  In Chapter Two consideration is given to whether State accountability should likewise be examined in the remainder of this thesis as a discrete outcome (measured against the evaluative criteria reached here); an entire process (the response to the breach, why the response was selected, by whom and for what purpose); or whether the analysis of State accountability is instead both a process and an outcome.

Chapter Two begins by outlining the methodology taken to construct State accountability as a conceptual interpretive framework and as a set of evaluative criteria for the assessment of State practice.  The discussion then initiates an overview of how State accountability is or is not sought in practice, which continues throughout the rest of the thesis.  The initial consideration of whether conceptual State accountability enjoys juridical support within international law is also undertaken here and Chapter Two concludes by determining whether there is any duty or obligation on States to ensure accountability and to what extent any duty or obligation applies in relation to holding other States accountable.

2.	CONSTRUCTING THE INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORK
The variety in formal and informal responses when States breach international law confirm that, at a minimum, there is an ad hoc practice of seeking accountability from States but the objective of this Chapter is to establish some way in which to determine whether the ad hoc practice amounts to what is, or is evolving as, an established legal principle.

There are three steps to constructing the interpretive framework for the balance of the thesis.  First, some limits are set on the ad hoc practice to be analysed.  This includes whether responses that are not strictly legal​[218]​ and responses that seek to hold the organs of the State accountable in lieu of the State, in light of the fact that State and individual accountability is often conflated, can be viewed as part of a practice of accountability.  Overall the question is: when States breach international law, how far can the examination of the aftermath be taken in order to determine whether the State was held accountable?

The second step deals with the issue of how to measure accountability and seeks to construct a ‘tentative set of [accountability] criteria’​[219]​.  In so doing, there will be consideration of whether State accountability is criminal in nature and what it is that makes redress effective for accountability purposes.  In other words, when will a response ensure that both information and sanctions are attained?

The third step follows on from the discussion in Chapter One as to whether there is a right to accountability in the human rights context.  The focus shifts here to consider whether States have a legal duty or obligation to seek accountability from other States.  An affirmative answer will affect the interpretive framework because it establishes a presumption that any response to a breach is for the purpose of seeking accountability.  A negative answer means it cannot be assumed that the objective in responding was to seek accountability.  Such a finding begs the question: can State accountability be an unintended consequence when the response was motivated by a different objective, such as retribution?

3.	THE SCOPE OF THE AD HOC ACCOUNTABILITY PRACTICE FOR ANALYSIS
The first step is to determine whether any and every response, when States breach international law, should be considered as a potential means for holding the State accountable.  Based on the presumption taken in this thesis that State accountability is neither an established legal nor an established non-legal principle, the possible scope for inquiry is significant.  And, as Bassiouni argues, just as there is no one manner in which States breach international law so there can be no one manner by which to hold States accountable​[220]​.  Thus, should an analysis of potential accountability mechanisms be undertaken in this thesis without any restriction as to what may or may not qualify as a means for holding States accountable?

The range of mechanisms for responding when States breach international law is evident in Pella’s ‘Memorandum Concerning a Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind’, which was drafted under the guidance of the International Association of Penal Law in 1926 and in the midst of a growing debate on State criminality.  The International Association of Penal Law recommended that the Permanent Court of International Justice have criminal jurisdiction over crimes of aggression and that any redress, when the Court determined that a State had committed aggression, should be imposed by the League of Nations.  The responses that were contemplated included ‘the destruction of strategic railways and fortifications, prohibiting military production, the confiscation of armaments, the limitation of the size of armed forces, complete disarmament, [and] the formation of demilitarized zones on the territory of the State’​[221]​.

In addition to responses that seek legal accountability, there may be means available for political accountability, and in certain circumstances, legal accountability may even by replaced by political accountability.  The need for pragmatism to accommodate any limitations on legal accountability was recognised by the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.  The Sub-Commission, wound up with the establishment of the Human Rights Council, had been a think-tank of experts mandated to study the maintenance of human rights within the scope of international law.  In a 1978 Report by the Sub-Commission considering the question of State liability for genocide, it was concluded that, at that time, ‘the State can only bear political responsibility for international crimes’​[222]​.

It was somewhat ironic that having accepted that the response to genocide could be political, the Sub-Commission would itself be charged with succumbing to political pressure when it removed any reference to the massacres in Armenia as an example of genocide​[223]​.  Schabas is of the opinion that the ‘unpardonable wavering on the Armenian genocide cast a shadow over what was otherwise an extremely helpful and well-researched report’.  This reference illustrates the impact of politics both in the responses that follow the breach of public international law and the initial determination that the State was in fact liable for the breach.

Given that non-legal, namely political, factors can influence the determination of a State’s liability, it makes sense that the interpretive framework that is conceptualised by State accountability should envisage that the nature of accountability may be legal and/or political thus, the range of potential responses that may be considered is significant.  This approach is in keeping with the interpretations of accountability in Chapter One that were taken from a range of perspectives, but that consistently emphasised that the outcome, rather than the means of attainment, is important.  Indeed, it can be envisaged that the State may be held accountable even where the response to the breach was not undertaken for that express purpose.  For example, the stated intention of the UN Claims Commission in Iraq, following the invasion of Kuwait, was to provide compensation for the damage rather than recognition of the fact that Iraq contravened international law, while Chapter Five will argue that the severe level of the compensation factored in a penal like element​[224]​.

A wide range of responses may thus come within the ad hoc practice of, and approach to, State accountability that will be analysed here, but two points require clarification: whether non-legal responses may also be taken into consideration and what is the effect of holding individuals or State organs accountable, in lieu of the State?

3.1	Non-Legal Responses
The dawning realisation in this thesis is that State accountability is to be understood in terms of what it seeks to achieve, and not in terms of the process used to achieve that objective.  Thus it can be envisaged that State accountability, as an outcome, could be achieved but that the response that preceded that outcome does not comply with public international law.  For example military intervention would strictly be in breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter but Chapter Five will argue that it was effective in bringing aggression to an end and forcing North Korea to account for its actions after the invasion of the Republic of Korea.

From the perspective of the international community of States, any response to a breach of international law, including jus cogens norms, must comply with international law.  For example, the UN has consistently emphasised the need to comply with human rights, humanitarian and public international law in measures taken by States to eliminate terrorism​[225]​.  Even the increase in counter-terrorist measures after the terrorist attacks in New York and Pennsylvania on September 11 2001, alleged to be by the Al Qaeda terrorist network, to meet what was popularly perceived as an increased threat of terrorism​[226]​ did not alter this stance​[227]​.

In addition to an express legal requirement, there is an implied moral advantage in ensuring that any response complies with international law.  This is especially the case where it is a jus cogens norm that has been breached, given the link to fundamental values that these norms are said to protect, as will be shown in Chapter Three.  In such cases it would appear hypocritical to argue in favour of any response that does not comply with international law​[228]​.  Certainly, ‘we should resolutely pursue our notion of justice but leave unharmed the current structure of international law’​[229]​, but the question here is whether a response that does not comply with black letter public international law will likewise be precluded.

It is not suggested here that illegal responses will be tolerated by States; rather the focus is on redress that is non-legal or, in Balint’s words ‘extra-legal’​[230]​.  For example, diplomatic protest and criticism are controversial, because taken from one perspective they constitute an unfriendly but lawful act and taken from the opposite view, such censure impinges on the principle of neutrality.

The balance and tension between what is expressly legal and what is impliedly permitted under public international law is seen with reference to the prohibition on intervention as expressed in the Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations Between States.  The Declaration provides that ‘no State or group of States has the right to intervene…in the internal or external affairs of any other State’, including through ‘the use of economic, political or any other type of measures’.  Though the Declaration is not a binding legal instrument, Shaw notes its use in expanding upon how the purposes and principles of the UN Charter are to be understood so that it has juridical weight.  If Shaw’s approach is adopted then the Declaration can be seen to confirm that the prohibition on intervention in the UN Charter is absolute​[231]​.

However, in the opinions of notable scholars such as Charney​[232]​, Meron​[233]​ and Schachter​[234]​ the prohibition on intervention cannot be interpreted as absolute because international law demands that States respond ‘to violations of human rights norms’​[235]​.  In such cases the question of whether intervention was legitimate, even if not expressly legal, would be determined by referring to the objective of the intervention.

Where the distinction between an illegal and a non-legal action relates to its objective then it is possible that a non-legal response may be consistent with the law but not strictly comply with it​[236]​.  The discussion here refers to the ongoing debate as to whether State intervention may be legitimate.  Further consideration of this debate is useful because it captures the issue of whether grievous breaches of international law would justify other States responding in a way that is potentially incompatible with the law​[237]​.  To the extent that State practice does tolerate intervention for such purposes then the use of intervention could be seen as a means for holding States accountable.

There are many definitions of the broader concept of State intervention, including definitions that refer to the use of force and non-physical means.  On the one hand, the ICJ have described the general concept of intervention as impacting upon the ‘State’s choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system and formulation of foreign policy’ by ‘methods of coercion, particular force, either in the direct form of military action or in the indirect form of support for subversive activities’​[238]​.  On the other hand, an academic perspective was provided by Verwey, who defined legitimate intervention as ‘the threat or use of force by a State or States abroad for the sole purpose of preventing or putting a halt to serious violation of fundamental human rights in particular the right to life of persons regardless of their nationality such protection placed neither upon authorization by relevant organs of the UN nor with permission by the legitimate government of the target State’​[239]​.

Both examples refer to the use of force, whether physical, non-physical, or implied, in order to overthrow the State’s sovereign rights; and in both cases the motivation for impinging on the State’s autonomy must be taken into account.  On the assumption that a difference in objective means that there is a difference in the type of intervention, the question is whether intervention is always illegal or whether, as in Verwey’s perspective, there are exceptions and intervention may in certain circumstances be seen as legitimate.

There are as many definitions of intervention, as there are declarations that intervention is not permitted under international law, however, it is argued here that there is a theme amongst these statements that the prohibition on all forms of intervention is not absolute.  For example, in the Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (the Nicaragua Case) the ICJ clarified that the prohibition on intervention is jus cogens - but where the intervention was through the use of force​[240]​.  Similarly Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states that ‘all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State’​[241]​.  In both cases, the prohibition is limited to forceful intervention and in the latter it only applies to Member States of the UN.  More broadly Article 2(7) of the UN Charter prohibits any form of intervention ‘into the internal affairs of a member State’, but then it only refers to interventions into UN States​[242]​.  The Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States is likewise comprehensive, and noted that ‘no State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever in the internal and external affairs of any other State’​[243]​, but as already noted the Declaration is not strictly binding.  Of course, one way to interpret the ICJ’s statement, the UN Charter and the Declaration is as combined jurisprudential evidence that the prohibition is recognised as customary international law.

The prohibition on intervention, both by forceful and non-forceful means, is widely expressed in public international law, if not also recognised as custom.  In addition, there is undoubtedly recognition that there may be an exception to the broader prohibition on intervention, in terms of intervention for humanitarian reasons​[244]​.

Recognition is varied and includes the ICJ, again in the Nicaragua Case, stating that ‘humanitarian aid cannot be recognised as unlawful intervention’​[245]​, although the Court did not consider that any type of force was an ‘appropriate method to monitor or ensure’ that Nicaragua complied with its obligations to respect human rights​[246]​.  There is State recognition, including Article 4(h) of the Charter of the African Union that allows intervention in ‘grave circumstances’.  And more recently, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was established by the Canadian Government in response to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his Millennium Report calling on UN Member States to consider whether the prohibition of intervention and the sanctity of State sovereignty could be subject to exception in the case of humanitarian crises.   The final Report was compiled by human rights experts including representatives of relevant UN bodies and the findings, which were presented to the UN in 2001, sought to capture the concept of humanitarian intervention as a ‘responsibility to protect’, or R2P, principle.  The ICISS concluded that ‘sovereign States have a responsibility to protect their own citizens…but when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of States’​[247]​, which would permit intervention on humanitarian grounds although the Report did not advocate unilateral intervention for this purpose.

In 2009 the UN General Assembly included a thematic dialogue on the R2P principles in its programme of work.  General Assembly President Miguel D’Escoto opened proceedings by stating that while ‘the authors and proponents of R2P…have the best of intentions’ this was outweighed by ‘those who might abuse the right that R2P would give nation-States to resort to the use of force against other States’​[248]​.  In particular, President D’Escoto referred to the invasion of Iraq, labelling the UK and the USA as ‘self-appointed saviours who arrogated to themselves the right to intervene with impunity in the name of overcoming nation-state impunity’ before disputing ‘whether we are ready for R2P’​[249]​.  While these are the comments of one individual, they capture the perceived tension in needing to respond when States breach international law when there is limited, formal means to do so, with the risk in tolerating ad hoc practices for this purpose.

The R2P principle is just one attempt to circumvent the legal prohibition on State intervention, while the legality of humanitarian intervention continues to be debated.  The law remains unclear, partly because some of the basic elements of humanitarian intervention, such as its preconditions or the form that it may take (including proportionality), are subject to considerable disagreement. Increasingly there is recognition by States, UN bodies and international courts that some form of humanitarian intervention  may be justified under certain circumstances. Consequently, while there is no clear rule of international law that permits intervention in general terms, there may be an exception to the prohibition of the use of force in particular circumstances and to meet certain humanitarian objectives.

On the basis that international law is a dynamic framework that responds to changing policy goals​[250]​, as evidenced by the emergence of jus cogens norms, the approach to be taken in analysing State practice is to contemplate a ‘mosaic’ of ‘legal and extra-legal’​[251]​ responses when States breach international law.  It is submitted that responses, which may not yet be legally sanctioned, can still be effective in holding States accountable and may be indicators of the future development and evolution of State accountability as a principle of public international law.  Thus the analysis will ask ‘with which combination of the legal and extra-legal’​[252]​ was accountability achieved?

3.2	Holding the State’s Organs Accountable in Lieu of the State
The second aspect for clarification is whether responses that seek accountability directly from the organs of the State can be interpreted as holding the State accountable.  It has already been noted that the conceptual distinction between individual and State accountability is less clear when translated into practice, given that the liability of the State will almost always relate to the acts and omissions of its organs.  If the breach can be identified with regard to the acts and omissions of the State’s organs then logic suggests that the State’s accountability may also be ascertained by referring to the accountability of the State’s organs.  In that case any redress sought from the State’s organs would simply be another factor in the matrix of responses used to hold the State accountable.

To a degree, the argument that the accountability of a State’s organs is relevant is an extension of the attribution principle whereby, if the acts of the organs establish that a State has breached its own obligations, then any remedy obtained from those organs would likewise be redress for breaching that specific obligation.  There are however three caveats to be noted about this quasi-attribution analogy.

Firstly, a State’s organs are not always held to account for their acts and omissions and thus the analogy only applies in certain circumstances.  For example, the functional immunity doctrine attributes the acts of the individual/organ to the State so that the individual/organ is no longer considered to have committed the breach.  In that case redress is not sought from the individual/organ who enjoys immunity, which means there is no degree of individual accountability that could then be ‘attributed’ to compensate for any gap in the State’s accountability​[253]​.  

Secondly, the analogy does not mean to argue that seeking redress from the State’s organs wipes out the need for redress from the State entirely.  Rather the redress imposed on the State’s organs could be used to meet any gap in accountability that arises due to the practical difficulties in holding States accountable.  Examples of where attribution of redress would be appropriate include where the breaching State’s resources were wiped out after conflict, making compensation impossible.  Indeed the concept of individual State accountability is premised on the fact that there are two distinct breaches (one by the State and one by the State’s organs) thus accountability of the State’s organs cannot automatically address the accountability of the State.

Finally, this form of quasi-attribution is inappropriate where the respective breach of each party was unrelated, as in the Nicaragua Case.  The ICJ held that the USA was responsible for breaching obligations that were different to those breached by the Contras, even though the breaches were contextually linked​[254]​.  Where the State’s liability arises without regard to the acts and omissions of another party, as in the Nicaragua Case where it was the acts of the US Government and military that were attributed to the State and not the acts of the Contras, then it is nonsensical to claim that the State has been held accountable with reference to redress sought from a third party.  In this example, the criminal accountability of the Contras had no relationship to the USA and therefore could have no bearing on the accountability of the USA.

The wider matrix of responses to be considered in assessing any ad hoc practice of State accountability thus contemplates that the accountability of the State’s organs may in certain circumstances be relevant, even though the breach remains separate.

4.	A TENTATIVE SET OF ACCOUNTABILITY CRITERIA
The interpretive framework constructed thus far conceptualises State accountability as a response that will be geographically, temporally and even culturally and politically specific​[255]​ and potentially encompass a number of objectives, so that accountability may only be an indirect aim​[256]​.  It is argued that in addition to the interpretive framework some form of accountability criteria are appropriate for the analysis in this thesis, which can be referred to in order to draw conclusions as to whether the particular context is an example of State accountability.

The associations made with accountability in a given situation provide the most accurate set of criteria for evaluation purposes.  For example, when it is individuals that are being held accountable, Bassiouni argues that the associations with accountability include ‘cessation…prevention…deterrence…rehabilitation of the society as a whole and of the victims…and reconciliation’​[257]​.  Rather than attempting to draft a definitive list of conditions to be satisfied for State accountability, the approach taken in this Chapter is to identify what associations arise in holding States accountable, in the context of State practice.

A hypothetical illustration here shows how State practice can be used to construct a set of accountability criteria.  For example, were a State to breach the right to self-determination by displacing the indigenous population, accountability could be associated with restoring the affected people to their homes.  This is not to say that restoration would be the only effective form of redress, indeed it might not be possible where the land had been annexed.  Rather, it is submitted that restoration would be one appropriate response because it is commensurate to the gravity in contravening the right to self-determination compared to, say, an apology.

A practical illustration is the Chinese occupation of Tibet since 1950.  The UN General Assembly has called for a ‘cessation of practices which deprive Tibetan peoples of their fundamental human rights and freedoms, including the right to self-determination’​[258]​.  China was not specifically mentioned as the protagonist in this case, but a series of related Resolutions by the General Assembly imply China’s liability​[259]​.  What is clear is that the Member States of the General Assembly were of the opinion that the Tibetan peoples’ right to self-determination had been infringed.  Arguably for China to be held accountable as a result, the Tibetan Government would need to be restored to power.  Only then would there be redress from the State that was commensurate to the specific breach.

This approach to identifying a set of evaluative criteria accommodates the reality that accountability is not a one size fits all concept, both in terms of the nature of the response and the point at which accountability can be said to have been achieved.  Given the argument here that State accountability is not based on a set standard, it would be impossible to identify any consistency as to what accountability is considered to mean every time States breach international law.  Instead the accountability criteria that are identified here, and illustrated by reference to State practice, are based on some form of consensus.  Whether or not the criteria selected are appropriate indicators of accountability will only be determined after the criteria are applied more comprehensively to the case studies in Chapter Five.

Before turning to the associations with accountability that arise in State practice however, there is some consideration of whether State accountability has any associations at a juridical level, and namely whether State accountability is criminal in nature.

4.1	Is State Accountability Associated With Criminal Accountability?
This thesis has not conceptualised State accountability in terms of criminal accountability on the presumption that criminal State accountability requires that redress is punitive and, therefore, due to the impossibility of imprisoning a State.  In theory however, the pejorative connotations in labelling the State a criminal could go a long way in terms of seeking accountability due to the injury to the State’s dignity, thus it may be hasty to dismiss the notion of criminal State accountability just because criminal redress – or punishment - is often linked with imprisonment.

For one thing, Gilbert notes that many scholars disagree with the notion that criminal redress cannot in fact be sought from States, arguing that the Covenant of the League of Nations is an example of where criminal State liability was envisaged​[260]​.  Where States commit an act of war​[261]​, Article 16 of the Covenant dictated ‘the severance of all trade or financial relations…the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State’​[262]​, and declared that the aggressive State was ‘no longer a Member of the League’​[263]​.  If, as Bruck suggested, the Covenant does constitute a ‘criminal code’​[264]​ then the issue of how to punish the State was overcome because punishment was interpreted as more than just imprisonment.  If, as Brownlie argues, Article 16 is a ‘police measure rather than punishment’​[265]​, then the question still remains as to whether a State can be punished within the scope of responses available under public international law​[266]​.

Furthermore, in light of the discussion thusfar that State accountability is generally interpreted as a context specific response, penal redress may not necessarily be appropriate​[267]​.  State accountability, as conceptualised here, and public international law generally, maintain their distance from the criminality framework, when it comes to the seeking redress from States​[268]​.  However, the arguments surrounding the notion of the criminal State require greater examination before the concept is dismissed completely.

Certainly criminal State accountability was rejected at the Nuremberg Trials​[269]​ and criminal State responsibility was rejected by the International Law Commission (ILC) (in the context of the doctrine of State responsibility, which will be considered in depth in Chapter Four) but the reasons for this must be assessed before the notion may be altogether discounted in the context of this thesis.  It is convenient to organise this discussion by drawing an analogy with the three limbs of domestic crime to determine whether the criterion of crime, sanction and an adjudicating forum are present under public international law if a State was alleged to have committed a crime and redress sought on that basis​[270]​.  This approach is reasonable given that if State accountability were to be conceptualised as criminal in nature then it would likewise need to be shown that there was some means to determine the State had perpetrated what is recognised to be a crime and that there was some means of imposing redress as a result.  

The first requirement is that the breach of public international law is also recognised as a crime under public international law.  The judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal clearly stated that ‘crimes against international law are committed by men, not abstract entities’​[271]​, which is the position recognised by States and as expressed under international criminal law.  Without referring specifically to the legal elements of a crime and determining that these elements are satisfied, a State cannot be branded a criminal, or if the State is branded criminal then the effect must be political rather than legal.

A declaration that the State is criminal is more likely to reflect the outcome of a conflict or to be censure for a particular act than it is to be a reasoned legal judgment that the acts and omissions of the State contravened black letter criminal law​[272]​.  Given that any allegation is likely to undermine diplomatic relations between the condemning party and the condemned State/s, a political charge of criminality will not be taken lightly​[273]​.  Thus finding a State to be criminal in political terms has the potential for political accountability, but it is unlikely to give rise to legal accountability.

The Nuremberg Tribunal was not required to determine if Germany was to be held legally – or criminally - accountable as the focus was on individual liability, which was viewed as a separate matter​[274]​.  Dupuy argued that if the focus is only on the role of individuals then this will lead to ‘destatalization of the action, which is nonetheless carried out on behalf of the State as its agent’​[275]​.  While this observation is accurate and such a consequence is not desired, it does not overcome the issues in identifying the separate crime committed by the State, which is completely separate from the crime committed by the relevant individuals.

One such obstacle in identifying the State’s breach as a crime is the mens rea requirement under criminal law, which justifies the imposition of a penalty because the perpetrator acted with some sort of knowledge or intent.  At the Nuremberg Trials, Prosecutor Shawcross dealt with this issue by arguing that the State was an accessory to the crimes as committed by individuals.  However, the Bench, led by Justice Jackson, did not agree and considered that all crimes have a mens rea element, which cannot be established if the alleged perpetrator is a State​[276]​.  Accordingly, the breach by the State was not to be viewed as a crime.

There are in fact many illustrations where States are considered to act with intent when they breach international law, but the nature of the intent is not the same as the mens rea standard that would arguably be required for criminal State accountability.  For example, the liability of States for damages under the Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects is determined ‘in accordance with the extent to which they were at fault’​[277]​.  At other times liability is only attributed once fault has been established, as it was in 1978 where Canada suffered environmental damage as a result of objects falling from outer space, which necessitated an inquiry to establish that the materials had been launched by the USSR so that it was the USSR that was liable to pay damages for the pollution caused​[278]​.  In these cases fault is used more as an indicator of liability rather than an indicator of intent to commit the breach.

Although concerned with Serbia’s responsibility, which is civil rather than criminal in nature, the ICJ took a similar approach​[279]​.  The Court stated in the Genocide Convention Case that even if there is a ‘specific requirement of a mental element in terms of the primary obligation’​[280]​ it is still ‘the act of a State that matters, independently of any intention’​[281]​.  Thus where Article II of the Genocide Convention provides that a complicit party be ‘aware of the special intent of the principal perpetrator’​[282]​, the Court noted this was not the same as the State possessing that intent itself​[283]​.

There is no evidence that international jurisprudence has developed in such a manner that if a State breaches the law, in a way that would be criminal if the perpetrator was an individual, the State is likewise considered to have committed a crime.  Violations of public international law by States can be seen as forming a discrete category of breaches.

The second element of the domestic crime analogy is that an adjudicating forum must identify that the breach is recognised as criminal under international law and impose a criminal sanction on determination of guilt.  The primary difficulty, which links to the issue of identifying a criminal sanction, is that currently the international courts including the ICJ do not have the power to punish a State.  Criminal sanctions ‘impl[y] a vertical society’​[284]​ whereas international law is based on the equality of States and the jurisdiction of the international courts is based on State consent.  As such, even if it could be argued that the courts have the ability to determine the State’s criminal liability (which Chapter Five will argue is no certain matter); there is no power to impose a punishment accordingly.

The third limb in the analogy with domestic crimes is the imposition of a sanction that establishes that liability is more than civil and in the context of breaches of jus cogens norms it is argued here that the sanction would need to show there was ‘universal condemnation’​[285]​ of the ‘crime’.  Criminal law has a clear association between punishment and some form of imprisonment.  For example, in the Case of Engel and Others v the Netherlands the European Court of Human Rights was considering the application of individuals that claimed disciplinary action taken by the State while the applicants were completing compulsory military service amounted to arrest and detention in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights​[286]​.  The Court considered the difference between disciplinary sanction and criminal punishment is identified on the basis that the ‘criminal sphere’ of sanctions is linked with the ‘deprivation of liberty’.  Yet, there currently appears to be no way of depriving a State of its liberty.

If a State cannot be imprisoned the question is how to seek redress that infers liability beyond the scope of general State responsibility.  In particular, must a criminal sanction be legal or could criminal condemnation of States, out of necessity, be political – similar to the approach taken in relation to Germany after World War Two.  The Nuremberg trials shifted away from collective responsibility and the Prosecution elected to hold individuals criminally accountable instead​[287]​.  The consensus amongst the Prosecutors was that in so doing there was an implication that Germany was complicit​[288]​, even if not held directly accountable by the Nuremberg Tribunal​[289]​, and this was sufficient in terms of censure – which also avoided the problem of seeking criminal redress directly from Germany.

How to seek criminal redress from States was also an issue faced by the ILC in codifying the law relating to State responsibility.  Draft Article 19 of the 1980 Draft Articles on State Responsibility sought to introduce the concept of criminal State responsibility but this was rejected from the final 2001 Draft​[290]​.  Chapter Four discusses Draft Article 19 in more depth when looking at the relationship between State responsibility and State accountability, but it is relevant to note here that while Draft Article 19 was able to identify what would amount to a State crime, it made no further provision for any form of penal sanction beyond what was already available within the standard scope of the State responsibility doctrine​[291]​.

Gilbert argued that there are modalities of reparation available in terms of engaging State responsibility that may also be effective in terms of criminal State responsibility.  One example is the declaratory judgment, which Gilbert argued can ‘be interpreted in terms of criminal sanctions’​[292]​.  Gilbert contended, ‘in a flight of academic fantasy’​[293]​ that a declaratory judgment may be interpreted as a finding of the State’s guilt and gave the example of the South West Africa Cases​[294]​.  Liberia and Ethiopia sought a declaration that South Africa was in breach of its mandate in South West Africa by introducing apartheid policies​[295]​.  The application was dismissed on procedural grounds​[296]​, but had it been decided on the merits then, Gilbert argued, the effect would be a determination of guilt for committing apartheid, which is an international crime.

Gilbert was writing in 1990 and since that time the decision in the Genocide Convention Case may provide some support for his ‘working hypothesis’​[297]​.  The decision is analysed throughout the thesis, but for the purpose of this discussion it is noted that the ICJ made declarations that Serbia had failed to comply with provisional measures and failed in its obligation under the Genocide Convention to prevent genocide​[298]​.  Serbia was not found to have been complicit in genocide and none of the violations by the State were listed as crimes under the Genocide Convention, but the very use of the declaratory judgment by the Court supports Gilbert’s argument.  Rather than compensation, the Court obviously considered that a declaratory judgment was more effective in terms of condemning the breach.  The failure to prevent genocide is not a crime under Article 1 of the Genocide Convention, but is arguably viewed by States as equally culpable given that prevention and punishment are listed as legal obligations within the same Convention that criminalizes the commission of genocide.  The submission here is that just because a form of reparation arises under the State responsibility principle it cannot be discounted as an effective sanction – both in relation to criminal responsibility as Gilbert argued, and as a means for holding States accountable, as argued here.

In terms of declaring the State to be criminal there are very real obstacles that have to yet to be overcome, namely whether it is possible to punish a State, and if so how.  From a political perspective, branding a State as criminal remains an attractive proposition if accountability is perceived as both political and legal.  Thus, even though State accountability is not conceptualised in this thesis as criminal State accountability and there is little juridical support for such a proposition, there will need to be ongoing reference to the potential that State accountability is associated with some form of criminal accountability when examining State practice.

4.2	When Does A Response Lead to the State Being Held Accountable?
Conceptualising State accountability as an interpretive framework provides the basis for the subsequent analysis of relevant practice and juridical support, but evaluative accountability criteria are required in order to draw conclusions from that analysis, as to whether State accountability remains lex feranda or there is evidence of a shift to lex lata.

The previous section showed that there are significant juridical obstacles to be overcome in associating State accountability with criminal liability.  This section turns to some indicators of State accountability by referring to isolated examples of State practice.  These examples draw on some of the emerging themes from the discussion so far, as to when the response to a breach is perceived as having held a State accountable – and what it means to hold a State accountable.

This discussion acknowledges that ultimately the conclusion in this thesis may be that, more than ever, State accountability is inextricably linked to individual or even organisational accountability.  Furthermore, this discussion does not preclude the probability that redress is likely to include both formal and informal responses given that it is the intended outcome, rather than its method, that is important.  Thus the findings made here are interim findings only.  This overview does not seek to be comprehensive and instead should be viewed as providing a set of tentative accountability criteria only – in order to facilitate the subsequent analysis, when the strength of these assertions will be tested.

4.2.1	The State Responsibility Doctrine is Not the Only Response When States Breach International Law
The first point affirms what is already evident in the growth of human rights courts and tribunals, which is that accountability is sought from States beyond the scope of the State responsibility doctrine.

As of 2009 there are no claims of State responsibility pending on the docket of the ICJ against the USA or the UK as a result of the invasion of Iraq in 2003​[299]​, despite the widespread condemnation of the invasion and rejection that the States were acting in self-defence​[300]​.  It would obviously make sense that no application had been brought before the ICJ if there had been no breach of the States’ legal obligations.  Yet, the steps taken by both the USA and the UK to establish that their actions had Security Council authorisation and that Iraq had itself failed to fulfil its legal obligations to warrant invasion​[301]​ and likewise attempts by States that provided assistance to the USA and UK, such as Germany, to justify their involvement by relying on the NATO treaty arrangement​[302]​, suggests otherwise.

Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has stated that the invasion into Iraq in 2003 was illegal​[303]​ but the reason this example is raised here is not to determine whether the use of force came within the exceptions to the prohibition that lie within the UN Charter.  It is to highlight that the question - of whether or not a State has breached public international law - is not considered solely from the perspective of whether a State’s responsibility has been engaged.

The lack of an express claim for State responsibility did not mean that there was no breach of international law.  Instead the lack of a formal application to the ICJ combined with the debate and criticism noted above illustrates that a determination of and response to breaches of international law is not restricted to the State responsibility framework, which is only one of the responses taken when States breach international law.

The first evaluative criterion is therefore whether the response to the breach exceeded the application and objective of the State responsibility framework to suggest that more was sought, in terms of answerability from the State.

4.2.2	The Response When States Breach International Law is Influenced by the Specific Context of the Breach and the Law Breached
Invoking the State responsibility doctrine is only one of many responses when States breach public international law currently tolerated in international relations, which is a reasonable conclusion given the diverse circumstances that arise in State practice and that necessitate some form of response.  The relevance of the specific context of the breach and the law that is breached is illustrated by considering Israel’s use of force in the Gaza in 2008/2009 and applying the interpretive framework to consider whether the responses to the attacks were seeking to hold Israel accountable as a result.

The use of force in question was a bombing campaign that other States and human rights organisations contended could not be justified as an act of self-defence​[304]​, was disproportionate even if the bombings did amount to self-defence, and was thus in breach of international law​[305]​.  The response by States to the attacks was in awareness that it was individuals that were being directly affected by the bombings​[306]​, so that the prolonged process of bringing a claim of State responsibility before the ICJ would have been ineffectual.  Instead the response to the attacks commenced with the Security Council adopting Resolution 1860 to ‘condemn all violence and hostilities directed against civilians and all acts of terrorism’​[307]​, specifically recognising that the attacks were ‘directed against’ civilians (including a school for displaced children that the Palestinian Ministry of Health claimed resulted in over 1,300 deaths​[308]​).

The Security Council called for a collective response by requiring ‘Member States to intensify efforts to provide arrangements and guarantees in Gaza in order to sustain a durable ceasefire and calm, including to prevent illicit trafficking in arms and ammunition and to ensure the sustained reopening of the crossing points on the basis of the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access between the Palestinian Authority and Israel’​[309]​.  Thus, the response took into account the immediate impact on the civilian population.  At the same time the General Assembly ‘demand[ed] that Israel, the occupying Power, comply with its legal obligations under international law, as mentioned in the Advisory Opinion rendered on 9 July 2004 by the International Court of Justice and as demanded in Resolutions ES-10/15 of 20 July 2004 and ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003’​[310]​.

The response was not only to the specific 2008/2009 bombings but in addition sought redress because the attacks meant that Israel was in breach of prior legal undertakings such as the 2005 Agreement on Movement.  The responses sought immediate compliance with the law and performance of the State’s obligations, while utilising a range of measures from condemnation to collective action and sanction.  Cumulatively, these measures amounted to a more severe response then if Israel’s responsibility had been engaged under the State responsibility doctrine.

In addition, the combined effect of the responses taken implies the gravity with which the legal obligations (and underlying norms) that were breached are viewed by States.  If the condemnation of Israel and the steps taken to compel compliance with international law are seen as a means of seeking accountability, then the fact that the response was from both the Security Council and General Assembly illustrates the broader interest held in maintenance of the specific law.  If the response was merely out of concern for international peace and security then it could be expected that the Security Council would have acted in isolation.

This interpretation is strengthened because the European Parliament​[311]​ adopted a similar tone to that of the UN bodies, to likewise call upon ‘Israel to fulfil its international obligations’ and bring an ‘end to all acts of violence…military actions killing and endangering civilians, and extrajudicial targeted killings’​[312]​.  As the only directly-elected body of the EU, any criticism levelled by the 736 strong representatives makes a significant impact in terms of reflecting popular consensus, in comparison to the condemnation of bodies comprised of, and influenced by, political appointments.

The power of condemnation in particular circumstances, and the fact that condemnation in this case arguably sought to hold Israel to account for its actions, can be seen when a comparison is made between the condemnation in 2008/2009 and the reaction of States to earlier violations of international law by Israel.  In particular there is a marked difference in the strength of the language, which in turn implies the gravity with which the attacks were viewed at the point of the massive human casualties in 2008/2009.

For example, in 2006 following the 34 day conflict between Israel and Lebanon, Security Council Resolution 1701 called for a cease-fire between the parties, but the closest it came to condemning Israel’s actions was to imply that the State had breached Lebanon’s sovereignty.  The Security Council ‘reiterate[d] its strong support, as recalled in all its previous relevant Resolutions, for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognised borders’ rather than directly stating that Israel had attacked Lebanon​[313]​.  Following the 2008/2009 attacks in Resolution 63/98, the UN General Assembly identified ‘the continuing systematic violation of the human rights of the Palestinian people by Israel’ and stated that ‘all measures and actions taken by Israel…in violation of the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions and contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, are illegal and have no validity’​[314]​.  Clearly criticising Israel for breaching Lebanon’s sovereignty does not condone the State’s actions but when contrasted with the severe tone in the latter Resolutions it is submitted here that there is a strong case that some form of accountability was also being sought.

The shift from noting that Lebanon’s territorial integrity had been compromised by Israel to severely condemning Israel for its systematic violation of human rights in the Gaza implies that the breach of certain norms (in this case norms of humanitarian protection), or at least a breach with particularly grievous consequences, will lead to a harsher response from States.  The point being made is that both the circumstances of the breach and the particular law that is breached can have a direct bearing on the nature of the response and likewise whether the response can be taken to have held the State accountable.

The second criterion is whether through both formal and informal means there was a context specific response that identified the gravity of the norm that was breached.

4.2.3	Any Response to a Breach of Public International Law Must Itself Comply with Public International Law
The next example is drawn from the various responses to the practice of extraordinary rendition and secret detention facilities, and the argument here is that any response for the purpose of seeking accountability cannot violate international law, no matter how grievous the breach is considered to be.  It is argued here that it is unacceptable to say that a State has been held accountable when the means used to do so violated public international law.

The European Parliament has acknowledged that, to varying degrees, Member States of the Council of Europe are involved in ‘a “spider’s web” of illegal transfers of detainees woven by the Central Intelligence Agency’​[315]​.  In so doing, States such as the UK, Spain and Poland are in breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment​[316]​.

In 2006 the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, which was established by the Council of Europe but enlarged to include non-European States with 56 full members as of 2009​[317]​, released a Draft Opinion on the proposed consequences for Member States if they actively participated or passively acquiesced in the practice of extraordinary rendition​[318]​.  In the Commission’s Draft Opinion there was no defence to the practice, regardless of whether the State was complying with its other legal obligations, namely treaty obligations, for two reasons.  The interpretation and performance of a State’s treaty obligations primarily must be ‘in a manner compatible with their human rights obligations’​[319]​, including the European Convention on Human Rights and the ICCPR​[320]​.  Secondly, it tends to be the prohibition on torture that is breached during the practice of secret detention, which is ‘a peremptory norm (jus cogens)’​[321]​ and therefore non-derogable.  The Report went on to outline a variety of responses that may arise where States practice extraordinary rendition, all of which are permissible under international law, all of which can be utilised without needing the Council of Europe States to adopt a formal response mechanism and all of which require the breaching State to account for its actions.

In relation to abuses occurring on a Member State’s territory by agents of another State, the Opinion noted that although the Member ‘State cannot search foreign military bases on its territory, unless this is allowed under the relevant treaties’​[322]​, it was still ‘obliged to prevent, and react to such abuse of its territory’​[323]​.  For that purpose, the Commission concluded that Members could ‘exercise powers in respect of registration and control of aliens, and demand identification and movement orders of those present on the military base in question…In addition, appropriate diplomatic channels can be used in order to protest against such practice’​[324]​.  It was the view of the Commission that Members ‘must take all possible measures’​[325]​.

In relation to where a Member State had cause to suspect that individuals were being transferred by plane for the purposes of interrogation, there were two possible scenarios.  First, the aircraft could falsely claim civilian status in which case there would be a breach of the Chicago Convention so that the Member State was entitled to search the plane and ‘take all necessary measures to secure human rights’​[326]​.  Second, if there was an established link between the aircraft and the flag State​[327]​, then international law provides immunity for the flag State, which means that the Member State cannot seize the aircraft.  In order to overcome this restriction, the Commission considered that the Member State could refuse flight clearance for the aircraft or make use of the airspace conditional on the flag State allowing the aircraft to be searched​[328]​.  Thus, the Commission considered that Member States were to take all possible measures in responding to the practice of illegal detentions and transfers, but those measures still had to comply with international law, regardless that the breach in question was linked to the arguably jus cogens prohibition of torture​[329]​.

The third criterion is that any response when States breach international law that is illegal cannot be a means for seeking accountability, as the concept is constructed here.

4.2.4	A Response That Ensures State Accountability for Breaching International Law May be Political
While the response must not violate public international law, it is apparent from the few examples given here, that the response will often be political rather than legal.  Indeed, in terms of the associations with accountability that are made here by applying the interpretive framework, it seems that redress is often political, such as criticism by the UN bodies, sanctions imposed by States, and condemnation by human rights monitoring bodies.

The uncomfortable international pressure on the USA as a result of the detention centre in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba and the subsequent questioning before the UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) illustrates the developments in both legal and political redress that can be interpreted as forms of State accountability.  It is submitted that the UNHRC is in fact part of a broader development that has already been noted, and which includes the Human Rights Council and introduction of the Universal Peer Review mechanism, as effective sources of monitoring State power in a public forum. 

The potential impact of the UNHRC can be seen in its consideration of the Report submitted by the USA under Article 40 of the ICCPR in 2006.  Specific answers were sought from the USA, rather than generalised responses, to questions relating to the treatment of prisoners in the US detention facility in Guantánamo Bay.  Questions related to the implementation of relevant US domestic law, such as section 1005 Detainee Treatment Act 2005, the independence of review boards, and whether the USA could explain ‘restrictions on the rights of all detainees to have access to all proceedings’ and ‘the reasons justifying force-feeding’​[330]​.

It is argued here that when States are confronted with allegations, such as those against the USA in the context of the detention centre in Guantánamo, and required to account for their acts and omissions, there is evidence of accountability beyond the framework of responses available under international law.  Chapter One identified that accountability is widely interpreted as a form of answerability that requires the party to be able to justify their actions or incur redress.

In terms of a response to the breaches of international law by the USA, the UNHRC in its ‘Concluding Observations’​[331]​ criticised the USA because it had not ‘integrated into its report information on the implementation of the [ICCPR] with respect to individuals under its jurisdiction and outside its territory’​[332]​.  In particular, the Committee noted ‘shortcomings concerning the independence, impartiality and effectiveness of investigations into allegations of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment inflicted by United States military and non-military personnel or contract employees, in detention facilities in Guantánamo Bay’​[333]​ and its concerns because ‘Section 1005(e) of the Detainee Treatment Act bars detainees in Guantánamo Bay from seeking review in case of allegations of ill-treatment or poor conditions of detention’​[334]​.

The UNHRC is not comprised of State participants and does not represent the views of State in the same way as other UN organs, such as the General Assembly.  Instead the UNHRC is comprised of 18 human rights panellists, appointed on the basis of their expertise and on the basis that they are not affiliated with a certain State​[335]​, although the extent to which the representatives are able to retain political neutrality is debatable.  However, as a forum that requires States to justify their actions, the UNHRC clearly has potential as a mechanism for seeking State accountability, albeit political accountability.

Certainly in the case of the USA and the questioning over Guantánamo, there may not have been legal accountability but there were further political consequences beyond the criticism endured from the UNHRC, notably with the closure of Guantánamo being a campaign issue in the 2008 US elections.  The change in Government under US President Obama prioritised closure of Guantánamo and within one month of assuming office an Executive Order was issued was signed, which noted that ‘in view of the significant concerns raised by these detentions, both within the United States and internationally’​[336]​ ‘the detention facilities at Guantánamo… shall be closed as soon as practicable, and no later than 1 year from the date of this order’​[337]​.  A change in State policy that is expressly linked to ‘concerns’ expressed at the international level about how the State had breached international law, is a strong case for State accountability in practice.

The final criterion, or perhaps more accurately characteristic, of State accountability is that the particular response and outcome may be legal but to a degree it is also likely to be political - and even moral accountability cannot be excluded.

4.3	A Tentative Set of Evaluative Criteria
The illustrations cited here are isolated and not intended to provide comprehensive or in-depth coverage, instead they are used to establish a set of evaluative criteria to provide a benchmark for measuring the legal evolution of State accountability as this thesis progresses and more examples of State practice are considered.

Holding a State accountable is more than just noting that the State failed to comply with its obligations under international law.  Redress is required and the objective of redress is to ensure the validity, and thus maintenance, of international law​[338]​.  In order to determine whether redress is effective for that purpose, four evaluative criteria are adopted to assess State practice.

The first criterion is whether the response is beyond the scope of State responsibility, which will indicate that something more is sought in terms of answerability than can be provided under the State responsibility doctrine.  The fact that no claim for State responsibility has been brought against the USA or the UK for their invasion of Iraq in 2003 on the one hand and the continued attempts to politically justify the State’s actions on the other showed that accountability is not simply an application of State responsibility.

The collective condemnation by States and international organisations and the calls for cooperation amongst States to establish a ceasefire and to assist in reopening the crossing points, in response to the use of force by Israel in the Gaza region in 2008/2009, confirmed that the circumstances of the breach and the actual law that is breached will influence the nature of the response.  Thus, accountability must be assessed contextually and the second criterion for analysis is therefore whether the response identifies the gravity of the norm that is breached.  It is submitted that in the context of breaching jus cogens such recognition would be that the breach had the potential to affect the interests of the international community as a whole.  How such gravity is recognised will itself be context specific.  If it were to be argued that in the example given, Israel was held accountable for breaches of humanitarian law, which some scholars identify as jus cogens​[339]​ but certainly gives rise to erga omnes obligations, then the cumulative responses taken by States collectively and by international organisations such as the European Parliament could be highlighted as recognition of the gravity of the breach.

The third criterion arose in discussing the Venice Commission’s Draft Opinion on permissible responses to the practice of extraordinary rendition, which it considered were only limited by what was permissible under international law.  Any illegal response must be excluded from the analysis, but this is noted with the caveat of the fourth criterion that was identified from the response to the USA’s breaches of, for example the Geneva Conventions, in the Guantánamo detention camp.  While accountability cannot be illegal it does not need to be strictly legal and political accountability will suffice.  Thus illegal responses will be excluded but non-legal responses may be considered.

The fact that accountability may not be strictly legal, and may be either political or moral in nature, does not however preclude that a legal obligation exists to seek accountability.  The final section in conceptualising and attempting some specificity in understanding State accountability is thus to consider whether there is any legal duty or obligation on States to seek accountability when international law is breached.

5.	IS THERE A LEGAL OBLIGATION ON STATES TO SEEK STATE ACCOUNTABILITY?
The objective here is to determine whether there is an obligation under customary international law to hold States accountable for breaching - in particular - jus cogens.  This will be done by determining the scope and nature of any duty on States to hold individuals accountable, that was touched on in Chapter One, and determining if any such duty exists to hold States accountable.  A legal duty to hold States accountable would have implications in terms of arguing State accountability as a principle lex lata.  In addition, a legal obligation to hold States accountable has implications in terms of establishing the liability of the duty holder. 

The first question is whether an obligation to seek accountability can be inferred from the right to redress for victims of human rights violations, which was discussed in Chapter One, and captured in instruments such as Article 2(3) ICCPR and Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  To the extent this duty binds all States and is part of customary international law there is clearly a legal obligation to ensure redress when an individual’s human rights are contravened, and the failure to uphold this will entitle the victim to redress from the State.

By examining how the right to redress was interpreted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Velasquez Rodriguez case​[340]​ it can be determined whether there are any links with how accountability is understood here.  In this case Honduras was alleged to be responsible both for breaching the human rights protection per se and for failing to comply with its duty to ‘ensure’​[341]​ a right to redress.  The finding was in the context of allegations against Honduras for breaching the victim’s human rights under the American Convention on Human Rights, through the acts of State agents​[342]​.  The victim disappeared during a period between 1981 and 1984, when individuals who were considered to hold views that were a threat to the State’s security were being abducted.  A complaint was lodged with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in which the Honduras Government delayed providing information to the Commission for four years before reporting that all officials were cleared of blame​[343]​.  At that stage the Commission joined the application to two similar cases against Honduras and filed a successful claim before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights alleging a breach of the victim’s human rights under the Convention​[344]​.

The Court held that Honduras had breached the victim’s rights under Articles 4, 5 and 7 of the Convention.  In addition, the Court considered that the State had breached the victim’s right to a remedy, and that the latter was entitled to redress from Honduras on that basis​[345]​.  In determining what was required to satisfy the obligation to ‘ensure’ the rights of the victim under the American Convention on Human Rights, the Court required States to ‘prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights recognised by the Convention’​[346]​.  ‘All means of a legal, political, administrative and cultural nature’ were to be taken by States, although it was not ‘possible to make a detailed list of all such measures, since they vary with the law and the conditions of each State’​[347]​.  When these tests were applied to the case, the Court was satisfied that Honduras had breached its legal obligations.

In particular, the fact that three witnesses were assassinated during the trial compelled the Court to issue provisional measures ordering Honduras to ensure those crimes were investigated and that there was protection available for the remaining witnesses​[348]​.  The Government also made a preliminary application arguing that all available domestic measures had not been complied with, despite the victim’s family having filed three writs of habeas corpus and two criminal complaints seeking information from the Honduran Government.  In rejecting the argument, the Court noted that ‘the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies under the international law of human rights has certain implications’​[349]​ including the requirement ‘to provide effective judicial remedies to victims of human rights’​[350]​ that Honduras had failed to satisfy.

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights found that the failure by Honduras to uphold the right to redress was in breach of its obligations under the American Convention on Human Rights​[351]​ and the State’s ‘legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim adequate compensation’​[352]​.

It is clear, in breaking down the elements of the right to redress as interpreted by the Inter-American Court, in this case, that the objective is as if it were described as a duty to ensure accountability.  This is because there must be a determination of liability and, in addition, some form of response that reflects the actual breach​[353]​.  To that extent, there is a degree of overlap between what is meant by the right to redress and how accountability is interpreted.

As was likewise noted in Chapter One when this topic was touched upon, it is tenuous to extend the similarities between redress and accountability in order to argue there is a legal duty to ensure accountability.  It is even more problematic to argue a right to redress for individuals amounts to a duty to seek accountability from States because it is unclear who the duty holder would be.  For example, it would be absurd to claim that Honduras was under a legal obligation to hold itself accountable.

Setting aside the issues that would arise in its implementation, the second question is whether there is in fact an established legal duty on States to hold individuals accountable (that is not derived from the right to redress), which could then infer an obligation to ensure States are held accountable.  Chapter Three will refer to the argument that States are under a duty to hold individuals criminally accountable when they commit international crimes and in particular whether this duty is because international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity and torture are based on jus cogens norms​[354]​.  If the basis of such a duty is because international crimes are based on the breach of jus cogens norms by individuals then there is no reason to suppose that such a duty would not likewise apply when it was a State that breached the jus cogens norm.

This leads to the third question: whether there is an obligation to ensure accountability specifically because States recognise the particular law as jus cogens​[355]​?  The German Federal Constitutional Court expressed such a view when it considered that ‘States are increasingly subjected to a duty to terminate and remove grave violations of peremptory international law’​[356]​ given that ‘modern public international law is characterised by a continuous increase in the severity of the legal consequences which it attaches to the violation of particular central norms’​[357]​.  However, any judicial optimism cannot overcome a lack of support in practice or the fact that there is sufficient uncertainty surrounding jus cogens, that is discussed in the next Chapter, to make it difficult to determine what the juridical basis of the obligation would be.

Victims have a right to redress under international law but the extent to which there is an obligation to hold States accountable is less certain.  There is a lack of practical support and indeterminacy as to whether the legal basis for such an obligation relates to the law being recognised as jus cogens.  There is also uncertainty whether States would be the only duty holders, or whether other actors, such as the UN, would likewise be bound.  A finding that there is no legal obligation, at this time, does not mean that such an obligation will not crystallise in the future – and Chapter Three considers more fully whether there is an obligation to seek criminal accountability from individuals that may indicate such an obligation would likewise develop in relation to States.

In relation to this Chapter however, a negative answer at this time means that it cannot be assumed that the response when States breach international law is with the objective of fulfilling a legal duty to hold the breaching State accountable.  Indeed, accountability may only be the by-product of a response, undertaken with a separate objective.

6.	CONCLUSION
Chapter Two has sought to construct an interpretive framework that may be used in this thesis to assess the extent to which States are held accountable under international law for breaching jus cogens norms and the extent to which State accountability is crystallizing as a principle of international law.  Three steps were taken in this Chapter for the purpose of conceptualising State accountability.

It was noted that the scope of State practice that would be considered in identifying State accountability that occurs on an ad hoc or informal basis is broad.  The various interpretations of accountability covered in Chapter One emphasised that the general concept is relational and context specific; the debate on the role of legitimacy versus legality in international relations, notably the argument that State intervention is permissible for humanitarian reasons; and the way that State practice emphasises compliance with the law, led to the conclusion that the response when States breach international law cannot be illegal but it can be non-legal.

The metaphor of a continuum of responses when States breach international law, is useful here.  On this continuum illegal responses sit at one end (the use of force, military overthrow of the government), responses that are set down in black letter international law are located at the other end (the doctrine of State responsibility, loss of immunity) and responses that are not prohibited but not expressly condoned lie in the middle (sanctions, censure).  It is submitted here that State accountability has the potential to cover the whole spectrum up to the point that response is illegal, and furthermore that a range of responses on the continuum may be used for any one breach.

The second step was to identify a set of evaluative associations for assessing the practice of State accountability.  These were set out and will be repeated only briefly.  The first is whether the response was in terms of engaging the principle of State responsibility (that is not, of itself, discounted as a response).  If the response is beyond the scope of the State responsibility doctrine then there is an assumption that something more is required than just reparation on that basis.  The second and third criteria are that the response is not illegal and that it is specific to the facts and the law breached.  The final criterion was that the nature of State accountability can be both legal and/or political, and even be quasi- criminal in nature.

The third and final step in constructing the interpretive framework was to note that there is no express legal obligation to ensure States are held accountable and that it cannot be assumed that when States respond to a breach of international law, the objective is to seek accountability.  This point is important in light of the question posed at the start of this Chapter as to whether the analysis should be outcome oriented or process oriented.  It is clear that if the objective in responding is not necessarily to hold the State accountable, and that the potential variety in responses is vast, the only commonality can be the outcome.
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Chapters One and Two constructed State accountability as an interpretive framework and if each Chapter in this thesis is viewed as a step in analysing the evolution of the concept from lex feranda to lex lata, then the purpose of Chapter Three is to understand the relationship between State accountability and already established, relevant, principles of international law.  If a relationship between hypothetical State accountability and the proven principles considered here is shown to exist, then there is a much stronger argument for the concept having normative standing.

Three doctrines of international law will be considered here.  The first two, being individual criminal accountability and State immunity, have a direct bearing on State accountability because they relate to the response when international law is breached.  In contrast, the third doctrine refers to the recognition and status of jus cogens norms that affect a State’s primary obligations, which at first glance appears unrelated to accountability for breaching those obligations.  

However it is the discussion of jus cogens that is pivotal to the direction of this thesis, because it will be argued that jus cogens is the link between conceptual State accountability and established public international law.  It is from the perspective of how the international community should respond when jus cogens norms are breached that it becomes credible to argue that the theory, canvassed thus far, is juridically feasible and has practical State support.

State immunity, which is the form of immunity that is mainly relevant to this thesis on State accountability, is ‘generally accepted as a principle of customary international law’​[358]​.  States are granted immunity ‘from the jurisdiction of the courts of another State’​[359]​, which, prima facie, suggests that immunity could prevent a State from being held accountable because there would be no determination of liability, let alone imposition of redress.  It seems incongruous that an established principle of public international law could have the potential to frustrate an effective response when international law is breached, and thus any link between the State immunity doctrine and conceptual State accountability will be examined.

Chapter Two examined the relationship between State accountability and some form of criminal accountability – namely in the form of criminal State responsibility - and concluded that, while there have been attempts to associate the two, there are, currently insurmountable issues in placing the State within a criminal liability framework.  While such a finding discounts the need for further consideration of criminal State accountability, it remains to be seen whether there is any overlap between State accountability and individual criminal accountability.

The conflation of the State and its organs, and the potential affect this may have in terms of the State’s accountability has already been noted.  Chapter Three builds on this earlier discussion in referring to the specific context of international criminal law.  It will be asked whether individual criminal accountability was ever intended to, or can in any way, address the accountability of both States and individuals.​[360]​  It is anticipated that where jus cogens norms are breached, individual criminal accountability will be shown to serve a discrete function, which may contribute to but cannot replace the need to hold the State accountable.

It is not the intention of this thesis to endorse one definition of jus cogens above another or argue that a certain norm is or is not jus cogens, because the focus here is on accountability for the breach rather than development of the law.  However, without greater clarity as to what jus cogens norms are it cannot be argued that there are unique properties relating to jus cogens that are instrumental to, and indicative of, the evolution of a principle of State accountability.  In addition, it may be assumed that if jus cogens are distinguished from standard norms of international law, then there is a definitional reason why this is so.  Furthermore, if it is shown that there is a distinction without understanding why, it is impossible to determine if so-called jus cogens norms have been breached and accordingly whether there is any practice of States being held accountable for such breaches.  Finally, the requirement for an analysis of jus cogens, instead of the term being used without explanation, is an indicator that there is some debate relating to the concept, which must therefore be canvassed here.

2.	IS THERE A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE IMMUNITY AND STATE ACCOUNTABILITY?
This Chapter seeks to clarify how the concept of State accountability interacts with established doctrines of international law and the doctrine of State immunity is the first of these to be considered.  The question is whether the doctrine of State immunity could undermine any principle of State accountability that this thesis shows to be evolving in public international law.  The potential for incompatibility exists because the immunity doctrine shelters States from the courts of a foreign State either determining its liability or ordering redress, which in turn could have been used as a mechanism to hold the breaching State accountable.

State immunity was described by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Ex Parte Pinochet (the Pinochet Case) as ‘a basic principle of international law [whereby] one sovereign State does not adjudicate on the conduct of a foreign State’​[361]​.  That same year, in the case of Holland v Lampen-Wolfe, the House of Lords recognised that State immunity ‘is a creature of customary international law [that] derives from the equality of sovereign States’​[362]​, which on the facts meant that the UK courts could not exercise jurisdiction over the USA.  Lord Millett did not consider that failing to adjudicate was a violation of the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, because in this case the USA is not party to the European Convention on Human Rights.  Thus, unless the USA consented to the UK Courts exercising jurisdiction, which it did not, there was no basis on which jurisdiction could be exercised​[363]​.  This decision illustrates how fundamental the immunity principle is perceived to be, at least by the House of Lords, in public international law.

The State immunity doctrine has the potential to undermine attempts to hold States accountable for breaching public international law because domestic courts cannot adjudicate on the acts and omissions of State actors.  It should be remembered, however, that immunity is limited in effect to findings of legal responsibility by a particular court and it is argued here that the much broader focus of State accountability distinguishes the concept from the State immunity doctrine.  In other words, and as will be argued in relation to the doctrine of State responsibility in Chapter Four, conceptual State accountability is separate to the strictly legal principle of State immunity.

State immunity and State accountability are separate so the focus here is on whether the doctrine is in any way incompatible with the concept, which would then suggest there is little chance of State accountability evolving to become lex lata.

2.1	The Function of State Immunity
If the purpose of State immunity is to prevent a determination of the State’s liability or imposition of redress then the doctrine is clearly incompatible with any hypothetical principle of State accountability.  However, this is not the case, and in the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (the Arrest Warrant Case) the ICJ noted that ‘the immunities enjoyed under international law…do not represent a bar to criminal prosecution’​[364]​.  The reference to ‘criminal prosecution’ highlights that the facts related to the immunity of individuals, while the quotation illustrates the point that immunity generally is not from the law itself.

In the Arrest Warrant Case, the ICJ upheld the immunity of a former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Congo after an arrest warrant was issued in Belgium for alleged breaches of the Geneva Conventions whilst the Minister still held office​[365]​.  The judgment does not make it clear that the Court considered the immunity of foreign ministers would come within the scope of State immunity, but the judgment does highlight that the Court considered, in discussing the broader principle, that immunity was not to facilitate parties in escaping the consequences of their wrongdoing.  It was noted ‘that the rules governing the jurisdiction of national courts must be carefully distinguished from those governing jurisdictional immunities: jurisdiction does not imply absence of immunity while absence of immunity does not imply jurisdiction’​[366]​.  The Court was being sure to note that immunity is unrelated to the function of the courts to determine a party’s liability, which remains unchecked.  To emphasise its point, the Court stated that ‘immunity from jurisdiction…does not mean that the [party] may enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes’​[367]​.

When it is State immunity in particular that is being considered, it can be seen that the intended function of the doctrine is as a tool to facilitate international law and manage relations between States.  For example, following the decision by the House of Lords in Rob Jones v Saudi Arabia​[368]​ granting immunity to Saudi Arabia for the alleged acts of torture by its agents, the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair declared that the decision ‘ensure[d] that the rules of international law and State immunity are fully and accurately presented and upheld’, while also confirming that the State’s ‘strong position against torture remains unchanged’​[369]​.

The European Court of Human Rights likewise takes the view that immunity is an important tool in international relations.  In McElhinney v Ireland the question arose as to whether the doctrine of State immunity would contravene the right to a fair trial enshrined under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights​[370]​.  The Court held that ‘generally recognised rules of public international law on State immunity cannot in principle be regarded as imposing a disproportionate restriction on the right of access to court’.  The Court considered that the principle of State immunity was anyway justified as it ‘pursues the legitimate aim of complying with international law to promote comity and good relations between States through the respect of another State’s sovereignty’​[371]​.

In Fogarty v United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights again had to consider the relationship between State immunity with the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  In this case, the Court held that ‘the right of access to court is an inherent part of the fair trial guarantee’ but that there are restrictions including ‘those limitations generally accepted by the community of nations as part of the doctrine of State immunity’​[372]​.

It is clear that the State immunity doctrine is a firmly established principle of public international law with a discrete function that is unrelated to the question of State accountability, as it is discussed in this thesis.  That is not to say that there have been no attempts to make inroads into the doctrine as seen with Wald J of the US Appeals Court who was of the opinion that jus cogens norms may give rise to an exception to the principle.

In his dissent in Princz v Federal Republic of Germany​[373]​ Wald J considered that there was a tension between the maintenance of jus cogens norms under international law and the State immunity doctrine.  The US Appeals Court of the District of Columbia was faced with an application for compensation against the German Government by a survivor of the Holocaust.  Wald J argued that the norm that had been breached was jus cogens, which meant that Germany waived any immunity that was available to the State.  The Court disagreed and held that, provided the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976 could be retrospectively applied to the period 1942-1945, Germany was to be granted immunity as none of the statutory exceptions in the Act applied​[374]​.

Judge Wald’s views are similar to those taken by ad hoc Judge van der Wyngaert in the Arrest Warrant Case, stating that the ‘practice [of] immunity leads to de facto impunity’​[375]​.  However, such opinions are isolated and the broader consensus is that the doctrine is not incompatible with ‘identifying and assigning…accountability’​[376]​.  This position does not alter just because the breach is of a jus cogens norm, as argued by Lady Fox noting that ‘there is no substantive content in the procedural plea of State immunity upon which a jus cogens mandate can bite’​[377]​.  A view shared by both the House of Lords and the European Court of Human Rights.

In Rob Jones v Saudi Arabia the appellant sought to bring a claim against Saudi Arabia alleging torture.  The House of Lords considered whether the principle of immunity barred the exercise of jurisdiction over Saudi Arabia to conclude that there was no exception to the doctrine just because the prohibition of torture was recognised as jus cogens.  The Court considered that ‘State immunity is a procedural rule…it does not contradict a prohibition contained in a jus cogens norm but merely diverts any breach of it to a different method of settlement’​[378]​.

In Al Adsani v United Kingdom​[379]​ the European Court of Human Rights also adopted the view that a ‘grant of immunity’ should not be described as ‘qualifying a substantive right, but as a procedural bar’​[380]​ noting at the same time that the fundamental importance of prohibiting torture had not given rise to an exception to the immunity doctrine.  Kuwait sought immunity from the jurisdiction of the UK courts to hear allegations of torture against Kuwait.  While the minority considered that granting immunity would undermine the applicant’s right to a ‘fair and public hearing’, under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the majority did not consider that would be the case.  The Court held that the right to a remedy under Article 6 did not exist in isolation and that the European Convention on Human Rights was to be read in conjunction with established principles of international law of which immunity is one​[381]​.

The function of the immunity doctrine in facilitating relations between States and as an established principle of international law is recognised by the international courts.  While there are isolated examples that perhaps suggest there could be some development of the doctrine as it applies in the context of jus cogens norms in the future, this has yet to occur.  Instead any concern that granting State immunity may allow the State to escape the consequences of its actions is addressed by the oft-repeated reassurance that as a procedural rule the doctrine does not prevent redress being sought from States.

2.2	Head of State Immunity as a Bar to State Accountability
State immunity and State accountability must be viewed separately but a few words are also needed here on head of State immunity, because if a head of State is the embodiment of the State then it would seem logical to anticipate that granting head of State immunity could have the same effect as granting immunity to the State.

To clarify, it is not being suggested that State immunity and head of State immunity are the same thing, although there is some overlap to the extent that a head of State may, as a general rule, benefit from both head of State immunity and State immunity while in office​[382]​.  Even if the effect of any overlap is that the State is indirectly granted immunity, the above discussion has shown that whether direct or indirect, State immunity is of little relevance to the analysis of State accountability.

The only relevance that head of State immunity has in this thesis is due to the argument that realistically State accountability will be the result of a number of factors, of which the criminal accountability of Government officials is one​[383]​.  If personal immunity is granted and the individual cannot therefore be held accountable before a court as a result, then obviously there is no measure of individual accountability that can be counted towards the accountability of the State.

However, to argue that head of State immunity has the potential to indirectly inhibit State accountability is to oversimplify the matter and fails to acknowledge that the immunities that are granted to heads of State fulfil quite separate and varying functions.  When the functions of head of State immunity, which seek to facilitate the international relations of States, are taken into consideration it is once again clear that the question of immunity (whether State immunity or head of State immunity) and the question of accountability are unrelated.  Suggesting that the head of State immunity doctrine must be adapted to ensure State accountability is like arguing that individuals must be allowed to directly participate in the creation of public international law in order to guarantee the protection of human rights.

Reference to the functions of head of State immunity clarifies the point.  Immunity ratione materiae is extended to the head of State as the functional embodiment of the State, which pragmatically means that immunity is also granted to the State.  Thus it is a non sequiter to say that granting the head of State immunity allows the State to avoid its liability – because it was the State that was effectively being granted immunity in the first place (albeit indirectly through its organs).

On the other hand, immunity ratione personae is based on non-attribution of the wrongdoing to the individual and instead imputing the wrongdoing to the State, for which the State then enjoys immunity.  There is an exception in relation to international crimes where immunity has been denied to individuals and will not be granted before certain international courts, provided that the court has jurisdiction to act in the first place​[384]​.  In those cases the acts and omissions are the individual’s own and thus unrelated to the State.

Developments in head of State immunity relating to international crimes illustrate two points.  Firstly, inroads into the principle of head of State immunity have occurred, and have been tolerated in the specific circumstances, only where the act or omission is independent of the individual’s role as it pertains to the State.  In this sense they can be seen not as exceptions to or developments in the immunity doctrine, because the doctrine had no application in the circumstances.  This again confirms that the head of State immunity doctrine and its associated functions are unchanged and that the immunity principle is separate from questions of accountability.

Secondly, and because the so-called developments in head of State immunity are in fact unrelated to the substantive immunity doctrine, it is worthwhile considering whether progress in holding individual heads of State accountable has any relevance in terms of State accountability.  Two notable examples are cited here and in both cases the breach in question was of a jus cogens norm.

The recent decision of the ICC to issue an arrest warrant for the incumbent head of State of Sudan, Omar Al-Bashir, established that the official capacity of an individual was not a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction before the ICC.  The charges included war crimes and crimes against humanity under the Articles 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute, which the ILC has given as examples of jus cogens norms​[385]​.  As of 2009 the arrest warrant had not been enforced and it is acknowledged that there is little likelihood of this happening while Al-Bashir continues in office due to the political and logistical difficulties in enforcing the warrant​[386]​.

The second notable example was the denial of head of State immunity in the Pinochet Case.  Spain sought extradition of former Chilean dictator Pinochet following his arrest in the UK and the House of Lords was faced with the prospect that Pinochet would not be brought to trial for the crime of torture if immunity from prosecution were granted​[387]​.  The majority held that Pinochet was not entitled to immunity - but only from 1988 when the UK ratified the Torture Convention in the 1988 Criminal Justice Act that recognised torture as an international crime.  Jorgensen argued that the effect of the decision by their Lordships was ‘to remove the immunity of former heads of State with respect to the international crime of torture while preserving the absolute immunity of the State itself’​[388]​, and the approach of the House of Lords has been criticised​[389]​.

Such criticism may be warranted, but it is argued here that any progress in relation to holding individuals criminally accountable by denying immunity is in fact only of indirect value in terms of seeking redress from the State​[390]​.  As already discussed – and will be again in Chapter Four - public international law does not provide for criminal State responsibility.  Thus, even if State immunity was not granted in the context of international crimes there would be little in terms of practical legal consequences because there is no legal means to hold the State criminally liable.  Civil liability would be no advance on the current State responsibility doctrine and this thesis is arguing that in isolation the doctrine is insufficient in terms of redress when the breach is of a jus cogens norm.

This thesis does not, however, argue that State accountability is criminal in nature, and the concept is also distinguished from criminal State responsibility.  Instead, and because the concept is not strictly legal, the discussion here illustrates that the immunity doctrine does not prevent State accountability.  The implied grant of State immunity to Chile, as noted by Jorgensen, and any practice of international courts indicting acting heads of States is thus of limited consequence in terms of State accountability.

2.3	Is State Immunity Incompatible with State Accountability?
Any perception that the immunity doctrine could mean that States are not required to answer for breaching public international law has not led to the doctrine being reformulated.  The risk that accountability (in its broadest sense as it applies to States and non-State actors) for breaching jus cogens norms could be frustrated has arguably encouraged greater judicial contemplation, but it has not yet led to any express development in the State immunity doctrine.  The conclusion, at this time, is that the doctrine of immunity and the concept of State accountability are not necessarily incompatible as the concept of accountability transcends immunity.  The increasing emphasis on maintaining jus cogens norms may however mean that there are developments in the future to guarantee co-existence​[391]​.

3.	IS THERE A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND STATE ACCOUNTABILITY?
In terms of legal developments that are relevant to seeking accountability for breaches of international law, perhaps the most significant relates to individuals rather than States, and it is the codification of international criminal law.  Commentators like Andersen note that the ‘rise of international criminal law’ has seen progression in holding individuals accountable, but argues that at the same time the effect has been to ‘crowd’​[392]​ out developments that would be pertinent in terms of seeking redress from States, for the equivalent to international crimes of individuals.  Effectively it is Andersen’s claim that is being tested in this section.

The first approach in determining whether there is a relationship between individual criminal and State accountability is to consider the historical context in which international criminal law evolved and determine why the law developed to focus on individual criminal accountability rather than State accountability.  Chapter Two noted the issues that arise in terms of actually seeking some form of criminal redress from States, namely how to punish a State, so this section concentrates upon the reasons that international criminal law did not develop in such a way as to take the role of the State into account in the first place.  This is to identify for discussion any further issues, not yet covered, that have the potential of frustrating the concept of State accountability  in practice.

The second approach in testing Andersen’s claim is to consider the extent to which individual and State accountability overlap or in fact are separate - in light of the difficulties in distinguishing between the two that have already been noted.  To the extent that State accountability is linked with individual criminal accountability, any legal developments in terms of the latter can then be considered in terms of evidence as to the normative standing of the former.

3.1	The Relevance of the Historical Context in the Development of International Criminal Law
The end of the First World War led to a significant development in terms of accountability for breaching international law because a distinction was sought by the Allied Powers between the individual fault of the German Kaiser and the fault of Germany as a whole.  Some sort of mechanism or tool whereby the liability, and thus accountability, of the Kaiser would be distinguished from the State and the general population was needed and with hindsight it is clear that the future development of international criminal law was influenced by these events.

The attempt to bring Kaiser Wilhelm II to trial pursuant to the terms of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles was because both the individual and the State were considered to be at fault; although the wording of the Treaty suggests the greater proportion of legal, as opposed to moral, blame was considered by the drafters of the Treaty to lie with Germany.  Article 227 stated that the Kaiser was to be put on trial ‘for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties’, so his breach was linked to the immorality of the war.  Germany’s liability, on the other hand, was for aggressive war.  Not only was the fault of the Kaiser treated separately from that of Germany, so was the culpable breach.  The Kaiser was charged with breaching ‘international morality’ rather than ‘international law’, which Kelsen argued was intended to capture the gravity of the breach while avoiding the fact there was a dubious legal basis for bringing the Kaiser to trial​[393]​.  Thus it was both the fault and the breach of Germany and the Kaiser that were treated as separate.

In terms of redress, Article 232 required Germany to pay reparations ‘for all damage done…by such aggression’, to imply a penal element in diverting funds from the internal reconstruction of Germany after the War, thus imposing a burden on the State.  Article 231 also required that Germany ‘accept’ responsibility for loss caused by any of its allies over which it had control.  In addition, Germany was required to admit its fault, rather than simply accept that the other parties to the Treaty considered Germany was at fault.  The redress sought from the State was, again, different to any redress that would theoretically be sought from the Kaiser in a criminal trial.  Yet while Germany was charged with acts and omissions recognised as criminal under international law, being aggression, the nature of redress was not envisaged to be so.

In contrast, the Kaiser could not be held accountable for aggression because there was perceived to be no such crime by individuals​[394]​.  Ultimately the trial was abandoned, however if the trial had occurred and the Kaiser was found guilty then the nature of the redress would have been criminal, despite the fact that breaching morality is not a crime under international law.

The anomaly noted here highlights that at the end of the First World War, the accountability of individuals was frustrated by a deficit in the expression of crimes by individuals under international law, while the accountability of States was frustrated by a lack of effective redress with which to respond to the State’s liability.  Thus there were two potential directions that the development of international criminal law was likely to take, either to codify the criminal accountability of individuals or identify some way to seek criminal redress from States.  History shows that the former focus was applied.

The practical issues in relation to seeking accountability from either the Kaiser or Germany were noted by the Commission on Responsibility that was established in 1919 to consider the issue of liability for the War.  Even before the consequences of imposing post-war reparations on Germany were apparent so as to dissuade against future use of, what proved to be, crippling reparations against the State as a whole, the conclusion of the Commission was that individual accountability was a priority.  The recommendation was that in the future there should be ‘penal sanctions’ ‘for such grave outrages against the elementary principles of international law’​[395]​.  In the aftermath of World War Two it was indeed penal sanctions that were sought from individuals for international crimes.

The focus at the Nuremberg Tribunals on individual accountability could not be in ignorance of the role played by Germany​[396]​, given that ‘behind every Axis war criminal…lies the basic criminal instigation of the Nazi doctrine’​[397]​.  But reparations had fallen out of favour as a means of redress due to the extent to which the German people had suffered as a result in the aftermath of the First World War.  Indeed, the idea of criminal State accountability was in fact discussed and rejected at Nuremberg, so criminal redress was not an option​[398]​.  Instead there were two ways in which it can be said that Germany’s liability was addressed.

Firstly, there were forms of collective criminal liability included under the Nuremberg Charter. This may be interpreted as a replacement for seeking criminal accountability directly from Germany if the view is taken that the accountability of individuals in some way counts toward the accountability of the State or that the State is in fact a derivation of the collective population.  Articles 9 to 11 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal provided that liability for membership of what was found to be a criminal organisation such as the Gestapo was to be in addition to liability for breaches committed in a personal capacity.  This meant that there was still some form of legal recognition of the systemic framework that existed, which allowed the individuals to commit the crimes in question​[399]​.

Secondly, it is submitted that Germany’s liability was addressed beyond the scope of the criminal framework – and that these responses are an example of an ad hoc attempt at seeking accountability from Germany​[400]​.  The terms of the Potsdam agreement required the reduction or destruction of all industry with war-potential, including shipbuilding, machine production and chemical factories, under the so-called Level of Industry Plans for Germany​[401]​, and included terms dividing Germany’s territory amongst the Allied powers.  In addition, a reparations deal was later agreed with the German Government and negotiated with international Jewish organisations and the Israeli government, which has resulted in excess of 60 billion dollars being paid to survivors​[402]​.  Finally, in 1990 an apology was made by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on behalf of the German State for the crimes of the Nazi regime​[403]​.  Taken in combination these responses illustrate that the focus on individual criminal accountability at the Nuremberg Tribunal was not considered to be a replacement for seeking redress from Germany.  Instead the means for seeking redress were not solely those mechanisms within the framework of international criminal law.

The historical context has had a significant impact on international criminal law as a major development in relation to individual accountability.  In the context of both World Wars the need to respond to the atrocity, the likes of which had not been seen before, meant that the difficulties in seeking legal accountability from the State were bypassed and the focus shifted to individual accountability, which was dealt with under international criminal law.  Germany’s liability, on the other hand, and the question of State accountability generally was left to be dealt with by reparation and political redress.

3.2	Is There Any Overlap Between Individual Criminal Accountability and State Accountability?
It is argued in this thesis that the more developments that are identified in relation to broadening the modes of redress when public international law is breached, the stronger the indicator that a principle of State accountability exists or could emerge.  To the extent there is any overlap between individual criminal accountability and State accountability then any developments in the former would be of especial relevance in arguing the existence of the latter.

The first such development would have to be international criminal law itself, which has certainly established a precedent in relation to individuals, whereby there can be effective accountability for a breach of international law generally and jus cogens norms in particular, given the overlap between international crimes and jus cogens that will be discussed substantively in the next section.  But holding an individual accountable for breaching international law generally, or jus cogens norms in particular, does not displace the need to hold the respective State accountable​[404]​.  The two concepts must be kept separate in terms of recognising that each party is accountable for their respective breach.  An example of this being the early attempts to define terrorism in the 1937 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, which was a development in codifying individual accountability but not in terms of State accountability.  This was the case even though the Convention provided that States were under a duty not to commit terrorism, by ‘encouraging terrorist activities’ that necessarily would involve the State’s agents​[405]​.

Further developments in international criminal law to facilitate individual accountability include the principle of universal jurisdiction​[406]​, the obligation under the maxim aut dedere aut judicare to extradite or prosecute​[407]​ and the duty on States to suppress piracy​[408]​.  Furthermore, if States fail to hold an individual accountable then other States, and even non-State actors such as the International Criminal Court may, in certain circumstances​[409]​, assume this role.

In fact, it appears that the more fundamental the norm is perceived to be (as with international crimes) the greater the scope of cooperation between members of the international community to ensure the breaching party is held accountable, but these developments all relate to individual accountability.  It is clear that States do breach public international law, including those norms that give rise to individual criminal accountability.  So either there is some overlap between the State and the individual, so that the individual’s accountability can count towards that of the State; there are prohibitive difficulties in imposing criminal redress on States; or the liability of States for breaching those norms remains but is not considered to be criminal in nature.  Alternatively, and the argument made throughout this thesis, all three explanations apply.

The fact that finding an individual accountable for a breach of his or her obligations under international law does not displace the need to address the State’s accountability is expressly noted under international law.  Article 25(4) of the Rome Statute of the ICC confirms that ‘no provision’ relating to individual criminal accountability shall prevent redress being sought from States’​[410]​.  Similarly, Article 5 of the ILC’s 1991 Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind provided that the ‘prosecution of an individual for a crime against the peace and security of mankind does not relieve a State’​[411]​ of liability.

In terms of judicial recognition, the ICJ ‘expressly rejected’ the contention that the State could escape liability on the grounds that individuals had been prosecuted for the same breach​[412]​, which was reiterated from the reverse perspective, being an international court that dealt with the liability of the individual rather than the State, in Prosecutor v Furundzija​[413]​.  The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) noted that the breach ‘of an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the human being’ would require the individual perpetrator to be held accountable and in addition, the ‘essential importance’ of the law in question, which was the prohibition on torture and based on what is arguably a jus cogens norm, required separate redress from the State​[414]​.  Thus international criminal law is only concerned with individual accountability, regardless that individuals and States may breach the same legal obligation.

Of course, the political reality of international relations may mean that redress is not sought from either the State or the individual.  A clear illustration of where politics is able to influence the application of international criminal law is in the lack of support for the arrest warrant issued by ICC seeking to indict the incumbent head of State for the Sudan​[415]​.  The lack of actual and practical support by the international community suggests there is little likelihood that the warrant will be implemented​[416]​.  However, the fact that the warrant was even issued to displace the traditional principle that an acting head of State enjoys immunity from prosecution should not be dismissed.  But, as with the majority of developments in terms of accountability for breaching international law that have thus far been discussed in this Chapter, the progress that is being made relates to individuals.

The progress in terms of holding individuals criminal accountable is indicative that more comprehensive accountability is sought for breaches of public international law.  However, it would be unsustainable to argue that the development of international criminal law establishes that a concept of State accountability has current normative standing.  Indeed there is a marked discrepancy between the relatively rapid growth in individual criminal accountability and the somewhat stagnant treatment in terms of making States answer for grievous breaches of international law, whether for pragmatic or political reasons.  This is of course separate to the point being argued in the thesis that the accountability of, for example, Government officials can be a relevant factor and count towards the accountability of the State.

To clarify, individual and State accountability are separate (although the former may be applied to the latter to a degree).  It is, however, submitted that individual criminal accountability is evidence that the development of public international law is being influenced by the international community’s desire for more comprehensive accountability.

4.	CONCLUSIONS ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF STATE ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE DOCTRINES OF IMMUNITY AND INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY
The conclusion here is that the ‘rise of international criminal law’ may initially have had the effect of ‘crowd[ing]’​[417]​ out developments relating to State accountability, but two points may be taken from the above discussion that are relevant to the assessment of the normative standing of State accountability.  While the breach of each party is treated separately, the accountability of individuals may be indirectly relevant in holding States accountable.  Secondly, the developments noted in the previous sections are associated with the increasing recognition by States that certain norms are of ‘essential importance’ to humanity​[418]​.  Recognition that there are certain fundamental rules of public international law also led to the inclusion of peremptory or jus cogens in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  Which is not to say that all international crimes are therefore jus cogens norms, because such an argument is impossible without having first considered what jus cogens are.

A greater understanding of jus cogens is needed to determine whether these particular norms were the catalyst for the changes noted above.  If it is the case that jus cogens have inspired debate on whether the immunity doctrine should remain unaltered, and if jus cogens are the same thing as the fundamental protections that inspired international criminal law then it is reasonable to argue  that jus cogens may equally inspire future change in relation to State accountability.  Of course, this is on the proviso that jus cogens also bind States.  The remainder of Chapter Three is dedicated to determining exactly what jus cogens are.

5.	‘JUS COGENS’
A greater understanding of jus cogens is critical to the progression of this thesis​[419]​.  It is submitted here that the strongest link between conceptual State accountability and established international law, and the primary indicator that there may be an evolution of the concept to lex lata, is that jus cogens have been recognised by States as norms that are non-derogable.  It is through adopting Koskenniemi’s view that law can be used to make sense of reality, that jus cogens is applied here as a tool to make sense - identify and analyse - any practice of State accountability​[420]​.

An analogy to further illustrate the rationale for this argument is with Evans’s point that ‘the language of State responsibility has been used…quite deliberately to broaden the scope of substantive legal [human right] obligations’​[421]​.  Here the question is whether the language of State accountability has been used to broaden the scope of substantive legal jus cogens related obligations.

When States recognise that jus cogens are non-derogable, as opposed to States simply accepting jus cogens as a legal declaration of what that conduct should be, an evaluative standard for measuring State conduct is established​[422]​.  In turn, it would be reasonable to expect that if State conduct was found not to comply with jus cogens, there would be some sort of mechanism for responding to the breach.  It is submitted here that evidence of such a mechanism is indicative of an evolving principle of State accountability.  And, if there is no such mechanism for responding when jus cogens are breached then the argument as to whether such norms in fact exist is equally valid.

But without clarity as to why States recognise that jus cogens are non-derogable and thus different to other norms of international law, it is impossible to contend that the need to protect such norms requires a response when breached or could inspire the evolution of a principle of State accountability.  This in turn makes it difficult to assess the legal feasibility of a principle of accountability, let alone identify any evidence that State accountability already occurs in practice.

This is not to say that there needs to be an unequivocal determination of the existence or content of jus cogens, indeed adopting a working definition for assessing State practice is beneficial as the subsequent analysis can then prove or disprove the definition that is adopted.  The conclusion may in fact be that not only is there no practice of State accountability but, in addition, there is little evidence of jus cogens being recognised by States.  For example, it was noted that while there had been developments in the immunity doctrine that could be linked with the recognition of jus cogens these were isolated and the standard approach is represented by the judgment in Al-Adsani​[423]​.  The decision by the European Court of Human Rights to uphold the immunity of Kuwait was legally sound but it also confirmed that established principles of international law are currently given primacy over emerging and indeterminate principles such as jus cogens.  Thus a working definition will be used in this thesis rather than presenting a new normative construction that attempts to resolve any of the debate relating to jus cogens.

The objective of this analysis is to identify what norms are recognised as jus cogens by looking for any State and juridical consensus as to jus cogens as a concept.  There will be an overview of the controversy as to definition, a consideration of the norms’ source and substance and also an assessment of the relationship between the content of jus cogens and erga omnes obligations.

5.1	Debating and Attempting to Define Jus Cogens
5.1.1	Definition
Supporters of jus cogens contend that there is a body of norms under international law that are universally binding and are different to standard norms of international law​[424]​.  In its 2006 Report on the Fragmentation of International Law, the ILC concluded that some rules of international law are more important, that they enjoy a ‘special status in the international legal system’ and are described in terms of being ‘fundamental’, ‘elementary considerations’ and ‘intransgressible principles of international law’​[425]​.  However, within this category was included not only jus cogens but also erga omnes obligations and aspects of the UN Charter​[426]​.  This highlights that there is an overlap between jus cogens and other norms, which are considered fundamental under international law.  In turn, the overlap with other fundamental international laws points to the debate as to how and why jus cogens are distinguished from standard norms.

The ILC considered that jus cogens norms can be distinguished from other ‘intransgressible principles’ of international law by referring to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention Law on Treaties (VCLT)​[427]​, which defines jus cogens as having two characteristics.  They are ‘recognised by the international community of States’ and in addition ‘no derogation is permitted’​[428]​.

This definition was also adopted by the ILC in its 2006 Report on the Fragmentation of International Law, but in contrast to Article 53 VCLT the ILC made a specific link between non-derogability and the ‘universal acceptance’ of the ‘superiority’ of the content of jus cogens as the elements that distinguish jus cogens from other fundamental principles of international law​[429]​.  Whether these elements are to be taken together (so that the reason why norms of jus cogens are non-derogable is their content) or read separately (so that the reason why norms of jus cogens are non-derogable is that they are universally accepted) requires further clarification.  Each element will be considered and at the same time the limitations in relying on the VCLT, which is a codification of the law of treaties, will be highlighted.  This is in order to clarify that any reference to jus cogens in the VCLT must be interpreted within the context of that instrument, which was concerned with treaty relations between States rather than an instrument more broadly concerned with the wider international community.

5.1.1.1	‘The International Community of States’
For the purpose of this thesis, the terms ‘international community’ and ‘international community as a whole’ refer to both State and non-State actors in international relations and that are subject to international law.  This interpretation is in accordance with the way the term is understood in Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited (the Barcelona Traction Case), where the ICJ used the term to refer to both ‘natural [and] juristic persons’​[430]​.

A comprehensive interpretation of the term was also taken by the ILC in its work on codifying State responsibility.  The Commission said that if recognition of the international community as a whole was required, in order that a law was identified as existing, then this did not mean there needed to be ‘unanimous recognition’; rather, recognition ‘by all the essential components of the international community’​[431]​ was enough.  These remarks were made as the Commission was considering the issue of whether State responsibility was criminal in nature were the breach to be ‘recognised as a crime by the community as a whole’​[432]​.  This thesis distinguishes between State crimes and breaches of jus cogens norms, but there is sufficient overlap that makes the ILC’s comments of relevance here​[433]​ because in both cases there is the need for universal recognition that the law was fundamental.

Practically speaking, and as the ILC has recognised, not every member of the international community can be consulted and, instead, consensus is interpreted as representative.  Indeed if consensus was to be absolute then the likelihood of any law coming into existence is minimal, hence why advocates of the persistent objector rule contend that it facilitates rather then frustrates the emergence of custom​[434]​.  Furthermore, the views of the international community tend to be expressed through States.  Parties such as NGOs and regional forms of organisation like the EU are increasingly viewed as representing significant populations and it is likely that they will play a more vocal role in the future, which in turn would address criticism that the content of international law was Western-centric and dominated by political and civil concerns, rather than economic and social issues​[435]​.  Thus ‘international community as a whole’ is understood to include non-State actors in relation to the interests protected, but in relation to the creation of public international law it is more rational, at this time, to view the term as primarily applying just to States.

The most likely explanation for Article 53 VCLT specifically referring to ‘international community of States as a whole’​[436]​ is that the Convention was drafted at a time when States dominated the international legal process.  Certainly the ILC noted that limiting recognition to States ‘was intended to stress the paramountcy that States have over the making of international law’​[437]​.  Thus the exclusion of non-State actors in the recognition of jus cogens was not intended to deny that parties other than States may have an interest in those norms.  The focus on States as the recognisers of jus cogens also highlights that only States may rely on Article 53 VCLT when a treaty is in breach of a jus cogens norm​[438]​.  Certain delegations to the Vienna Conference identified the potential discrepancy between having fundamental norms on the one hand and a limited capacity to protect those norms on the other and sought to introduce a broad right to invoke Article 53 into the Convention, but this was rejected​[439]​.

The reference to the community of States underpins the debate relating to jus cogens, which is how important State recognition is to the establishment of the norm in question as jus cogens in status.  There is a parallel between Article 53 VCLT and Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, as the accepted statement of traditional sources of international law​[440]​, which uses similar language to refer to principles of law as ‘recognised by civilised nations’​[441]​.  This parallel shows that both jus cogens and non-jus cogens rules depend upon State recognition, in turn implying that the only thing to distinguish jus cogens is that they are non-derogable.

This interpretation is confirmed by further reference to Article 38, which refers to conventions and principles of law that are ‘recognised’ by States and custom that is ‘accepted’ by States.  Article 38 also includes judicial decisions and teachings of publicists but these are ‘subsidiary’ sources, which therefore institutes a hierarchy.  To the extent that any hierarchy in international law is due to State recognition of the specific source, then there would be no difference between standard norms (established by convention, treaty or as a general principle) and jus cogens norms.  If this is the case then the definitional distinction for jus cogens must relate to the second element, non-derogability.  This, in turn, requires clarity as to what ‘non-derogable’ means.

5.1.1.2	‘Non-derogable’
Article 53 states that a jus cogens norm is ‘recognised by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted’.  The issue is whether the norm is non-derogable on the basis that the international community of States have recognised it as such or whether the norm was always non-derogable and now the international community of States have recognised this fact.  Before this issue can be considered in depth, clarity is required as to what is meant by the term derogation.

Derogation is defined in the Oxford Law Dictionary as a ‘lessening of the authority, strength or power of a law, right or obligation’​[442]​.  Derogation is not the same as a dispensation which applies to the party bound by the law, rather than the law itself.  Under EU law, therefore, all member States have the possibility to derogate from directives pursuant to Article 95(4) of the EC Treaty because there may be circumstances where it is ‘necessary’ for a Member State ‘to maintain national provisions on grounds of major needs referred to in Article 30, or relating to the protection of the environment or the working environment’​[443]​.  In other words, it is the substance of the law/directive that permits exceptions, and not the particular States bound to it.

Derogation underlies the human rights framework in the EU, as seen in Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights, but is also present in the broader human rights context under international public law.  This can be seen in Article 4 of the ICCPR, which given the overlap between human rights and jus cogens discussed in this section makes it a useful touchstone for this discussion.  Both Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 4 ICCPR state that the respective Convention or Covenant may only be derogated from in times of public emergency, that is to say there is a balancing exercise that permits the protection to be suspended at certain times.  Furthermore, when States do derogate from the Covenant they are required to take steps to inform other States, which indicates that the balancing exercise is not to be taken unilaterally, that wider approval is required due to the nature of the protections in question and that the content of the specific protection is relevant.

It is clear that derogation from the ICCPR is only permissible in limited circumstances, which the Human Rights Committee expanded upon in General Comment 29​[444]​.  ‘Two fundamental conditions must be met: the situation must amount to a public emergency which threatens the life of the nation, and the State party must have officially proclaimed a state of emergency’​[445]​.  The Comment justifies derogation from the Covenant only when it is ‘essential for the maintenance of the principles of legality and rule of law’​[446]​ to again suggest a balancing exercise between the specific right and the broader corpus of fundamental rights.  In this case, derogability is a question of the content of the norm, rather than any consent to it.

In seeking to define derogation as used in the context of Article 53 VCLT, it is reasonable to refer to how the term is interpreted in the wider context of the Convention as it applies to jus cogens.  Article 53 VCLT states that a treaty that is incompatible with a jus cogens norm is void.  Pursuant to Article 71 VCLT, the parties to that treaty must eliminate the consequences of the breach and bring their actions into conformity with the norm.  Thus, there is no exception envisaged under the VCLT permitting derogation.  Accordingly, there is nothing to suggest that derogability has a non-standard meaning or that it means anything other than a legally justifiable exception for departure.

The fact that it is the non-derogability of jus cogens that makes them exceptional gives rise to the question, however, of whether there are additional consequences to derogation from the norm.  In other words, are the consequences of derogation solely negative (States must not derogate from the norm and to do so would make the treaty void) or are States under a positive obligation to take positive action to implement the norm, as well as erasing the consequences of the treaty.  For example, if a boundary treaty was inconsistent with the right to self-determination (assuming the right to self-determination is recognised by States as having jus cogens status​[447]​) then would the States in question be obliged to declare that the treaty was invalid or would States be required to take further steps to protect the self-determination of those individuals affected​[448]​?  This discussion leads to a broader question: whether jus cogens give rise to a duty or obligation on States to take steps to ensure these norms are protected and complied with by other parties.  That issue will be discussed below, but greater understanding is first required of some of the problems raised in relation to the definition of jus cogens.

The inconsistency in defining jus cogens as non-derogable but failing to give any practical recognition of this characteristic either indicates the limitations of the Article 53 definition in capturing the substance of jus cogens or illustrates that the non-derogability of jus cogens does not relate to the content of the norm.  Certainly it is safer to proceed on the basis that the definition in Article 53 VCLT is authoritative rather than definitive and to shift in focus to determine whether there is evidence of any State, juridical or even academic consensus in the debate relating to both the conceptual and substantive form of jus cogens.

5.1.2	Debate
Theorists such as Grotius​[449]​ have long questioned the potential existence of an overlap between legal norms and the moral interests of the broader community, while many cultures and philosophies are underpinned by associations with natural law.  For example, Lao Tzu referred to ‘a universal governing principle’​[450]​ in the Tao-Te Ching; Islam recognises the divine Shar’ia in the Qur’an; Jewish faith takes direction from the Torah; and Canon law is based on the Christian faith​[451]​.

However, it was not until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that the view that a body of norms that protects the interests of the entire international community and not just States was expressed as a matter of law.  The prohibition on slavery, the emergence of international humanitarian law that was subsequently codified in the Hague and Geneva Conventions, the progression in international criminal law at Nuremberg​[452]​ and judicial references to fundamental norms​[453]​ all contributed to the move away from a purely State-centric conception of international law.  This acted as a precondition for the development and broad acceptance of jus cogens​[454]​.  Broad acceptance, however, has not led to any consensus as to the source, the substantive content or even the existence of jus cogens.

Support for the theory of jus cogens in academic writing predated its formal recognition in the Vienna Convention regardless of the fact that there was little in the way of practical implementation​[455]​, but the subject was ‘highly controversial’​[456]​.  The level of contention increases with the subject of accountability for breaching jus cogens and the argument that jus cogens are special because they seek to protect the interests of the international community as a whole.  If this is the case then it would be reasonable to assume that the international community as a whole arguably would have an enforceable interest in seeking accountability when those norms are breached​[457]​.  This creates a shift of power away from States and in favour of the international community as a whole​[458]​.

The controversy relating to accountability, however, is logically preceded by the debate relating to the definition of jus cogens.  Article 53 VCLT is argued to be the most authoritative expression but it is also the only definition of jus cogens found in a legal instrument to which a large number of States are party.  The reason for this is linked not to the concept per se, given that historically it has received support as noted above, but tends to relate to what it is that makes jus cogens so special​[459]​.  In particular, there are three points of contention.  The first two issues will be considered here and relate to the source and substance of jus cogens and its content.  The third issue is the focus of this thesis: that if jus cogens do exist then how are States to be held accountable for breaching them?

5.2	The Source and Substance of Jus Cogens
Attempts to understand and articulate the distinction between standard and jus cogens norms of international law have contributed to an ongoing debate, the nature of which was captured by Shaw​[460]​:
some writers regard [jus cogens] as an affirmation of Natural Law concepts, which are deemed to underlie the system of international law and constitute the method for testing the validity of the positive rules. Other writers, particularly positivists, treat it as a sub-heading under treaty and customary law and incapable of adding anything new to international law unless it reflects the consent of States.

The crux of the debate thus relates to whether they are to be distinguished based on their substance or their source.  If the source of jus cogens is independent of State consent, for example jus cogens do not arise from one of the sources of international law listed in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, then the fact the norms are perceived as non-derogable can be explained on that basis.  However, if the source does depend on State consent as stated in Article 53 VCLT, then why are jus cogens defined on the grounds that they are non-derogable?

There are many possible answers to this question​[461]​.  The two solutions considered here are that either jus cogens are non-derogable because of the substance of the norm, which cannot be derogated from irrespective of the norm’s source.  Alternatively, jus cogens are non-derogable because of the source (it is non-derogable because the community of States recognised that the norm is jus cogens), which was the approach taken by the ICJ, albeit in the context of an Advisory Opinion, when it stated that the ‘question whether a norm is part of jus cogens relates to the legal character of the norm’​[462]​.  Each interpretation will be considered but it is contended here that regardless of which argument is the most persuasive, they both identify that jus cogens norms are different to standard norms of international law because they are perceived to protect the interests of more than just individual States.

5.2.1	Jus Cogens as Non-Derogable Due to the Norms’ Substance
Jus cogens are often associated with a form of higher law: for example Verdross refers to an ‘ethical minimum’​[463]​ while former Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties, the late Hersch Lauterpacht, considered jus cogens norms to be ‘cogent’​[464]​.  In a similar vein, the Mexican delegate to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties claimed that jus cogens ‘derive from principles that the legal conscience of mankind deem absolutely essential to coexistence in the international community’​[465]​, to link jus cogens with near-mythical characteristics.

An association between jus cogens and higher law has led supporters of this interpretation to conclude, as Verdross did, that jus cogens exist regardless of whether or not States comply with these norms​[466]​.   Or, as Koskenniemi phrases it, ‘jus cogens norms bind irrespective of consent (they are non-derogable regardless of whether their existence is recognised)…but what those norms are, is determined by consent’​[467]​ (recognition by the community of States is needed to identify which norms are non-derogable jus cogens).  This interpretation is supported with reference to the wording of Article 64 VCLT​[468]​, which contemplates the situation ‘if a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges’​[469]​ rather than a new jus cogens norm being recognised.  In other words, the new norm emerges because its substance is recognised as non-derogable, rather then the new norm being recognised at which point it becomes non-derogable.

While Article 64 VCLT lends support to the argument that jus cogens are non-derogable due to their substance, the wording of Article 53 VCLT does not.  Rules of jus cogens are defined as norms that are recognised as such by the ‘community of States’, which as already noted invokes comparisons with Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute that refers to principles of law ‘recognised by civilised nations’ as a source of international law​[470]​.  The parallel between Articles 53 and 38 is a persuasive indicator that, at a minimum, some form of State acknowledgement and thus consent, is required.  That is not to argue that jus cogens come within the category of general principles under Article 38, even if these norms are dependent on State consent.  The broad phrasing of Article 38(1)(d) makes it difficult to draw any conclusion as to its scope and application but in practice the international courts refer to ‘general principles’ in order to avoid a situation of non liquet (or no applicable law).  Thus, ‘general principles’ are not taken to comprise a discrete body of law as recognised in Factory at Chorzów Case​[471]​ or a catchall category that includes jus cogens.

5.2.2	Jus Cogens as a Source of International Law
Critics of jus cogens dispute that a body of rules are distinguished from the general corpus of international law on the basis of substantive content alone.  In addition, critics contend that it is impossible for any norm of international law, including jus cogens, to exist without consent.

Ragazzi identified the French delegate to the Vienna Convention as one such cynic that claimed ‘France would have had no problems in subscribing to a concept of jus cogens restricted to certain basic human values shared by all States but did have problems accepting an ill-defined concept of jus cogens’.  This highlights that the dispute was not with the existence of jus cogens generally.  The reason that States, such as France, elected not to adopt the Convention at that time was due to the lack of clarity about the content of jus cogens (speculating that the norms could magically appear) or the contention that jus cogens could come into existence without the assistance of the sources of law listed in Article 38​[472]​.

Arguably the reference to the ‘international community of States’ in Article 53 VCLT was intended to address the risk of any dispute between States as to identifying the content of jus cogens.  The initial draft of what was then Article 50​[473]​ made no reference to State recognition and the interpretive discretion that this potentially gave to States acting in isolation or even non-State actors such as the international courts, was unacceptable especially as no consensus existed as to what norms were considered to be jus cogens.  The fact that State recognition was an afterthought in the drafting process indicates that it was the substance of the norm that was initially considered definitive.  However, the late addition of State recognition does illustrate that there was either an emerging or a dominant association between jus cogens and custom, so that some form of State acceptance was perceived as integral to the definition.  The positivist tone at the Vienna Convention was apparent.

Prosper Weil, is one such positivist and critic of the concept, who disagreed that jus cogens could emerge as an alternative source of international law and regardless of State consent.  In support of his arguments, Weil cited ‘the difficulty, even the impossibility of identifying the substance of rules of jus cogens; the risk presented to the stability of treaties; and its underlying incompatibility with the structure of the international system’​[474]​.  Weil warned that placing jus cogens outside the accepted parameters of Article 38 in order to overcome a lack of definitional consensus would only serve to undermine the established framework of international law​[475]​.  Given that supporters perceive jus cogens as fundamental to this framework​[476]​, and should Weil’s prediction be correct, it is unlikely that it would then be accepted that jus cogens exist completely independent of State input.

This discussion highlights the focus of the debate on whether jus cogens norms are non-derogable on the basis of the norms’ substance or the norms’ source.  No solution is readily available but what is clear is that both arguments recognise that jus cogens seek to protect a shared underlying interest.  Whether this interest is inherent to the norm or was recognised as such by the community of States can be set aside and the focus shift to the content of jus cogens​[477]​.  However, before discussing the individual jus cogens norms it is reasonable to consider whether the shared interest that has led to the designation of certain norms as non-derogable also gives rise to an obligation on States to ensure compliance with those norms​[478]​ and if so, by what means and under what circumstances.

5.3	Is there a Positive Duty on States to Ensure Compliance?
There is evidence in the VCLT of a legal obligation on States to protect and ensure compliance with jus cogens norms.  The consequences of a treaty that conflicts with jus cogens norms are set down in Article 71 and require the parties to eliminate the consequences and bring their relations into conformity with the jus cogens norm in question.  The debate about how to identify jus cogens is unresolved, and there are difficulties in determining when an obligation of compliance and protection would apply, and what the consequences of such an obligation would be.

On the one hand, if jus cogens are non-derogable due to their substantive content then it could be expected that every State is under a legal obligation to ensure their maintenance and that arguably this duty would be owed to the international community as a whole.  On the other hand, if jus cogens are non-derogable as a source of law, then there would need to be some form of recognition by the community of States that the norm gives rise to an obligation to comply and in addition to ensure compliance by other parties.

Ultimately the limited practical recognition suggests that there is no such obligation, that there is universal State practice contrary to that obligation or that there is some limitation that exists in relation to exercising the obligation.  In particular, it is unclear what the consequences of such an obligation would be in terms of implementation.  An obligation to maintain jus cogens would bind all States so that when the duty was breached responsibility could be invoked by another State because its interests had been directly affected.  Alternatively a claim could be brought that would be similar to that of an actio popularis, but such a concept is not tolerated in public international law.

The issue of whether actio popularis is permitted under international law has come before the ICJ and although ultimately rejected, it did receive some isolated support.  In the South West Africa Cases​[479]​, South Africa disputed the right of Ethiopia and Liberia to bring a dispute relating to the treatment of individuals pursuant to the Mandate for South-West Africa, given that the parties did not have a direct interest at stake.  The ICJ dismissed the preliminary objections raised by South Africa as to jurisdiction and interpreted the relevant terms of the Mandate to mean that other States had ‘a legal right or interest in observance by the Mandatory of its obligations’ that was owed to both the ‘inhabitants of the Mandated Territory’ and other States​[480]​.  By the time of judgment in the Second Phase however, the Court’s interpretation of the Mandate had changed and it considered that there was no ‘legal right or interest’ in general observance.  States were only entitled to bring a claim insofar as their rights were directly affected, for example in this case there were foreign missionaries present.  The Court considered giving the Applicants the right to bring a claim on the basis of a ‘general interest’ in observance of the Mandate would be the same as a ‘right resident in any member of a community to take legal action in vindication of a public interest’.  In other words it would amount to an actio popularis, which ‘is not known to international law as it stands’​[481]​.

Judge Schwebel in his dissenting opinion in the Nicaragua Case considered that the precedent in the South West African Cases was ‘decisively displaced’​[482]​ by the dictum of the Court in the Barcelona Traction Case​[483]​ that had discussed the concept of obligations erga omnes, which are owed to the international community as a whole.  The enthusiasm of Judge Schwebel sits uneasily with decisions in the Nuclear Tests Cases​[484]​ and East Timor (Portugal v Australia) (the East Timor Case)​[485]​ where the Court dismissed the idea of the actio popularis even though the obligation in question was considered precisely to be erga omnes.

In the Nuclear Tests Case an erga omnes obligation was insufficient to allow Australia and New Zealand to bring what amounted to an actio popularis seeking a declaration that French nuclear testing was to end​[486]​.  And in the East Timor Case, the Court held that the erga omnes nature of an obligation to ensure the right to self-determination was an insufficient basis on which to displace the need for consent to jurisdiction​[487]​.

Obligations erga omnes are an established principle under international law and will be discussed later in this Chapter.  There is no evidence however that any obligation on States to protect jus cogens or other erga omnes obligations has led to a resurrection of the actio popularis.  It can only be said that to the extent that there is a duty to protect jus cogens, then at this time there seems to be no practical means of enforcement.

5.4	Content
There is a lack of consensus in identifying what norms are jus cogens, evidenced by the small number of norms considered to be jus cogens, which in turn implies that the threshold for recognition is high​[488]​.  The fact that those norms commonly cited as having jus cogens status do not include any economic or social rights further suggests that the consensus that does exist is subject to political factors and that the interests of a few powerful States prioritising civil and political rights is able to influence the recognition process​[489]​.  The fact that there is not a comprehensive or finite list of jus cogens means however that there is future potential for recognition of economic, social and cultural concerns​[490]​.

Two perspectives will be considered in order to clarify what the currently accepted content of jus cogens is.  The work of the ILC will be recalled regarding the VCLT and other topics.  This is followed by discussion of the relationship between jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations, with which they are often associated.

5.4.1	The International Law Commission
It is appropriate to draw on the findings of the ILC having already referred to the list of accepted jus cogens norms provided by the ILC at the start of this section, and its treatment of jus cogens in drafting the VCLT.  In reaching its conclusions on whether States recognise a particular norm is jus cogens, the ILC has prioritised consensus over comprehensiveness​[491]​.

The ILC gave two reasons why it declined to expand upon the definition of jus cogens in Article 53 VCLT ​[492]​:
First, the mention of some cases of treaties void for conflict with a rule of jus cogens might even with the most careful drafting, lead to misunderstanding as to the position concerning other cases not mentioned in the article.  Secondly, if the Commission were to attempt to draw up, even on a selective basis, a list of rules of international law which are to be regarded as having the character of jus cogens it might find itself engaged in a prolonged study of matters which fall outside the scope of present [international law].

The ILC felt that it was preferable for the ‘identification’ of jus cogens ‘to be worked out in State practice and in the jurisprudence of international tribunals’​[493]​.  Given that the same definition was used in the 2001 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, it is clear that State practice and international jurisprudence have not proven enlightening​[494]​.  Still the ILC did note while working on the Draft Articles that States ‘have a special role…as par excellence the holders of normative authority on behalf of the international community’​[495]​.  Thus, the ILC was pragmatic enough to consider that the role of States in recognising jus cogens norms was necessary not only pursuant to Article 53 VCLT but in order to ensure the concept was accepted as more than theory.

Although there has not been any great progress in the definition of jus cogens, the ILC perceives that there is a sufficient consensus amongst States to be able to identify the minimum in jus cogens norms.  The strongest evidence of what the international community of States recognised to be jus cogens was found in treaties and international conventions that did not allow certain provisions to be derogated from​[496]​.  The ILC referred to General Comment No. 24​[497]​ where the 18 State representatives that comprised the Human Rights Committee at the time considered that certain ‘provisions in the Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights] that represent customary international law (and a fortiori when they have the character of peremptory norms) may not be the subject of reservations’​[498]​; the inability to waive certain standards under the Geneva Conventions​[499]​; and jurisprudence of both domestic and international courts​[500]​.  The conclusion was that ‘jus cogens norms that are clearly accepted and recognised include the prohibitions of aggression, genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, crimes against humanity and torture, and the right to self-determination’​[501]​.  The Commission’s decision not to provide an exhaustive list was instrumental in reaching this point, as it encouraged a consensus to build and the impact of developments in the law to be taken into account.

Common amongst all the norms said to be recognised by the community of States as jus cogens is that they ‘arise from those substantive rules of conduct that prohibit what has come to be seen as intolerable because of the threat it presents to the survival of States and their peoples’​[502]​.  This phrase captures an underlying issue in this thesis, namely how recognising a norm as jus cogens actually prevents or avoids the ongoing reality that the survival of peoples is threatened.  It also highlights that while the community of States is required in order to recognise jus cogens norms, the interests to which these norms pertain include more than just States – it includes their peoples.

For the purposes of determining what norms are recognised as jus cogens, the ILC settled upon the criterion that jus cogens seek to ensure ‘the survival of States and their peoples’​[503]​.  It is not that recognition of norms as jus cogens will somehow magically ensure ‘the survival of States and their peoples’​[504]​.  Instead, and as De Hoogh said, ‘the essence of jus cogens lies not in the impossibility of derogation, but in the impossibility of eluding the application of norms of jus cogens’​[505]​.  In other words, the interests of States and their peoples must be protected regardless of how that is expressed in legal, normative terms.

The overview of the debate surrounding the content and existence of jus cogens given here is less about resolving the controversy, and more about identifying why a whole thesis is dedicated to pondering accountability for their breach.  In summary, while the very existence of jus cogens is debatable the underlying interests for protection are not.  Thus, in understanding jus cogens to represent the fundamental interests of the international community as a whole, the need for accountability when these norms are breached is clear.  Therefore, jus cogens provide a link between the concept of holding States accountable for threatening the interests of States and their peoples, and public international law.  This argument is not without precedent given that international crimes, which likewise seek accountability when the interests of States and their peoples are harmed, are linked with jus cogens.

Descriptions of international crimes as being capable of ‘shocking the conscience of mankind’​[506]​ and of ‘concern to the international community as a whole’​[507]​ invoke parallels with the language used to define jus cogens as protecting ‘the survival of States and their peoples’​[508]​.  A similar, albeit implied, association was made by the ICJ in both 2006 and 2007 when it stated that ‘the norm prohibiting genocide was assuredly a jus cogens norm of international law’​[509]​ because Article 1 of the Genocide Convention then defines genocide as an international crime.  There is also recognition at the State level including the US Third Restatement of the Law which notes that ‘norms that create "international crimes"…are also jus cogens’​[510]​ and the decision by the European Court of Human Rights in K-H W v Germany that international recognition of a norm as jus cogens would be sufficient to make its breach by an individual a crime under international law​[511]​.

International criminal law is concerned with individual rather than State accountability but to the extent that the crimes in question are based on jus cogens norms then it sets a precedent whereby public international law has developed in such a way as to protect the fundamental interests of the international community as a whole and ensure accountability when that interest is threatened.  What remains to be seen is how and if there is a either a formal or ad hoc approach to seeking State accountability for jus cogens norms, as there is with individual accountability.

5.4.2	The Relationship Between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes
The very last step before turning to consider juridical support and State practice that illustrates whether State accountability has normative standing is to clarify the relationship between jus cogens and erga omnes.  This is important because where obligations arising from jus cogens are owed to the international community as a whole they are obligations erga omnes.  Thus the issue of State accountability for breaching jus cogens norms cannot avoid considering State accountability for breaching erga omnes obligations, although the two are separate.

In order to address the relationship between jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations, the difference between norms and obligations under international law must first be made clear.  To the extent that there is no substantive discrepancy then accountability for one will automatically lead to accountability for the other.

In Bassiouni’s opinion, obligations ‘pertain to the legal implications’ while norms relate to ‘legal status’​[512]​.  Austin describes the difference in terms of an obligation being ‘a duty’ and a norm being ‘a command’​[513]​.  Likewise, Kelsen considers that ‘the content of legal norms’ is comprised of ‘legally established obligation[s]’​[514]​ so that legal obligations are the consequences of a legal norm.

The link between norms and obligations is derivative.  Norms derive their legal expression from obligations in the form of treaties and custom while obligations derive their rank from norms, in the sense that it is the norm that makes the obligation legally binding.  However, while the existence of obligations is dependent on the existence of norms, the recognition of norms can in fact be frustrated by the recognition, or lack thereof, of obligations.  This is illustrated with the right to self-determination.  There is controversy surrounding the jus cogens status of self-determination that is exacerbated by the fact that although there is recognition that the norm exists​[515]​, there is little clarity about its substantive content and in particular the obligations that derive from the norm.  For example, it is unlikely that self-determination would be recognised as jus cogens if there was then an obligation on all States to provide territory for indigenous groups because, practically speaking, there would have to be derogations.  Until the obligations relating to self-determination are identified, it is unlikely that any consensus about its normative status will be reached.

In terms of enforcement, obligations are clearly articulated in treaties and conventions but ‘only the party to whom an international obligation is due can bring a claim in respect of its breach’​[516]​.  In contrast, and as a general rule, norms are universally binding.  However, without a forum or way to enforce the norm separate from the obligation, their broader application appears moot.  The difficulties in establishing such a forum are apparent with regard to jus cogens, and relate to the indeterminacy surrounding the content of these norms.  If the norm gave rise to obligations owed to the international community as a whole then the lack of enforcement mechanism is somewhat remedied, but there are still two issues.

The obligation or obligations may not be comprehensive in capturing the entire content of the norm.  For example, the obligations that derive from the prohibition on genocide, and expressed under the 1948 Genocide Convention, range from punishing perpetrators to not conspiring with perpetrators, and it is the cumulative effect of these obligations that represent the totality of the norm.  Even if there are obligations owed to the entire international community as a whole that capture the entire substance of the norm, the holder of the obligation must still be entitled to bring a claim in the respective forum​[517]​.

The international courts have likewise considered the distinction between norms and obligations.  For example, the ICTY stated that the prohibition against torture was both a jus cogens norm and an erga omnes obligation​[518]​.  The Court recognised that the prohibition had jus cogens status ‘because of the importance of the values it protects​[519]​’, and that in addition to the obligations on parties not to commit acts of torture, the prohibition ‘imposes upon States obligations erga omnes’ relating to ‘enforcement’​[520]​.  The norm was kept separate from the obligations because the norm established the gravity of the breach, while the obligations dictated the consequences of protecting such fundamental values for all States.  On the basis that each has its own role in international law it is as important to ensure that States are held accountable for breaching the norm, as for breaching the obligation.  Furthermore, there appears to be a link between the norm and the scope of the obligations derived from it.

Drawing a distinction between jus cogens and erga omnes is not necessarily what was intended by the ICJ when it defined erga omnes in the Barcelona Traction Case​[521]​ dictum over four decades ago.  Tomuschat argues that the current ‘expansive’​[522]​ interpretation of erga omnes that includes all multilateral obligations is ‘based on a misunderstanding’​[523]​.  He argued that the Court was aiming to create a link between erga omnes and the fundamental interests of the international community as a whole, and that the ICJ did not intend erga omnes to include all multilateral obligations simply because they are owed to every member of the international community.

An erga omnes obligation is an obligation owed by States to every member of the international community, which Tomuschat believes distinguishes erga omnes from multilateral obligations that are owed between all States.  Erga omnes are based on ‘values held in high respect by all States’​[524]​ so that they are ‘the concern of all States’​[525]​.  In illustrating what would amount to an obligation erga omnes in the Barcelona Traction Case, where the facts related to a commercial dispute, the ICJ referred to racial discrimination.  This reference is contextually incongruous unless the Court intended to illustrate that there is a difference between multilateral obligations, which might arise in the commercial context, and erga omnes obligations based on the content of the obligation.

Tomuschat clearly considered that the concept of erga omnes has been manipulated beyond the original intent of the Court and, in so arguing, created a strong parallel with jus cogens as both seek to protect the interest of the international community as a whole​[526]​.  For example, the breach of a multilateral obligation would not automatically give all States the right to respond when the obligation is breached, but when the values protected by erga omnes ‘are at stake’ then Tomuschat states that ‘extraordinary powers’ ‘deserve being activated’​[527]​.

Tomuschat’s interpretation is not the more popular and contemporary interpretation of erga omnes that has been established over four decades of cumulative juridical consideration.  But in so far as this interpretation is correct, it highlights that certain, but not all, obligations that are owed to the international community are owed universally because they relate to the protection of fundamental interests.

It is the fact that both erga omnes and jus cogens are linked to the interests of the international community as a whole that creates an association between them.  Where the erga omnes obligation is based on a jus cogens norm there is also the question of whether the fundamental interest that underlies them both gives rise to an additional secondary obligation on States to respond when the primary obligation is breached.  Practice suggests that if the answer is yes then there is a lack of clarity as to what the obligation would entail.  For example, when Israel built the wall surrounding East Jerusalem and the ICJ found that Israel had acted in breach of an erga omnes obligation protecting the right to self-determination (which is arguably jus cogens)​[528]​ the responses by States, as opposed to international organisations such as the UN and the Arab League, were political.  Yet, if there was a legal obligation on States to respond to Israel’s activities then arguably States would have had the legal authority to take the steps in order to protect the Palestinian right to self-determination, but what those steps would be is an indeterminate notion.

Regardless of speculation that jus cogens and erga omnes are related, the scope of erga omnes is now understood to include all multilateral obligations, thus weakening any perceived link, and confirming that the two concepts are discrete.  This conclusion is supported by referring to how the Barcelona Traction dictum has been interpreted by both scholars and the ICJ.

Scholars such as Ragazzi have argued that the dictum does, and was intended to, mean that the maintenance of erga omnes are in the interest of the international community as a whole but unrelated to the norm underlying the obligation​[529]​.  Ragazzi considered that erga omnes bind all States; that as a result of being bound, every State has a legal interest in maintenance of erga omnes; and that every State can seek redress for a breach​[530]​.

A similar interpretation was taken by the Institut de Droit International in its Resolution on ‘The Protection of Human Rights and the Principle of Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs of the State’, when it stated that an obligation erga omnes was ‘incumbent upon every State’ and that ‘every State has a legal interest in the protection’​[531]​.  The Institut considered that the interest held by every State in the obligation gave rise to ‘a duty of solidarity among all States’ to respond when the obligation was breached’​[532]​.  The Resolution in question related to human rights, which could suggest a link between the duty to respond and the normative protection of human rights.  However, the association is more clearly with erga omnes because Article 1 of the Resolution provides that States are under an obligation to uphold the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which are also erga omnes, and ‘incumbent upon every State in relation to the international community as a whole, and every State has a legal interest in the protection of human rights’​[533]​.

The manner in which the dictum has been applied by the ICJ also confirms that erga omnes are separate to jus cogens.   Examples of erga omnes obligations given by the Court include aggression, genocide, protection from slavery and protection from racial discrimination or obligations ‘instrumental’ to ‘the preservation of peace and the promotion of fundamental human rights’​[534]​.  All of which are listed by the ILC as recognised jus cogens.  However, the way the obligations are interpreted by the Court in practice shows that the content of the norm is viewed differently to the underlying obligation.  For example, in the Genocide Convention Case the ICJ found that Serbia’s responsibility was engaged for failing to prosecute individuals accused of perpetrating genocide​[535]​, which is an erga omnes obligation​[536]​ found in the Genocide Convention​[537]​.  Serbia was not held responsible for breaching any normative duty on States to prosecute the perpetrators​[538]​.

The concepts of erga omnes and jus cogens are separate because the former are concerned with the range of parties that may invoke its breach while the latter is concerned with the status of the norm under public international law.   Erga omnes are obligations that are owed to every member of the international community so that every member has an interest in compliance, but this does not necessarily mean that every member of the international community has an interest in the underlying norm, unless that norm is jus cogens.  Given that there is a conceptual difference between erga omnes and jus cogens it is reasonable to infer that a distinction will likewise be needed for accountability purposes.

Pragmatically the steps taken to hold a State accountable for breaching erga omnes obligations that arise from a jus cogens norm will also be used to hold the State accountable in relation to breaching the underlying norm.  However, it is submitted here that a conceptual distance must be maintained because accountability for breaching jus cogens norms must also reflect the jus cogens nature of the underlying norm.  This is to prevent the absurd situation that the breach of an erga omnes obligation not to fish in another State’s territorial waters is treated the same as the breach of obligations arising from the jus cogens prohibition on genocide for accountability purposes, thus undermining the conceptual basis of jus cogens as seeking to protect the interests of the international community as a whole.

5.4.3	A Working Definition of Jus Cogens
The continuing debate surrounding jus cogens means that there is no clear definition of the concept or its content, which in turn makes it difficult to seek accountability when jus cogens are breached.  On the assumption that jus cogens even exist, and in order to determine whether there has been accountability when the norm is breached, some form of working definition is needed.

While there may not be any consensus as to the source of jus cogens, all four sources of international law listed in Article 38 ICJ Statute can be cited to support the proposition that the concept of jus cogens is recognised under public international law.  The many academic writings are cited above, as were the Draft Articles on State Responsibility that make separate provision for the breach of an obligation based on a jus cogens norm.  The VCLT expressly states the existence of jus cogens and other treaties give implicit recognition, for example the Rome Statute of the ICC governs international crimes of which certain crimes such as genocide derive from the breach of a jus cogens norm.  Furthermore, there have been developments in international criminal law and State practice that can be linked with jus cogens norms, such as the exercise of universal jurisdiction over such norms.  Examples include the Eichmann Case where the Israeli Court considered the norm in question arose from ‘a universal source pertaining to the whole of mankind’​[539]​ and Demjanjuk v Petrovsky where the US Federal Courts assumed jurisdiction over a defendant for alleged crimes against humanity committed under the Nazi regime on the basis of ‘the universal character of the crimes in question’​[540]​.

These few examples of recognition are placed within a broader framework whereby jus cogens is a controversial subject, both in terms of existence and content.  As already noted, it was not the intention of the discussion here to resolve any of the conflict that exists.  Instead the objective here was to show that jus cogens provides a link between conceptual State accountability and established international law and then use that link as evidence that State accountability may be evolving to lex lata.  Two questions arise from this discussion.

How can jus cogens provide a link between State accountability and established public international law when the very notion is controversial?  If jus cogens are understood as protection of the fundamental interests of more than just States, then the principle has in fact been recognised under public international law, for example in the development of international criminal law.  On that basis, the first limb of the working definition of jus cogens used in this thesis is that jus cogens are norms that are non-derogable and that seek to protect the interests of the international community as a whole.

The second question relates to the issue that even if jus cogens can be conceptualised in a way that shows they are recognised under international law, there is still sufficient indeterminacy to make it difficult to identify specific norms for the purposes of analysing their breach.  The list of norms that the ILC considers to be recognised as jus cogens has been shown above to be widely relied upon, thus it is appropriate for the same list to be used here.  

For the purpose of identifying instances where States are said to have breached jus cogens and in order for the responses to those breaches to be assessed from the perspective of whether the State was held to account, the jus cogens norms that are clearly accepted and recognised are ‘the prohibitions of aggression, genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, crimes against humanity and torture, and the right to self-determination’​[541]​.

One final point argued here, which follows on from the working definition given above, is that the link between jus cogens and the fundamental interests of peoples that have historically been recognised, is consciously made in order to pre-empt the issue of inter-temporal application from arising in relation to the case studies in Chapter Five.  The inter-temporal principle in public international law means that ‘it is not permissible to import into the legal evaluation of a previously existing situation…doctrines of modern law that did not exist or were not accepted at the time’​[542]​.  Thus any evaluation of State practice would arguably need to be restricted to case studies after 1969 when the term jus cogens was first used, in the VCLT.

This thesis does not elect to restrict itself and case studies from throughout the twentieth century will be relied upon.  The VCLT itself does not refer to the problem of inter-temporal application but there is support that the principle is qualified, thereby justifying the consideration and assessment of alleged breaches of norms that occurred before the term jus cogens was coined.  For example, the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia​[543]​, while considering how the Mandate established by the League of Nations in 1919 should be interpreted in 1971, stated that ‘an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of interpretation’​[544]​.  This Chapter has shown that the express identification of jus cogens in public international law was preceded by what were arguably centuries of contemplation and implied legal recognition that certain norms protect more than just the interests of States and are fundamental to the framework of international law.  Using the term jus cogens to describe norms that supporters argue have existed for centuries is simply to interpret those norms within ‘the entire legal system prevailing’ today.

On that basis, and because the focus in this thesis is on accountability for breaching jus cogens rather than defining the concept of jus cogens, it is submitted that it is justified in Chapter Five to analyse alleged breaches of norms that were ex post facto listed by the ILC as having jus cogens status.

6.	CONCLUSION
Chapter Three was comprised of two parts.  The discussion sought to understand any relationship shared between State accountability and established doctrines of international law.  To the extent that there is an overlap, it is increasingly viable to argue that the concept has, or is developing, normative standing.  The doctrines of State immunity and individual accountability were discussed and the consistent theme was that the concept of State accountability is quite separate but there are indicators that the shared interest in the maintenance of jus cogens norms may influence future development.   

The second part of Chapter Three considered jus cogens and sought to clarify what consensus exists, if any, in relation to how these norms are defined and identified.  The focus in considering the jus cogens debate was how the lack of understanding and clarity of these norms could affect accountability when these norms are breached.  In reaching conclusions for this purpose, two points are noted.  Firstly, the list of norms that were identified by the ILC in drafting the VCLT remains authoritative and provides an appropriate reference point in assessing the responses to breaches of jus cogens, rather than non-jus cogens norms​[545]​.  Secondly, because jus cogens norms seek to protect the interests of the international community as a whole, and not just States, then the interest in holding States accountable for breaching jus cogens norms is likewise expected to be held by the international community as a whole, and not just States.

In analysing the concept of jus cogens it was necessary to give some consideration to some related terms, for example it was considered whether the term ‘international community as a whole’ has a different meaning in referring to the recognition of jus cogens and to the creation and implementation of international law generally.  It was not the intention of the discussion to give authoritative definitions or endorse certain interpretations of the terms considered and working definitions were adopted instead.

Thus to summarise the interpretations given to relevant terms in Chapters One, Two and Three, the ‘international community as a whole’ comprises both State and non-State actors when determining what parties have an interest in the law or accountability for its breach but only States when concerned with the implementation or creation of the law or recognition of jus cogens.  Impunity is the impossibility of redress under international law (hence why accountability, which may be political, is not always the opposite of impunity).  Sovereignty is an expression of Statehood but does not define the State.  Liability is a determination that the law has been breached (and needed in order for redress to be sought – in other words it is the first step in accountability).  Responsibility is also a form of answerability but can be distinguished from accountability because it solely comprises a determination of liability (Chapter Four will consider what is meant by State responsibility).

Chapter Three has progressed the analysis in this thesis toward tracing the legal evolution of State accountability.  Most importantly it has shown that there is a link between established international law and a concept of State accountability, which is the protection of jus cogens norms.  It is the recognition of jus cogens by States, and the fact that these norms relate to the interests of the international community as a whole that has already affected entrenched legal doctrines and is arguably influencing the evolution of State accountability.  Using jus cogens to evaluate State conduct provides a measuring stick for assessing practice and provides a legal language by which to describe that a principle of State accountability has juridical support and is legally possible​[546]​.
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Emerging from this thesis is that the strongest evidence that State accountability exists is where it is shown to have support in State practice and in terms of juridical viability.  The question that has not yet been addressed however, is why there would be State or juridical support for a conceptual principle of accountability when there is already an established principle of State responsibility in public international law?
 
In particular, there are two objectives that are represented by the two sections in this Chapter.

Firstly, the difference between the doctrine of State responsibility and the concept of State accountability must be understood.  This is especially given that the principle in the Chorzów Factory case​[547]​ that underpins the State responsibility doctrine, appears to overlap with the concept of State accountability.  In order to distinguish between them, the Chorzów Factory principle will be broken down and assessed from the perspective of how it is implemented in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility (‘Draft Articles’).  On the basis of these findings, comparisons can be made to determine if there is an overlap with the accountability concept proposed here and if not, what is the difference.

Giving an overview of the second section here rather pre-empts the findings in the first section that State accountability and State responsibility are not incompatible, and they serve separate functions in terms of seeking redress from States.  This distinction does not preclude finding that within the legal space inhabited by State responsibility, some indication that a broader approach to seeking redress from States for breaching international law is possible, and even desirable.  Juridical support for the concept of State accountability, separate to the doctrine of State responsibility, will be assessed both in relation to general attempts to expand upon the doctrine, such as with the attribution tests, and specifically in relation to the current serious breach regime and rejected notion of criminal State responsibility.

Thus, the first section identifies why it is that this thesis seeks to assess the normative standing of conceptual State accountability when international law already makes provision for responding when States breach international law. The second section determines what juridical indicators exist or have emerged in the context of the development and implementation of the State responsibility doctrine that support the argument that State accountability is viable under international law.  Throughout both sections the finding in Chapter Three that jus cogens norms represent the link between State accountability and its evolution as a legal principle is tested.

A final point made here relates to terminology. The Draft Articles refer to ‘peremptory’ norms but for the purposes of continuity this Chapter will continue to refer to ‘jus cogens’ norms.  Secondly, the use of the word responsibility in the context of discussing the State responsibility doctrine must be clarified.  Chapter One noted that responsibility is a determination of liability but that it is different to accountability, which requires both a determination of liability and redress as a result.  A cursory knowledge of the State responsibility principle would recall that the doctrine both determines the State has breached an international obligation and requires reparation, suggesting the elements are the same as with State accountability.  This Chapter will examine whether reparation and redress, for the purpose of seeking responsibility – rather than accountability - are in fact the same thing.  On the basis of that discussion there can be clarification as to whether responsibility under the doctrine has the same meaning as responsibility as defined previously.  Until that time, and to prevent confusion, the discussion on State responsibility treats the doctrine as separate to a broader conception of responsibility.

2.	THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE DOCTRINE OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY
2.1	Analysing the State Responsibility Doctrine and the Chorzów Factory Principle
It is an established principle of international law that ‘the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form’​[548]​; known as the Chorzów Factory principle because the statement was made in that case and has been associated with the decision since that time.  This principle is captured within, but not limited in its application to, the State responsibility doctrine.  Therefore, the Chorzów Factory principle still applies even if a State cannot be held responsible under the Draft Articles, seemingly undermining the argument here that State accountability is needed to meet a gap in redress.

However, because the elements of State responsibility are inferred in the Chorzów Factory principle, and vice versa, any limitations in engaging the doctrine will be shared with the Chorzów Factory principle.  There does not therefore need to be a separate analysis of both the doctrine and the principle to identify the differences in relation to the concept of State accountability, instead the broadest possible analysis will ensure that the findings are comprehensive.  Accordingly, the relationship between State accountability and State responsibility will be assessed from a holistic perspective and based on the elements of the Chorzów Factory principle as expressed in the Draft Articles.

The first section is broken into two parts in order to outline the development of State responsibility to identify if, and to what extent, the increasing recognition of jus cogens norms highlighted in Chapter Three has influenced the doctrine.

The first part gives an overview of the State responsibility doctrine as it occurs in practice in order to highlight the similarities and difference with State accountability.  The emphasis on the judicial interpretation of the doctrine will provide a contrast with part two that focuses primarily on the codified doctrine.

Part two considers the work of the ILC from the late 1940s until 2001, when the Draft Articles were presented to the UN General Assembly.  To the extent that the recognition of jus cogens proved influential on the work of the Commission, it would be reasonable to expect that this would somehow be reflected in the Draft Articles.  The analysis is broken into three elements, the breach of an engagement, an obligation to make reparation and reparation in an adequate form.

The reason why States obey international law is beyond the scope of this thesis, and instead the presumption has been made that accountability is desired when States breach international law​[549]​.  This section considers the relationship between the concept of State accountability and State responsibility as the only formal doctrine for seeking redress from States for breaching international law recognised under international law.  The focus is on if and why the doctrine does not lead to accountability; in particular, when the breach relates to a jus cogens norm​[550]​.

2.2	An Introduction to the State Responsibility Doctrine in Practice
This overview is designed to highlight those characteristics of State responsibility that are salient to this thesis, and the means by which to illustrate the doctrine’s relevant features is by referring to its judicial application.  This is in contrast to the more in-depth textual analysis of the Draft Articles that follows.

2.2.1	The Genocide Convention Case – The Objective of the State Responsibility Doctrine
There has been widespread criticism of the judgment in the Genocide Convention Case on the basis that it failed to identify and communicate the gravity of Serbia’s actions​[551]​.  However, the role of the ICJ in the case was only to determine whether the State had breached its obligations under the 1948 Genocide Convention​[552]​.  Any dispute not ‘relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III’ was not within the Court’s mandate​[553]​, therefore any criticism that Serbia was not held accountable should be given with caution, because that was never the Court’s task.  This discussion expands on the analysis of the Genocide Convention Case in previous Chapters, while in addition seeking to illustrate the specific objectives of the State responsibility doctrine.

The ICJ was required to determine whether Serbia was responsible for having breached its obligations under the Genocide Convention to punish genocide​[554]​, to prevent genocide​[555]​ and not to commit genocide​[556]​, in the context of the ethnic conflict that occurred during the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia.  The focus on responsibility for breaching obligations owed under the Convention meant that, regardless of whether the acts and omissions in question may be the same, the judgment was unrelated to the question of Serbia’s accountability for breaching the jus cogens prohibition on genocide (as the concept of State accountability is understood here)​[557]​.  Further analysis will illustrate why there is both a relationship and a conceptual difference between the State responsibility doctrine and State accountability in the context of the Genocide Convention Case.

In terms of similarities, both State responsibility and State accountability seek to separate the State from its organs in determining the breach, or in other words determine why Serbia, rather than its various State organs, was liable.  The discussion has already addressed the fine line between a State and the individuals in power within the State, in terms of seeking redress for breaching international law.  This overlap is apparent in the context of the Genocide Convention, which is focused on the criminal accountability of individuals, where Article IX refers to State responsibility but it is unclear how relevant the State’s responsibility is in determining the individual’s liability.  The link between the State and the individual is also highlighted with reference to the facts in the Genocide Convention Case.  Had the Court found that Serbia was responsible for committing genocide​[558]​, then realistically this would be because ‘the actions of [Serbia’s] organs or persons or groups whose acts are attributable to [Serbia]’​[559]​.

The Court referred to the level of ‘political, military and logistical relations between the federal authorities’ to conclude that at the relevant time the Serbian authorities in Belgrade and direct perpetrators of the genocide were not ‘equated with organs of [Serbia]’​[560]​.  The perpetrators were not completely and wholly dependent on Serbia​[561]​, following direct orders from the State or under its effective control​[562]​.  Serbia’s responsibility could only be engaged if there was a clear link shown between the ‘influence’​[563]​ of the State, the exercise of that influence and the acts of the direct perpetrators​[564]​.  It was on the basis of the control and power exercised by Serbia that the State’s responsibility would have been engaged.

Attributing the acts of the State’s organs to the State does not preclude a separate finding against the individuals in question.  ‘That international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon States has long been recognised’​[565]​ and attribution is a tool to ensure that the breach of a duty both by the State and the individual are separately identified, rather than condemning the same breach twice​[566]​. 

The Genocide Convention Case therefore illustrates the overlap between the concept of State accountability and the doctrine of State responsibility because from both perspectives Serbia’s liability would be treated as independent to the liability of its organs.  While various individuals and organs were implicated in an act of genocide, Serbia’s breach related to the structural and supportive framework that meant that individuals, State leaders and military groups were able to carry out direct acts of genocide.

The Genocide Convention Case also highlights two differences between State accountability and State responsibility.

State responsibility is established by, and dependent on, attributing the internationally wrongful acts and omissions of the State’s organs to the State, without considering whether the State could be liable independent of its organs.  The difficulty is that if the link to the direct perpetrators is not considered strong enough then the State will not be held responsible.  Thus in the Genocide Convention Case the ICJ found that genocide had occurred​[567]​ but Serbia was only viewed as responsible for failing to prevent it.  There is a risk if relying solely on a finding of State responsibility that the State’s culpability, which is not required for a finding of State responsibility, will be overlooked because the strict attribution requirements were not satisfied.  Certainly attribution plays a role in determining the State’s accountability but because it is used in an informal manner the level of attribution is going to be more flexible, for example the level of necessary control may be lowered when a State is clearly at fault​[568]​.

The Court considered that Serbia ‘was in a position of influence, over the Bosnian Serbs who devised and implemented the genocide in Srebrenica…owing to the strength of the political, military and financial links’​[569]​.  The State’s authority extended over not just ‘persons or entities whose conduct was attributable to [Serbia], but also all those with whom the Respondent maintained close links and on which it could exert a certain influence’​[570]​.  In addition, and citing in support a visit by UN representatives requesting that the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee for the Red Cross have access to the prisoners being held at Srebrenica, Serbia ‘could hardly have been unaware of the serious risk’​[571]​ that genocide would occur.  With these points in mind, and noting that ‘it does not need to be proven that the State concerned definitely had the power to prevent the genocide; it is sufficient that it had the means to do so and that it manifestly refrained from using them’​[572]​, the Court concluded that Serbia was responsible for failing to prevent genocide.

It seems that the factors cited above, which were sufficient to establish responsibility for preventing a negative obligation on Serbia to prevent genocide, equally establish the systemic preconditions that allowed the genocide to occur.  It is thus argued here that Serbia’s culpability extends to breaching a negative obligation not to commit genocide.  The high threshold for attribution under the doctrine thus presents a very real limitation in terms of identifying and condemning the State​[573]​.

In this case, responsibility was engaged specifically for the breach of obligations under the Genocide Convention and, as already seen, the evidentiary standard for State responsibility may be higher because it is determined by a specific attribution threshold.  It was the source of the obligation that meant there was to be a formal inquiry as to State responsibility, rather than an informal determination of State accountability.  As a result the scope of redress was likewise to be subject to any limitations arising under the State responsibility doctrine.  Thus the second difference between State accountability and State responsibility is that the nature of the remedies is limited to those under the doctrine, which in turn reflects the fact that a finding of State responsibility is between States and unrelated to any other party affected by the breach.

The consequences where Serbia was found responsible were to be determined in accordance with the ‘well-established rule of international law that an injured State is entitled to obtain compensation from the State which has committed an internationally wrongful act for the damage caused by it’​[574]​.  This is as opposed to redress on the basis that Serbia had breached its obligations under international law per se.  The Court made declarations that Serbia had failed to comply with provisional measures and prevent genocide and, in addition, ordered Serbia to cooperate with the ICTY​[575]​.

Where Serbia was found responsible for breaching its obligations to prevent and punish genocide, the reparation ordered was appropriate.  Reparation seeks to both ‘wipe out the consequences of the breach’, and ‘re-establish the situation which would…have existed if that act had not been committed’​[576]​.  Thus, it was pertinent to identify what damage was incurred as a result of Serbia breaching the obligations it owed to Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Having found that Serbia was not responsible for the genocide, the Court considered that Serbia could not then be responsible for any damage arising from the genocide, and instead made a declaration of the breach and ordered the State to cooperate with the ICTY​[577]​.  The failure to make even a symbolic award of compensation should be viewed within the limited ambit of reparation under the doctrine and the focus on determining liability rather than redressing it​[578]​.

However, in the context of holding Serbia accountable, the reparation ordered by the Court is less convincing in terms of effectiveness.  Setting aside the argument as to whether Serbia’s acts and omissions amounted to genocide, and focusing instead on the established breaches of prevention and punishment of genocide, it will be considered whether the outcome is one of State accountability as the concept is understood here.

Certainly, a declaration by the Court that ‘Serbia has violated the obligation to prevent genocide, under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’ and ‘failed fully to co-operate with that Tribunal’​[579]​ is clear recognition of the breach.  But for accountability purposes more is needed than just determining that the State is liable, there must be some form of redress accordingly.

The question is whether the nature of the reparation ordered was effective in terms of redress, which is assessed in relation to the specific context, including reference to the law allegedly breached.  The 1948 Genocide Convention gives rise to obligations erga omnes, which suggests that any response would need to reflect that the obligation was owed to the international community as a whole and that the international community as a whole was potentially affected when the obligation was breached.

On the one hand, the reparation ordered was effective because the need for political stability in the region was paramount​[580]​.  Potentially anything more than the declarations made by the Court, including widespread compensation, could have encouraged ongoing tension in the region or seen tensions spill over to affect other States.  If the judgment is viewed as ‘an opportunity for the direct reconciliation of people in the former Yugoslavia​[581]​’, then arguably the interests of the broader community were taken into account and the redress was effective.

On the other hand, the fact that the wanted suspect Ratko Mladic had still not been apprehended in 2009, despite media reports that show Mladic living in Serbia seemingly with the acquiescence of local authorities​[582]​, suggests that Serbia has not complied with the Court’s orders.  This implies that the reparation ordered was not effective in terms of redress.

This argument is not displaced by claiming that the enforcement of a judgment is irrelevant in assessing whether there has been effective redress.  It is illogical to suggest that a State can be held responsible or accountable just because the form of reparation was identified without provision also being made for its implementation.  This highlights a further reason why a finding of State responsibility does not ensure the State is held accountable, which is the lack of a direct enforcement mechanism for judgments rendered by the ICJ (that is in keeping with State responsibility as a tool to manage State relations rather than to police the maintenance of public international law).

Immediately after the Court entered its judgment the ICTY noted that cooperation by Serbia had ‘visibly improved’​[583]​, but by 2008 Serbia’s assistance was only considered to be ‘adequate’​[584]​.  The ongoing calls by the ICTY and UN​[585]​ that EU candidacy should be made conditional on cooperation with the Tribunal, illustrate that these bodies continue to seek redress from Serbia, which in turn shows a gap in Serbia’s accountability.

This overview of the Genocide Convention Case has shown that State accountability does overlap with the State responsibility doctrine because both seek redress from the State for its own discrete breach of the law, rather than that of its organs. State responsibility is engaged for an internationally wrongful act, which is conduct that is attributable to the State under international law and that constitutes a breach of an international obligation. Thus, if the conduct is not attributable under the international law relating to State responsibility or is not in breach of an international obligation, the doctrine is not engaged.  In such cases this thesis argues a principle of State accountability should apply.

2.2.2	The Nicaragua Case – The Wrong Forum for Responding to Breaches of Jus Cogens Norms
Because the focus in this thesis is on jus cogens it is worthwhile getting an initial indication of whether State responsibility is implemented in a way that would make it an appropriate forum for also dealing with jus cogens breaches.

In 1986 Nicaragua brought an application before the ICJ alleging that the USA had breached obligations it owed​[586]​ under customary international law relating to the prohibition on the use of force​[587]​, interference with Nicaragua’s sovereignty​[588]​ and intervention​[589]​.  In order for responsibility to be engaged it needed to be shown that the USA owed the obligations in question to Nicaragua, which was established because the obligations arose under customary international law.   Evidence was also needed that the USA breached those obligations either directly or through the acts and omissions of the rebel Contras that could then be attributed to the USA.

The Court considered that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the ‘relationship of the Contras to the United States Government was so much one of dependence on the one side and control on the other that it would be right to equate the Contras, for legal purposes, with an organ of the United States Government’​[590]​.  The Contras were a separate entity and accordingly the responsibility of the USA was not engaged in relation to the direct acts of the Contras, for which the Contras remained independently liable under international law​[591]​.

The Court then considered whether the level of established control was sufficient to attribute the acts and omissions of the Contras to the USA.  While the USA ‘largely financed, trained, equipped, armed and organised’ the Contras, this was not considered sufficient to amount to ‘effective control’​[592]​ because the culpable acts could have been carried out irrespective of support​[593]​.  Accordingly the USA was not responsible on the grounds that the conduct of the Contras could be attributed to it.

Finally the Court held that the USA was responsible for breaching obligations relating to the prohibition on the use of force under customary international law, which it owed directly to Nicaragua.  In his Separate Opinion Judge Singh noted the previous ‘contribution of the Court to emphasise the principle of non-use of force as one belonging to the realm of jus cogens’​[594]​, but any judicial recognition of the prohibition as jus cogens was of little relevance to the Court’s findings in the case.  In fact, two points illustrate that a finding of State responsibility by the Court was insufficient in terms of seeking redress for the US breaching, what Judge Singh classed as, jus cogens norms.

First, the status of the norm underlying an international obligation is a separate question from determining to whom the obligation is owed and the consequences of breaching that obligation.  The Court’s views on whether or not the prohibition on the use of force is jus cogens were incidental, and did not preclude consideration of whether or not the USA was entitled to invoke a defence, such as necessity.  Jus cogens are non-derogable so no defence can be invoked to its breach, thus either Judge Singh was wrong and the prohibition is not jus cogens​[595]​, Article 53 VCLT is wrong and jus cogens are derogable or the Court was simply not concerned with the breach of the underlying norm.

Second, the effective control test that was applied here to exclude the USA from being responsible for the acts and omissions of the Contras is a steep one, which is arguably inappropriate if it means that States escape liability for breaches of international law that affect the interests of the entire international community.  No criticism is being made of the effective control test in the context of determining State responsibility​[596]​.  Instead the view taken and that was noted in discussing the Genocide Convention Case earlier, is that certain circumstances may require that a different test for attribution be applied.  In those cases, the State responsibility framework should arguably be discounted as an appropriate forum.

Throughout this thesis there appears to be juxtaposition between the progressive recognition of jus cogens as fundamental norms by the ICJ and its steadfast application of black letter international law.  Nowhere does it seem more apparent then in the context of State responsibility, which leads to the preliminary conclusion that State responsibility is the wrong forum for responding to breaches of jus cogens norms.  What remains to be seen is whether a textual analysis of the doctrine will lead to a similar conclusion.

2.3	State Responsibility Under the Draft Articles
The most definitive expression of the State responsibility doctrine is in the 2001 Draft Articles on State Responsibility​[597]​, which some States consider reflect the doctrine under customary international law​[598]​.  This broad acceptance by States strengthens the argument in favour of the existence of jus cogens because the Draft Articles both expressly and by implication acknowledge that international law affords certain norms a separate status.  There is express reference to jus cogens in noting that the effects of the breach of an obligation arising from jus cogens are deemed to be ‘serious’​[599]​ as well as the specific reference made to ‘peremptory’ norms​[600]​.  By way of implied reference there is the inclusion of erga omnes obligations and Article 50 makes the use of counter-measures conditional on ensuring ‘the protection of human rights’; both of which invoke parallels with the fundamental interests of more than just States and therefore jus cogens.

While international law generally, and the State responsibility doctrine specifically, have developed in recognition of jus cogens, the mere reference to ‘peremptory’ norms in the Draft Articles is insufficient to ensure that the doctrine provides effective redress for breaching jus cogens.  What is sought from this discussion is evidence that the Draft Articles were, or were not, intended to apply to breaches of jus cogens norms.

2.3.1	Historical Overview of the Attempts at Codifying the Doctrine
The work of the ILC in codifying the State responsibility doctrine culminated in the 2001 Draft Articles but started in 1947​[601]​.  It was at this time that the UN requested the ILC to ‘undertake the codification of the principles of international law governing State responsibility’​[602]​, which was ‘desirable for the maintenance and development of peaceful relations between States’​[603]​.

Progress was slow and inevitably hindered by the significant changes occurring in international law throughout the twentieth century.  One example of the controversies that arose to slow down work was whether a principle of criminal State responsibility should be considered within the scope of the ILC’s project.  It has already been noted that State criminality was rejected at Nuremberg, but this did not stop the debate from continuing.  There was still the need for a suitable form of redress from States for the scale of breach witnessed during World War Two and, in the opinion of the UN Secretary General, ‘recent developments such as the question of the criminal responsibility of States as well as that of individuals acting on behalf of the State’ would therefore be relevant to the ILC’s work​[604]​.  A related suggestion in 1948 was that there should be a convention to criminalise genocide that would apply to both individuals and States and that the jurisdiction of the ICJ could be extended accordingly​[605]​.  It was clearly a time of much change in international law that had the potential to impact upon on the law of State responsibility.

By the 1960s States such as the USSR criticised the slow progress being made by the ILC​[606]​.  In response a Sub-Committee was set up to monitor the Commission’s work, and it concluded that the reason for the delay was the bifurcated focus on both primary and secondary obligations​[607]​.  The Commission therefore sought to make a ‘strategic retreat’​[608]​ and altogether avoid the question of whether criminal responsibility should be included within the codified doctrine.  The focus shifted from any consideration of the primary obligation or its normative basis to instead deal with State responsibility as a discrete topic that was solely concerned with the consequences in breaching primary obligations.  The change was justified on the basis that any inquiry relating to either primary obligations or norms that bind States would have encroached into the prerogative of States to determine the content of international law​[609]​.  The ILC did remain conscious, however, that any developments in public international law that occurred while the Articles were being drafted would still need to ‘be reflected in some way in the Articles’​[610]​.

By the 1970s the ICJ had given its famous dictum in the Barcelona Traction Case, which highlighted that certain international obligations are owed by States to the international community as a whole, and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) had referred to jus cogens norms from which no derogation was permitted.  The scope of obligations and norms for which State responsibility could potentially be engaged had thus expanded beyond bilateral obligations incurred in treaties and under customary international law.  The 1976 Draft attempted to address this change by returning to the idea that maybe States could be held criminally responsible, which would then create a distinction in the nature of responsibility akin to the difference in the law.

Draft Article 19​[611]​ was introduced in the 1976 Draft and stated that any breach of norms, such as ‘self-determination’ and ‘respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’ that were considered ‘essential by the international community as a whole’​[612]​, would be ‘an international crime’​[613]​.  These State crimes were to be distinguished from State delicts in order to illustrate that obligations based on ‘essential’ norms were different from obligations that were not, and that redress for the breach of such an obligation was also within the scope of the State responsibility doctrine.  At the time the ILC clearly intended that the Draft Articles would address a breach of what it specifically referred to in 2001 as jus cogens norms, but by 2001 the crime/delict distinction was removed.  Thus, to the extent that the Draft Articles currently address a breach of jus cogens norms, the redress is not criminal in nature.

In addition to the issues relating to State criminal responsibility that were discussed in Chapter Two, there was pressure on the ILC to bring its work to a close after several decades and criminal State responsibility was again rejected​[614]​.  However, the ILC still had to determine how to ensure effective redress for the breach of what, by this time, were widely described as jus cogens norms​[615]​.

The Draft Articles were positively received by the international community in 2001​[616]​ but the only direct reference to jus cogens in the final text is in Draft Article 40.  The reason being that the question of redress for a breach of jus cogens norms is, in Sztucki’s words, ‘independent of the problem of legal responsibility’​[617]​.  Whether or not the effect of the Draft Articles is to treat breaches of jus cogens as a separate consideration to matters of State responsibility, and whether such a conclusion would apply more broadly to the Chorzów Factory principle is where the focus of the discussion now turns.

The Chorzów Factory principle is broken down and three questions considered.  Does an obligation to make reparation for breaching an engagement give all parties to that engagement the right to seek reparation?  Does reparation for the breach of an engagement lead to redress for breaching the underlying norm?  Is reparation the same as effective redress as it has been defined in terms of holding States accountable?

To the extent that the answer to any of these questions is negative, there are limitations in relying on the State responsibility doctrine, or the principle in the Chorzów Factory Case, to seek redress from States for breaching international law.  The implication is that States will enjoy impunity for breaching jus cogens norms if no other mechanism for redress exists, in which case there is an argument for some other form of State accountability.

2.3.2	Does an Obligation to Make Reparation for Breaching an Engagement Give all Parties to that Engagement the Right to Seek Reparation?
Under the Draft Articles, responsibility may be invoked by an injured and a non-injured State.  A State is deemed to be injured if it is directly owed the obligation and is affected by its breach, or alternatively the obligation is owed to the ‘international community as a whole’​[618]​.  In comparison, a non-injured State is entitled to invoke responsibility where the breached obligation is owed to a group of States including that State or, as with an injured State, the obligation is owed to the ‘international community as a whole’​[619]​.  The fact that only States may invoke the doctrine, even if the obligation is owed to the international community as a whole, confirms that a legal interest in compliance does not give rise to a procedural right to seek redress when the obligation is breached.  While ‘there are other persons or entities besides States towards whom obligations may exist’​[620]​ there is no direct right set down in the Draft Articles for non-State actors to invoke State responsibility.

Vermeer-Kunzli suggests that the phrase ‘international community’ should not be given a literal definition in the State responsibility context.  Instead she argues that the term should be interpreted to mean those parties that are able and willing to respond to a breach of the obligation, which would accord with the focus of the doctrine on inter-State relations.  In practical terms this approach is sensible because only States have judicial standing before the ICJ in order to bring an application and only States have the physical resources to implement the judgment.  Thus the phrase ‘international community’ does not expand the scope of parties entitled to invoke responsibility​[621]​, but it does expand the category of obligations for which State responsibility can be engaged.

Draft Article 33 confirms that the Draft Articles are not intended to give non-State actors a right to invoke responsibility.  The content of international responsibility that is set out in the Draft Articles is ‘without any prejudice to any right arising from the international responsibility of a State which may accrue directly to any person or entity other than a State’, with ‘international responsibility’ being interpreted here as direct redress for non-State actors​[622]​.  Similarly, even though Draft Article 40 expressly refers to obligations based on ‘peremptory’ norms, there is no additional provision made in relation to the parties that have the right to invoke responsibility for such obligations.  Thus redress is conditional on the obligation being owed to the invoking State directly or as a member of the international community and irrespective that the obligation is erga omnes or based on a jus cogens norm.

The difference between invoking State responsibility for the breach of an obligation and seeking redress because the norm underlying the obligation was also breached can be seen in the claim by the USA for State responsibility against Iran in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (Tehran Hostages Case)​[623]​.  The ICJ noted that Iran had breached, and was continuing to breach, the obligations it owed directly to the USA so that the USA had the right to invoke responsibility​[624]​.  The breaches in question related to the activities of the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam’s Policy that attacked the US Embassy in Tehran taking US citizens hostage.  The Iranian Government failed to take any action, which was in contravention of obligations Iran owed pursuant to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.  In addition, Iran’s failure to act to end the hostage crisis meant that the acts of the hostage takers were also attributed to expand the grounds on which Iran was responsible.

As well as finding Iran responsible because it had breached obligations owed directly to the USA, the ICJ noted that the interests of the entire international community had potentially been affected.  Having made separate findings on the question of State responsibility, the Court then drew ‘the attention of the entire international community to the irreparable harm’​[625]​ because obligations that were ‘vital for the security and well-being of the complex international community’​[626]​ had been breached.  Iran’s actions could not ‘fail to undermine the edifice of law carefully constructed by mankind’ and the ‘rules developed to ensure the ordered progress of relations’​[627]​, but even though the breach had the potential to affect the interests of the international community as a whole the Court had no ability to provide redress on those grounds.

It was not only the ICJ that considered that Iran’s activities affected more than just the USA, and the response by other members of the international community indicate that something more than findings of State responsibility was needed. The Security Council criticised and then called upon the Iranian Government to ‘release immediately the personnel of the Embassy of the USA being held at Tehran’​[628]​, which showed that Members of the Security Council implicated the State authorities in the hostage crisis, even if only because the Government had the ability to effect a release of the hostages.

As well as its application to the ICJ, ‘the United States Government took other action’​[629]​.  The USA introduced a resolution for economic sanctions before the Security Council, which was blocked by the USSR, seemingly on the grounds that the breach was of a bilateral obligation so that only the USA had the right to seek redress​[630]​.  Where it had been unsuccessful in initiating collective condemnation the USA then resorted to unilateral sanctions and measures, including travel restrictions to Iran and reparations​[631]​.

The additional actions by the USA may be interpreted in several ways.  One view could be that the USA was dissatisfied with the reparation ordered by the ICJ, which included cessation and full reparation​[632]​.  An alternative suggestion is that the USA sought to ensure that there was redress on behalf of other parties affected by the breach, or in other words the USA sought to unilaterally address the gap in accountability left in engaging the State responsibility of Iran and due to the interest of the entire international community in the breached obligations.  The fact that Member States of the European Community subsequently joined in imposing sanctions makes this argument plausible​[633]​.

The reality is more likely to lie somewhere between both interpretations.  Iran’s failure to comply with the Court orders inevitably led to dissatisfaction for the USA, as well as highlighting the limited effectiveness in relying on an unenforceable judgment by the ICJ as the sole means to seek redress.  Even if the additional sanctions imposed by the USA did have less than altruistic motives, it does not hide the fact that the additional response taken was largely tolerated, and even supported, by other States.  This will be due to the political power of the USA but, it is submitted here, is also due to the fact that Iran breached international law in a way that posed a threat to more than just US interests, and because a finding of State responsibility was an inappropriate means of redress​[634]​.
 
Unsuccessful attempts to bring an application before the ICJ on grounds other than the breach of a bilateral obligation owed to the invoking State is evidence that the responsibility doctrine is limited in terms of the parties with the right to bring an action.  An application that seeks redress for the ‘irreparable harm’​[635]​ potentially caused by the breach is further evidence that States are more inclined to try and overcome the limitations of the State responsibility doctrine when it is more than just State interests that are at stake.  The difficulty in using the State responsibility doctrine for this purpose was illustrated in the East Timor case.

Portugal alleged that the right to self-determination of the East Timorese people was violated when Australia concluded a treaty with Indonesia relating to the Timor Gap that was occupied by Indonesia since 1975, when Portugal had been the administrating power​[636]​.  Portugal claimed that Australia ‘incurr[ed] responsibility vis-à-vis both the people of East Timor and Portugal’​[637]​ because the obligation to respect a community’s self-determination that was breached through the treaty in question, is erga omnes.  On the basis that all States would have an interest in maintenance of the obligation, Portugal claimed the right to invoke Australia’s responsibility​[638]​.

The Court agreed that the right to self-determination is an ‘essential principle of contemporary international law’​[639]​ and that the self-determination of the East Timorese people was fundamental.  Despite recognising that more than the interests of the State parties were affected by the breach, the Court declined to hear the application on its merits because to do so would require a judgment that pertained to Indonesia, who was not a party to the Court​[640]​.

The application was dismissed on procedural grounds and accordingly is not a precedent in terms of the status of self-determination in international law, but it illustrates that attempts are made to overcome the limitations of the State responsibility doctrine in certain situations (being the limited right to invoke the principle in this case).  In his dissent, ad hoc Judge Skubiszewski considered that Indonesia’s absence from the Court should not have prevented the ICJ from exercising jurisdiction because the effect was to bar jurisdiction ‘whenever the application of erga omnes rules…were at stake’​[641]​.  Evans​[642]​, too, noted that while the Court did not deny the existence of the obligation, it frustrated its own potential as a judicial forum for recognising either the obligation or the underlying jus cogens norm, if found to exist​[643]​.

Draft Article 40 refers to obligations that are based on jus cogens norms, but this does not appear to have been a catalyst in terms of expanding the scope of parties legally entitled to bring a claim or in terms of an increase in claims of State responsibility specifically on the grounds that the norm underlying the obligation is jus cogens.  This is apparent in the context of the Israeli construction of the wall around East Jerusalem, the facts of which were discussed in Chapter One.

Israel’s actions were recognised as contravening international law, in breach of obligations owed by Israel and undermining what arguably are considered to be jus cogens norms, yet no State has sought to invoke the State responsibility doctrine.  Furthermore, because of the restrictions on invoking responsibility and judicial standing before the ICJ, a non-State party cannot bring a claim to the Court.  Instead the UN General Assembly recognised that Israel ‘refuse[d] to comply with international law vis-à-vis its construction of the abovementioned wall’​[644]​ and the ICJ was requested to issue an advisory opinion.  It was the opinion of the Court that the construction of the wall was ‘contrary to various of Israel's international obligations’ and ‘that the responsibility of that State is engaged under international law’​[645]​.

The Opinion given by the Court was the sole consideration of the State’s legal culpability and highlights that the limitations in relying on the State responsibility doctrine are not overcome even if the entire international community is perceived to have an interest in the obligation that is breached.  No claim for State responsibility was brought, despite the ICJ labelling the obligations as erga omnes so that all States were theoretically entitled to invoke responsibility under Draft Article 48​[646]​.  Although ‘the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination’ is arguably a jus cogens norm​[647]​, no claim was brought because State responsibility cannot be invoked for breaching the norm alone.

Draft Article 48 permits a claim to be made by a State on behalf of an injured State/s or other parties with a legal interest in the obligation, although this is limited to requesting cessation, non-repetition and performance of the obligation.  On the one hand, the ILC noted that Draft Article 48 ‘involves a measure of progressive development, which is justified since it provides a means of protecting the community or collective interest at stake’​[648]​.  On the other hand, the Commission noted that this development may be more theoretical than practical as currently its effect suggests that a State invoking responsibility under Draft Article 48 ‘may be called on to establish that it is acting in the interest of the injured party’​[649]​.  The Commission made this judgment by referring to ‘various human rights treaties [that] allow invocation of responsibility by any State party. In those cases where they have been resorted to, a clear distinction has been drawn between the capacity of the applicant State to raise the matter and the interests of the beneficiaries of the obligation’​[650]​.  Where the injured party is not a State there are ‘greater difficulties, which the present Articles cannot solve’​[651]​.

It is even clearer that Draft Article 48 is not intended to expand the scope of the Draft Articles given that Draft Articles 43, 44 and 45 continue to apply when responsibility is being invoked on behalf of another party​[652]​.  For example, an invoking State will be required to establish the nationality of claims and the exhaustion of local remedies which, as Evans points out, is incongruous with Draft Article 48 being used to seek redress where the interests of the entire international community are at stake, if that was the intention​[653]​.

The objective of the State responsibility doctrine and the Chorzów Factory principle is generally considered to be to identify when States breach their obligations owed to other States and to ensure reparation from the State on that basis​[654]​.  This goal does not change just because the Draft Articles by implication recognise erga omnes obligations and expressly refer to jus cogens norms, and certainly neither factor has extended the right to invoke responsibility in practice.  Without a legal entitlement to invoke the doctrine that was commensurate with the legal interest held in the obligation, the Draft Articles can only go so far in guaranteeing responsibility or accountability.

2.3.3	Does Reparation for the Breach of an Obligation Lead to Redress for Breaching the Underlying Norm?
Draft Articles 33 and 48 state that responsibility may be engaged for breaches of obligations owed to the ‘international community as a whole’, which includes obligations erga omnes that arise from jus cogens norms.  The question here is whether engaging State responsibility for the breach of an erga omnes obligation arising from a jus cogens norm is effectual in terms of providing redress on the basis of the norm as well as the obligation.  In other words, is redress for breaching an obligation, which expresses the rights, duties and rules arising from a norm, the same as redress for breaching the norm per se?

There is an assumption that if the answer is no, the risk of a gap in redress arises because only the obligation is dealt with.  Likewise, it is assumed that if the answer is yes, then the fact that State responsibility is engaged for breaches of legal obligations is not a limitation in terms of seeking accountability from the State​[655]​.  Both assumptions are tested below.

The difference in legal function between norms and obligations (what each does) was discussed in Chapter Three.  The focus here is on whether there is also a difference in the legal content (what each regulates).  If there is a substantive difference between the norm and the obligation, the State’s responsibility will only extend insofar as ‘the breach of an international obligation rather than a rule or a norm of international law’​[656]​.

What matters for the purposes of engaging State responsibility is not the existence of a norm, rather that the norm’s application to the responsible State ‘is captured by a legal obligation’​[657]​.  The potential gap between the norm and obligations derived from it, in terms of seeking redress, can be illustrated by referring to the Opinion of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in Beazley v USA​[658]​.

The Inter-American Commission’s Opinion was sought when the USA intended to execute the petitioner, who was aged 17 at the time of his offending, in contravention of Articles I, II, VII and XXVII of the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.  In addition, the Commission was asked to consider whether there had been breach of a customary prohibition​[659]​ on executing persons aged below 18 years at the time they committed the crime, and which was also argued to be jus cogens​[660]​.  The Commission declared the claim was admissible and issued precautionary measures requesting that the USA not carry out the execution pending the outcome of deliberations.   The USA failed to comply and the petitioner was executed 18 months before the Commission released its Opinion.

The Commission concluded that the actions of the USA in sentencing and executing the petitioner were ‘contrary to an international norm of jus cogens’​[661]​.  In terms of the State’s responsibility, the Commission found that the State had ‘failed to act in accordance with its fundamental human rights obligations as a Member of the Organization of American States’​[662]​ because it failed to comply with a request under Article 25 Rules of Procedure that execution be halted prior to resolution of proceedings​[663]​.  The USA was considered to have breached both specific legal obligations to which it was bound and a norm of international law but the State’s responsibility was only for contravening its obligations and redress was only ordered on those grounds.

The potential for a deficit in redress for the breach of the norm arises only if the obligations in question do not fully capture the nuances of the specific norm.  In this case, the Commission noted that disregarding precautionary measures (the obligation) also amounted to a breach of the broader human rights obligations that applied to the USA as a Member of the Organisation of American States.  Thus, in terms of the label used, the gravity in breaching both the norm and associated obligations was captured.  However, the gravity in breaching both the norm and associated obligations must also be reflected in terms of the reparation ordered.  It is all very well for a court or other body with the legal authority to make a determination to note that the State has breached a jus cogens norm when it failed to fulfil its legal obligations, but without giving substantive recognition in terms of the redress ordered how can reparation for the breach of an obligation lead to redress for breaching the underlying norm?

Having determined that the USA was subject to its jurisdiction because it had ratified the Charter of the Organisation of American States in 1951​[664]​, the Commission called for the State to ensure future compliance with its obligations under the Convention​[665]​.  In addition, it ‘recommended’ that compensation be given to the petitioner’s family and that there be a review of the USA’s law on capital punishment.  The Commission also ordered, in light of the gravity of the breach and the lack of measures taken by the USA to address its offending, that there be immediate publication of the Opinion​[666]​.

Redress was ordered for the breach of the USA’s obligations, rather than the underlying norms, but in this case reparation for the obligation arguably also amounted to redress for the norm.  Publicly condemning the USA for taking active steps to execute a youth highlights the gravity of the breach because both the failure to comply with precautionary measures issued by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the fact the USA had contravened the normative prohibition on executing minors were recognised.

The nature of redress for the underlying norm that was breached was more political than it was legal, which accords with the broader discussion of State accountability in the thesis.  In terms of the specific discussion on State responsibility in this Chapter, however, the conclusion is that the question of redress for breaching the underlying norm is peripheral to the objectives of the doctrine.  Thus the fact that responsibility is not expressly engaged for breaching legal norms is not so much a limitation of the doctrine, but an observation as to its function.

It is argued that as the function and content of norms and obligations differ, so does the function and content of the State responsibility doctrine when compared with the concept of State accountability.  Redress for breaching an obligation is not the same as redress for breaching the underlying norm at a theoretical level but the two can overlap in practice as the Beazley case has shown.  Thus the assumption made at the start of this section, that there is the risk of a gap in redress left by the Draft Articles when only the obligation is dealt with, must be dismissed as overly simplistic.  The reality is far more complicated and requires greater understanding of what the nature of reparation is in the context of the State responsibility doctrine and how it overlaps with redress in the context of State accountability.

2.3.4	Is Reparation the Same as Effective Redress?
In 2001 the ILC noted that the ‘basic legal consequences’ in engaging State responsibility, being the remedies under the Draft Articles, did not ‘preclude the future development of a more elaborate regime of consequences’​[667]​ in relation to ‘serious breaches’ of obligations arising from jus cogens norms.  Therefore the assumption is that, although obligations based on jus cogens norms are distinguished vis-à-vis obligations arising from standard norms, the Draft Articles give little practical effect to that distinction in terms of the consequences in engaging State responsibility.

To test this assumption and determine any overlap with redress for accountability purposes the analysis shifts to consider the forms of reparation listed under the Draft Articles, which in turn codify the modalities of reparation historically used in the State responsibility context.  Chapter Two argued that there is no one modality of redress in relation to holding States accountable, but it was submitted that in the context of breaching jus cogens effective redress would require some form of recognition that the breach had the potential to affect the interests of the international community as a whole.  The inquiry thus becomes whether reparation under the Draft Articles is able to redress the consequences when, for example, States commit an act of aggression?

Tomuschat is just one commentator arguing that the collective aspects of State responsibility, pursuant to Draft Articles 40 and 48, are ‘in consonance with the growing trend’​[668]​ that recognises that State responsibility ‘is not only due to the “injured State” but [also] to the community of Nations’​[669]​.  Although acknowledging that it may be more than just States affected by the breach, Tomuschat warns that it is unlikely that there can be any relief under the Draft Articles as they only apply insofar as the breach was of an obligation owed between States​[670]​.  Tomuschat’s statement will be expanded upon and clarification sought about the reasons that reparation, in terms of State responsibility, is or is not effective as redress, in terms of State accountability.  In particular, whether the difficulties associated with relying on a form of reparation in the context of the Draft Articles continue when the form of reparation is relied on in a different context.

2.3.4.1	Restitution
The Draft Articles define restitution as any step necessary in order to return to the ‘status quo ante’ and to ‘re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed’​[671]​.  The ILC concluded that restitution was ‘of particular importance’​[672]​ where the obligation was based on a jus cogens norm because it ensures compliance with the primary obligation.  Where the obligation is based on a jus cogens norm the question of reparation for the actual breach thus becomes a secondary consideration after restitution.

When the focus turns to reparation for the breach there is the need to determine what the objective of reparation under the State responsibility doctrine is.  If the obligation is based on a jus cogens norm and is owed erga omnes, it would be literally impossible to ensure ‘a return to the status quo ante’ from the perspective of every member of the international community.  This suggests, if only on the basis of the practicalities involved, that reparation under the Draft Articles is solely concerned with the consequences of the breach as it affects the invoking State.

The decision of the Permanent Court of Justice in the Chorzów Factory case made it clear that ‘reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act’​[673]​.  Where this is not possible through restitution, then additional means such as compensation may be used.  Examples include where the primary obligation no longer exists and there is nothing left to restore, as was noted by the ICJ in the Genocide Convention Case in the context of the obligation to prevent genocide​[674]​ and in the case of the Rainbow Warrior Arbitration​[675]​, where the treaty obligation breached by France no longer applied and satisfaction was ordered instead​[676]​.

While restitution has the obvious benefit of ensuring compliance with the obligation, and therefore with the norm on which it is based, there are limitations when used in the State responsibility context because reparation is only ordered to the extent necessary to ‘wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act’​[677]​.  This in turn has consequences in terms of relying on restitution as a means of holding the State accountable.

Restitution will restore the relationship between the parties to the obligation and thus the obligation itself, but this has limited bearing on any norm that is breached.  For example, if a State breaches its treaty obligations and invades another State then restitution could be used to reinstate the treaty, but this has no effect in relation to the use of force that was involved.  The breach of an obligation may result in that obligation being brought to an end while the breach of a norm does not bring an end to that norm or alter its status or existence​[678]​.  Restitution is thus beneficial in terms of ensuring compliance with the norm but not in terms of redress for its breach.

In the State responsibility context, the focus is on restoring the relationship between States, which narrows and simultaneously rationalises the scope of reparation.  Article 71 VCLT makes it apparent that the objective in responding where a treaty obligation based on a jus cogens norm is breached is primarily compliance with the norm.  Pursuant to the VCLT, where a treaty is in contravention of jus cogens State parties are beholden to ‘eliminate as far as possible the consequences of any act performed in reliance on any provision which conflicts with the peremptory norm of general international law’ and ‘bring their mutual relations into conformity with the peremptory norm of general international law’​[679]​.  The ILC interpreted Article 71 to stress that ‘full conformity with the rule of jus cogens’ was the objective, rather than addressing the consequences that arise from the breach​[680]​.  Thus restitution can be used to re-establish the relationship of the parties to a breached obligation, while also ensuring compliance with jus cogens norms underlying treaty obligations pursuant to Article 71 VCLT.

The second consequence in relying on restitution as a means of holding the State accountable relates to the limitation imposed by Draft Article 35 on the possible scope of restitution.  Restitution must not be ‘out of all proportion’ to the breach and the ILC advocated a standard of ‘equity and reasonableness’​[681]​ against which to assess proportionality.  However, it is argued here that it is unlikely the same proportionality standard would apply in terms of redress for breaching any obligation owed to an invoking State and redress for breaching the norm underlying that obligation when it seeks to protect the interests of the international community as a whole.  It is axiomatic that the consequences in breaching obligations based on jus cogens are significant, and to measure proportionality in terms of the effect of the breach of the obligation against one State is inappropriate​[682]​. 

The final consequence in terms of relying on restitution as a means of holding the State accountable is that, pragmatically, reversal of the consequences of breaching jus cogens is often impossible.  This is not only because the interests of the international community as a whole may potentially be affected but also because these breaches tend to be catastrophic in terms of the results.

For example, in the Genocide Convention Case Serbia was found responsible for breaching its obligations to prevent and punish genocide and declarations were made accordingly​[683]​.  Even if Serbia had been found responsible for the commission of genocide and thus in contravention of the normative prohibition of genocide, restitution would have been impossible because there is literally nothing to restore and a return to the status quo ante would have been inconceivable.

In the context of State responsibility, reparation aims to ‘wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act’​[684]​ and it has been seen that the consequences of applying restitution for that discrete objective make restitution unlikely in terms of redress when the obligation is erga omnes and often impossible in terms of redress for the breach of a jus cogens norm.  These findings are regardless of whether or not restitution is being relied upon as reparation under the Draft Articles.

In the earlier 1996 draft of the Articles, restitution was expressly excluded as a form of reparation when the breached obligation was based on a jus cogens norm​[685]​.  Grey summarised the position of the French delegate who said there was actually no need to exclude restitution for this purpose because realistically such a provision would be ‘operating on an unduly theoretical level; it is providing for possibilities that do not seem to have arisen in the past and do not seem likely to arise in the future’​[686]​.  Certain members of the ILC have similarly labelled restitution a ‘trivial’ remedy when an obligation based on a jus cogens norm is breached​[687]​.

The word ‘trivial’ is apt because it captures the essential problem that restitution cannot convey the potential enormity when jus cogens, or obligations based on the norm, are breached.  To claim that the breach of jus cogens could be effectively redressed by simply reversing the consequences of the breach, within the bounds of what is proportional, runs the risk of trivialising the norm.

2.3.4.2	Compensation
Compensation is defined in the context of the Draft Articles as a method of providing redress when restitution cannot, and thus is limited to ‘payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear’​[688]​.  This does not exclude the potential that compensation may be effective beyond the scope of State responsibility, where the measure of compensation would not be limited to that required to restore the status quo ante.

Several points relating to the definition of compensation under the Draft Articles illustrate that its effectiveness is limited by, and therefore to, the State responsibility context.

Compensation and satisfaction are considered complementary in the context of the State responsibility doctrine, so that ‘the function of compensation is to address the actual losses incurred as a result of the internationally wrongful act’ and ‘satisfaction is concerned with non-material injury’​[689]​.  Cumulatively compensation and satisfaction are used to ensure full reparation but, pursuant to Draft Articles 36 and 37, only ‘insofar as it cannot be made good by restitution’.

The second point is that compensation may be expressed in both monetary terms and ‘other forms of value’​[690]​ in order to ‘offset the damage incurred’​[691]​, but only to the extent necessary to ensure ‘full reparation’​[692]​.  Draft Article 27 confirms that the State will still be required to ‘make good any material loss’, although in those cases compensation is to be sought separate to the State responsibility framework.  For example, a finding that the State is not responsible under the doctrine because there is a ‘circumstance precluding wrongfulness’​[693]​ does not preclude the State from having to compensate any loss caused by its actions, as noted by the ICJ in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project when it stated that any defence to a finding of responsibility ‘would not exempt [the State] from its duty to compensate’​[694]​.

The third point is that there is no penal function associated with compensation​[695]​, or indeed any form of reparation under the Draft Articles​[696]​, that could have the effect of distinguishing between the breach of an obligation based on a jus cogens as opposed to a standard norm of international law​[697]​.  The ILC recognised that without a penal function the utility of compensation is considerably narrowed, but that the function of reparation is to restore the relationship between the affected and breaching State so that reparation is not concerned with the maintenance of the underlying law.  A point also noted by former US President Johnson in the context of seeking assurances and guarantees of cessation and non-repetition from the USSR for breaching obligations relating to diplomatic protection when he stated that ‘regret and compensation are no substitute for adequate protection’​[698]​.

The decision of the ICJ not to award compensation in the Genocide Convention Case is interpreted here as recognition that compensation has a limited, non-penal function under the State responsibility doctrine.  The Court considered that compensation was not an ‘appropriate form of reparation’​[699]​ where Serbia breached its obligation to prevent genocide because there was no link between the breach of that obligation and any damage for which compensation could be awarded.  The ICJ did not consider there was any requirement to award compensation on the basis that full reparation was otherwise guaranteed through the Court’s declarations.  It is also worth noting that when the 1948 Genocide Convention was drafted, the ‘majority’ of parties had considered that State responsibility for breaching the Convention could involve ‘liability to pay damages’ and ‘the question of States having to compensate their own nationals…also caused some interest’​[700]​.  Thus resorting to satisfaction in this case may be linked to the specific obligation so that seeking compensation in response were a State to commit genocide is not impossible.

The fourth point is that compensation is only granted to the State that invokes responsibility​[701]​.  Practice provides few instances where States have attempted to bring a claim for compensation on behalf of third parties​[702]​, despite a limited number of forums existing in which compensation may be sought by non-State actors.  Regardless of the measure or how widely the obligation is owed, the compensation that is ordered only represents a breach of the obligation as it is owed to the invoking State.

The final point is that compensation is not awarded under the Draft Articles for damage that cannot be quantified in financial terms​[703]​. Compensation for ‘the affront or injury caused by a violation of rights not associated with actual damage’​[704]​ is also excluded.  In theory this means that compensation is in no way used to recognise the actual breach, which therefore bypasses issues that arise in terms of assessing damage incurred through the breach of an obligation erga omnes.

In practice however, there are examples where compensation has been quantified in a way that indicates there is redress for breaching the law as well as reparation from the State for breaching its legal obligations owed to another State.  This argument is where the level of compensation implies a punitive characteristic.  In such cases it is logical to then link the imposition of a penal element with recognition that more than just the interests of the State in question are potentially affected by the breach.

An example of this is in the Mexican Claims Commission cases where Mexican authorities were found to be in breach of their obligations to ensure that the perpetrators of crimes committed against US nationals were punished.  Compensation was not sought for the acts of the individual perpetrators​[705]​, but in recognition that the State had failed to ‘take proper steps to apprehend and punish’ the responsible parties​[706]​. The high award of compensation​[707]​ suggests that a penal element was factored in​[708]​, which can in turn be linked to the State’s failure to punish the perpetrators of crimes as required under customary international law, especially in the context of human rights breaches​[709]​.

2.3.4.3	Satisfaction
Satisfaction is defined as any ‘appropriate modality’​[710]​ that satisfies the gap in reparation insofar as the injury ‘cannot be made good by restitution or compensation’​[711]​.  The proviso has been described in terms of giving satisfaction its ‘legal character’ because there is no limit on the form that satisfaction may take, but there is a limit on when it may be used under the State responsibility doctrine.  Satisfaction would be used, for example, where the damage cannot be financially quantified as is the case with an insult to a State’s reputation or pride if the national flag is destroyed, in which case the damage cannot be undone but it is not tangible either​[712]​.

The function of satisfaction as a sort of last resort remedy implies flexibility in order to overcome any residual issues in providing redress that prevent compensation and restitution being used for that purpose​[713]​.  Notably, satisfaction is more likely to ensure redress when the obligation is erga omnes because it seeks to remedy injuries that are described as ‘symbolic [in] character, arising from the very fact of the breach of the obligation, irrespective of its material consequences’​[714]​ and without needing to establish any actual injury.

The variety in the modes of satisfaction support this point.  Draft Article 37 is not exhaustive and includes ‘acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology’​[715]​, all of which have the potential to benefit a more comprehensive audience and provide widespread redress rather than simply acknowledging the injury of directly affected parties.

The implied flexibility in using satisfaction, which would permit the mode of satisfaction to be tailored to the particular facts and nature of the breach, indicates a greater chance of States being held accountable at the same time as being held responsible - albeit that accountability would not have been the primary objective.  Practice shows otherwise, because the hierarchy in the forms of reparation mean that satisfaction is still only relied on insofar as is necessary to ensure full reparation.

The Rainbow Warrior Arbitration illustrates that the utility of satisfaction can be frustrated when applied in the State responsibility context.  France breached the terms of a settlement treaty concluded with New Zealand after France admitted its liability in relation to the bombing of a Greenpeace vessel in New Zealand waters.  The treaty breach occurred when France repatriated the responsible French agents from exile and the form of reparation ordered was satisfaction, on the basis that the breach of the treaty did not give rise to any damage for which compensation could be provided​[716]​.  There can be no criticism in terms of a true application of the State responsibility doctrine, but there can be no doubt of the ineffectiveness in terms of recognising France’s culpability, given the original contravention of international law that led to the settlement treaty in the first place.

The declarations by the Arbitration Tribunal were effective in terms of redress for the breach of France’s treaty obligations, but ineffective in relation to the norms that were also breached.  The Tribunal noted that the breach of the treaty settlement between France and New Zealand was grievous because it was in response to breaches of what is arguably the jus cogens prohibition on using force against the territorial integrity of another State​[717]​.  Despite this, the Tribunal considered that a declaration of French responsibility was still the most appropriate form of redress as it ‘put an end to the present unhappy affair to promote close and friendly relations’​[718]​.

A further inhibition on satisfaction when utilised in the context of the Draft Articles is the proviso that satisfaction ‘shall not be out of proportion to the injury and may not take a form humiliating to the responsible State’​[719]​.  As with restitution, there is the risk that if satisfaction were to be effective in providing redress when a breached obligation is based on a jus cogens norm then it may be sufficiently egregious to humiliate the State.  Thus it is doubtful that satisfaction as a form of reparation in the context of the State responsibility doctrine would often be effective for the purposes of State accountability, especially if the breach in question was of a jus cogens norm​[720]​.

2.4	Why State Accountability is Different to State Responsibility
This first part of Chapter Four has sought to show the reasons why the normative standing of conceptual State accountability is being explored when public international law already makes provision for responding when States breach that same law.  In so doing the argument has been made that the doctrine of State responsibility, as it is expressed under the Draft Articles and more broadly captured as a general principle of law in the Chorzów Factory case, is not the same thing as the concept of State accountability that is being explored in this thesis.

The Draft Articles are somewhat progressive in terms of recognising the existence of jus cogens norms and the effect that erga omnes obligations have had on the law on State responsibility, which developed at a time when bilateral obligations owed between and affecting the interests of States were the primary focus.  The various limitations and characteristics of the doctrine that have been noted here, however, illustrate that the State responsibility principle has not kept pace with nor substantively adapted to these developments in international law.  Instead the doctrine continues to fulfil a discrete function and occupy a designated legal space.

From the overview given of the ILC’s work in codifying the doctrine through to the consideration of examples of the doctrine’s application before the ICJ and a textual consideration of the Draft Articles, it has been seen that State responsibility has its own discrete objective.  In particular, three elements of State responsibility were discussed to illustrate either limitations or characteristics that distinguish the doctrine.

First, non-State parties do not have the right to invoke State responsibility.  In contrast, the extent to which non-State actors play a role in holding States accountable will be determined in Chapter Five, although it is anticipated that the responses that seek to hold States accountable in practice are more likely to come from States.  However, given that accountability has been conceptualised as legal but also political and even moral in nature, then the contribution of non-State actors cannot be discounted.

Second, state responsibility is engaged for the breach of legal obligations.  Again it is not expected that there will be a massive change in the context of State accountability.  Indeed, it is anticipated that in practice State accountability will be the pursuit of redress when States breach their legal obligations.  It is the fact that State responsibility is not concerned with redress for the underlying norm at all that distinguishes the doctrine from a principle of State accountability.

Third, reparation aims to wipe out the consequences of the breach insofar as it affected the relationship between the State parties to the obligation in question.  Thus, while the individual forms of reparation may each be effective there are limitations in relying on restitution, compensation and satisfaction in the State responsibility context, which mean that reparation under the Draft Articles does not ensure effective redress for the broader purpose of State accountability. 

What emerges from these points is that the distinguishing features of State responsibility are not radical in terms of separating the doctrine from the concept of State accountability.  Indeed there is nothing to exclude a finding of State responsibility from being taken into account in determining a State’s accountability – as part of a matrix of responses used for this purpose and considered under the interpretive framework in this thesis.  Instead, it is submitted that it is the different objective of each doctrine (both actual and hypothetical) that means they must be kept distinct at a theoretical level.  The strongest evidence in support of this argument would be where juridical support for State accountability as a separate principle is found in the context of the State responsibility doctrine and it is to that inquiry the discussion now turns.

3.	IS THERE JURIDICAL SUPPORT FOR STATE ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER THE STATE RESPONSIBILITY DOCTRINE?
The first section analysed State responsibility from the perspective of understanding what limitations are inherent to the doctrine, which means that holding a State responsible does not necessarily ensure that the State is held accountable.  The second section seeks to determine what indicators exist or have emerged in the context of the codification and implementation of State responsibility that support the argument that State accountability is feasible under international law or even that the doctrine has paved the way for such a concept to evolve.

This is taken in two steps.  There will be an examination of attempts to extend the doctrine to cover a broader ground of State liability.  The criminal State responsibility regime that was rejected from earlier drafts of the Articles and the current serious breach regime in Draft Article 40 will be examined. This analysis seeks to understand whether either regime may be viewed as a specific indicator that the ILC was seeking to overcome the limits of the State responsibility doctrine, which in turn is evidence of juridical support for a broader concept of State accountability.

3.1.	Implied Attempts to Extend the Doctrine for the Purposes of Seeking State Accountability
State responsibility is a fundamental rule of international law but like all principles of international law it will be required to adapt with relevant changes to the framework in which it exists.  The Chorzów Factory principle is just one statement of the doctrine, while other reflections adopt the language more widely associated with State responsibility as rights and obligations, rather than engagement.  For example, in the Spanish Zone of Morocco Claim Judge Huber stated that ‘all rights of an international character involve international responsibility.  Responsibility results in the duty to make reparation if the obligation in question is not met’​[721]​.  Drawing upon these and similar broad statements about State responsibility, the ILC have identified and codified the precise parameters of the doctrine.  As the discussion above has shown, the culminating Draft Articles sought to capture those changes within international law that have impacted upon the principle of State responsibility while remaining true to the underlying Chorzów Factory principle.

Yet, it is apparent from the discussion above that State responsibility cannot both fulfil its discrete function, to ensure full reparation from States for breaching their legal obligations, and be the sole means for holding States accountable for all breaches of public international law.  There is an unassailable tension between the doctrine of State responsibility, which is based on State equality and State sovereignty​[722]​, and the concept of State accountability, which is based on the assumption that the interests of the international community as a whole are influencing the development of public international law.

An illustration of how this tension manifests - so that some additional mechanism beyond the State responsibility doctrine is needed for accountability purposes - is where the breach in question is so grave that it affects a significant population.  In such a case there is both a moral and general legal argument that any contributing State must redress the damage caused.  Yet any determination of liability under the State responsibility doctrine requires convincing evidence and ‘charges of exceptional gravity’ have to be supported by evidence that is ‘fully conclusive’​[723]​.  Of course no criticism can be levelled at an evidentiary standard that does not allow one sovereign State to be responsible to another sovereign State without clearly proving the case; except, it is submitted, when the effect is that States escape with impunity.

However, it is not being argued that the State responsibility doctrine permits State impunity.  Two factors illustrate support for the broader thesis of an emerging practice of seeking accountability for States beyond the doctrine:  the fact that the State responsibility doctrine is no longer the only means for responding when States breach their legal obligations, and attempts to expand upon the doctrine itself.

State responsibility is no longer the sole forum for seeking redress from States.  For example, individuals have the right to bring claims before the European Court of Human Rights where Evans argued State responsibility is not being applied in a strict, doctrinal sense - it is ‘State responsibility in the layman’s sense’​[724]​.  While States are being called to answer for breaching international law, the approach will depend on the modus operandi of the forum.  So, in reference again to the European Court of Human Rights, the focus is on upholding the principles found within the European Convention on Human Rights and ‘the language of State responsibility…has been employed quite deliberately to broaden the scope of substantive legal obligations’​[725]​.

A more thorough illustration that a broader accountability doctrine is forming, and which includes doctrinal State responsibility, is the adoption and adaption of the attribution principle in other forums.  The level of attribution required to determine a State’s liability alters depending on the context in which the principle is being applied.  This in turn shows that the objective of the State responsibility doctrine is discrete but that principles associated with the State responsibility doctrine have been expanded upon for the purposes of ensuring that redress is more comprehensively sought.

There are at least three attribution tests used by the international courts and each approach is context specific.  For example, Talmon highlights that the ICJ used a test of effective control in the Genocide Convention Case, in determining Serbia’s responsibility for acts of secessionist entities​[726]​.  In contrast, an overall control test was used by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadic, to determine whether the conflict was international in nature so that the individuals could be tried for breaches of the Geneva Conventions​[727]​.  Finally, an effective overall control test was used by the European Court of Human Rights in Cyprus v Turkey​[728]​ in order to prevent a ‘regrettable vacuum in the system of human rights protection’​[729]​.

In Cyprus v Turkey the acts and omissions of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (a secessionist entity) were attributed to Turkey on the grounds that it exercised effective overall control of the authorities.  If the European Court of Human Rights had employed the standard of effective control that is required to engage State responsibility then the risk was that Turkey would escape liability.  Evans describes the approach of the European Court of Human Rights as ‘reflective of the ethical view of human rights’, whereby the State’s liability is addressed because it morally needs to be, rather than because certain legal tests have determined that it can be​[730]​.

The fact that a different standard of attribution was possible and would be appropriate in different circumstances was recognised by the ICJ in the Genocide Convention Case where it noted the different tests highlighted above and stated that ‘logic does not require the same test to be adopted…the degree and nature of a State’s involvement in an armed conflict on another State’s territory…can very well and without logical inconsistency differ from the degree and nature of the involvement required to give rise to that State’s responsibility for a specific act in the course of that conflict’​[731]​.

In each of the cases mentioned, the context was different and each jurisdiction had separate objectives to justify taking a separate approach.  The objective of State responsibility is to ensure reparation when a State breaches its obligations owed to another State in accordance with the clear legal tests established under the doctrine, thus a higher standard of attribution is appropriate.  In comparison the European Court of Human Rights is not concerned with State responsibility, in the doctrinal sense, it is concerned with the liability of States for breaching obligations owed under the European Convention on Human Rights.  As Evans noted, the relief that is likely to arise is not so much the Court’s determination that the rights have been breached.  Rather relief ‘is more likely to flow from the political process into which this judgment fits rather than the judgment per se’​[732]​.  It is because redress is sought beyond the State responsibility framework and attempts are being made to expand upon the traditional scope of the doctrine that this thesis argues a broader conceptualisation of what it means to hold States accountable has juridical viability.

3.2.	Specific Attempts to Extend the Doctrine for the Purposes of Seeking State Accountability
3.2.1	Criminal State Responsibility
The now defunct Draft Article 19 was concerned with obligations relating to human rights, of which many are also recognised as jus cogens norms​[733]​ and sought to overcome what the ILC saw as a contradiction ‘if the same consequences continued to be applied to the breach of obligations arising out of the rules defined as jus cogens’​[734]​.  In order to overcome this contradiction, Draft Article 19 ‘diverted attention away from the normality of State responsibility for breaches of international human rights’​[735]​ and jus cogens based obligations by drawing a distinction between delicts and crimes.

Yet there are breaches of both human rights obligations and jus cogens obligations that are not crimes.  Even if Draft Article 19 had been successful in resolving one problem, by recognising that not all breaches of international law can be treated the same, there was the risk that another problem would be created: the imposition of a hierarchy in breaches.  The unlikelihood that States would accept the ILC making a determination on what breaches would amount to crimes and the consequences this would entail, made it somewhat inevitable that criminal State responsibility would not be adopted in the final Draft Articles, where Draft Article 19 was replaced with the serious breach regime in Draft Article 40​[736]​.

As is the case with the current Draft Article 40, the wording of Draft Article 19 illustrates that the ILC considered the breach of an obligation arising from a jus cogens norm to be more than an internationally wrongful act, and that the consequences of engaging responsibility should reflect this​[737]​.  In comparison with Draft Article 40, Draft Article 19 sought to reflect this difference by distinguishing between breaches that are crimes and breaches that are described as delicts.  This was with the view that classing a breach as a ‘crime’ would encourage condemnation because of the pejorative associations with the word.

Draft Article 19 defined a State crime as the ‘breach by a State of an international obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the international community that its breach is recognised as a crime by that community’.  The parallel in wording to Article 53 VCLT and the Barcelona Traction dictum make it clear that State crimes were intended to cover erga omnes obligations based on jus cogens norms.  As it had in relation to identifying what norms were recognised as jus cogens, the ILC considered that State opinion and practice would be the guide in identifying which breaches were recognised as crimes.

States expressed their opinion on Draft Article 19 when it was first introduced by the ILC, and the range of views shows there was not a consensus amongst States that criminal State responsibility was considered to exist lex lata.  There was however, support expressed for drawing a distinction between certain obligations, primarily amongst non-Western States, including the USSR who considered it of ‘fundamental importance’​[738]​ and Kenya that considered it of ‘the greatest importance’​[739]​.

Throughout the life of Draft Article 19 and notably into the 1990s, there was increasing scepticism by States with respect to the question of whether a State could commit a crime and be held responsible under the responsibility doctrine.   The USA had ‘fundamental concerns about the very concept of State crimes’​[740]​, while the UK expressed reservations that State crimes had ‘an adequate juridical basis’​[741]​.  There was considered to be insufficient support for criminal State responsibility because, and as expressed on behalf of Austria, State crimes ‘thus far had not been accepted in State practice’​[742]​.

Even those States that disputed the existence of State crimes, such as the UK, noted however, that ‘there was growing evidence of the existence of a distinction between civil and criminal responsibility based on the importance attached by the international community as a whole to certain obligations of a fundamental nature’​[743]​.  State opinion more consistently supported the view that certain breaches warrant more than the imposition of standard State responsibility, but how this could be manifest remained ‘in a relatively fragmentary, unsystematic or indirect form’​[744]​.  There appeared to be very little that States were willing to collectively acknowledge which could be of any assistance to the ILC in giving the concept of State crimes a more determinate form.

The benefit of State recognition is that the ILC is not then required to make a unilateral decision about the breaches that amount to State crimes.  However, there is the danger in relying on the opinion and practice of States that any theoretical protection could be hindered by the political and pragmatic considerations that influence States in determining whether to recognise a norm as jus cogens.  Simply labelling the breach a ‘crime’ will not be enough to ensure that the recognition of certain norms as jus cogens translates in terms of effective redress.  Even if using the word crime was accepted as a suitable means to extract breaches of obligations with a higher normative foundation, this distinction needed to be confirmed in terms of the consequences when breached.
	
As previously noted, the ILC did not expand in any substantive way on what the consequences of responsibility would be under Draft Article 19.  It was envisaged that the Security Council would play a significant role, but even this suggestion may have contributed to the unpopularity of criminal responsibility, given the potential power that would be divested to the Security Council​[745]​.  By 1998 the ILC conceded that ‘the Draft Articles failed entirely to provide defined procedures and to attach distinctive consequences to crimes’​[746]​.  Eventually the ‘obscurity’ of the norms in question, the consequences that would be incurred and the level of State support for the concept and its content ‘made it impossible to know what, if anything, was a crime’​[747]​.  The ILC noted that Draft Article 19 ‘in essence, was nothing more than a system for ex post labelling of certain breaches as "serious"’, which is the more streamlined approach in the current Draft Article 40 and serious breach regime​[748]​. 

The ILC clearly intended in codifying the law on State responsibility to deal with the anomaly that while States recognise that certain norms have a higher status, international law had yet to acknowledge the fundamental nature of those norms by providing suitable redress when those norms were breached, making any designation of status a misnomer.  This dilemma was first addressed in Draft Article 19 and subsequently in the final Draft Article 40.

3.2.2	The ‘Serious Breach’ Regime
On the basis that jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations are relevant considerations under the Draft Articles, there is juridical support for arguing that redress can be sought from States for breaching more than bilateral obligations that the State had consented to.  To the extent that the Draft Articles still only provide redress for the breach of the obligation alone, there is an indication that further development in terms of the responses when States breach international law is feasible.

Draft Article 40 attempts to link the breach of an obligation based on a jus cogens norm to ‘a stricter regime of responsibility than that applied to other internationally wrongful acts’​[749]​.  Taken in combination with Draft Article 41 a serious breach of an obligation arising from a ‘peremptory norm’ will attract ‘particular consequences’ that do not apply when the obligation is not based on a jus cogens norm.  Several points illustrate that while the serious breach regime provides recognition that the consequences when an obligation based on a jus cogens norm is breached may be different, the practical effect of that recognition under the Draft Articles is limited.

The first point concerns use of the word ‘peremptory’ in Draft Article 40 as pertaining only to the serious breach of an ‘obligation arising from a peremptory norm’​[750]​.  The Commentary to the Draft Articles confirmed that the ILC intended that only a breach of the obligation would give rise to responsibility​[751]​ and not on the basis of the ‘peremptory’ norm alone.

The second point relates to the intention of the ILC.  While giving reassurance that Draft Article 40 was ‘not intended to suggest that any violation of obligations [arising from a jus cogens norm] is not serious or is somehow excusable’​[752]​, the ILC did state that ‘less-serious examples’ would not give rise to the stricter form of responsibility envisaged in Part Two.  The effect of this comment is to suggest that the distinction was being drawn based on the gravity of the actual breach, and regardless of the norm underlying the obligation.  The more serious the breach of the obligation, the stricter the responsibility is likely to be, but this would apply no matter what the obligation.  In that case, the utility in referring to the underlying jus cogens norm appears to be as an indicator that breaches of such obligations are more likely to be serious, but there is no guarantee of this fact.

The third point is that the consequences of a breach under Draft Article 40 are no more effective in terms of providing redress, beyond what has already been discussed in relation to the standard forms of reparation available under the Draft Articles.  However, the two additional consequences imposed under Draft Article 41 do highlight that the serious breach regime was in some way concerned with breaches that affect the interests of more than just the State invoking responsibility.

The first additional consequence listed in Draft Article 41 is that States must cooperate to bring the breach to an end by any lawful means, to imply that States are under a positive duty to cooperate due, arguably, to the normative origins of the obligation​[753]​.  The ILC noted a growing trend in international cooperation ‘in response to the gravest breaches of international law’​[754]​.  The ILC was of the opinion that cooperation amongst States was ‘often the only way of providing an effective remedy’​[755]​.  Thus it was reasonable to expect that a similar response from States could and would follow the serious breach of international obligations based on jus cogens norms.

The thesis argues that more is required in terms of accountability than just bringing the breach to an end.  For example, it is submitted that a State would not be held accountable for committing genocide just because other States cooperate to bring the breach to an end.  If that was the case, there would have been no grounds for subsequent reparations by Germany at the end of World War Two after the Allied forces had ceased control of the country.  Having said that, there is no reason why the steps taken to bring the breach to an end may not be a step taken toward accountability.  The distinction drawn here relates to how cooperation is envisaged in the context of the Draft Articles, which is not as a form of redress.  Draft Article 41 is a strong indicator that certain breaches affect the interests of more than just the invoking State and justify the international community of States responding as a result.

The second additional consequence set down in Draft Article 41 is non-recognition of the breach and non-assistance to facilitate its continuation.  Again the ILC noted an increase in State practice​[756]​ whereby the response to certain breaches was for States to try and prevent legal status being awarded to the consequences of the breach​[757]​.  However, there are implications in an act of non-recognition that may discourage States from acting accordingly, which in turn undermines the impact in non-recognition as a means of redress.  A prominent example of this was the delayed acknowledgement by the US Government that the atrocities that occurred in Rwanda in 1994 amounted to genocide​[758]​.  To do so would have arguably required the USA to act in accordance with its obligations under the Genocide Convention​[759]​.  Thus, it may be in the best interests of States not to make a formal declaration of non-recognition​[760]​.

There are additional problems that lead critics to claim that non-recognition has very little practical impact, or in the words of Judge Kooijmans ‘the duty not to recognise amounts…to an obligation without real substance’​[761]​.  Talmon highlights two reasons why non-recognition has no practical legal effect when the breach involves an obligation based on jus cogens norms.  As jus cogens norms are considered non-derogable a breach can never be legalised and an act of recognition will not change this.  Even if a breach of jus cogens norms could be made legal by an act of recognition it is unclear what the practical effect of this would be.  For example, in a claim for title over land it is apparent how recognition would lead to legality and thus, there would be practical effects for the parties involved.  However, if the breach was of the prohibition of genocide then the only impact that recognition would have is that there would no longer be a breach of the obligation, because along with the prohibition on torture and crimes against humanity ‘these situations as a rule do not automatically give rise to any legal consequences which are capable of being denied by other States’​[762]​.

The fact that neither of the additional consequences provided for under Draft Article 41 impose any additional consequences for the breaching State confirms that the serious breach regime has little substantive effect in expanding the scope of redress available pursuant to the Draft Articles​[763]​.  There is, however, a savings provision in Draft Article 41 whereby the consequences set down are stated to be without prejudice to any other consequence that a serious breach of jus cogens based obligations ‘may entail under international law’.  This provides the clearest indicator that further development of the responses when States breach international law, and specifically jus cogens norms, is feasible.

3.3	Juridical Support for State Accountability
There are several differences in the approaches taken by the ILC to expand the doctrine of State responsibility to accommodate the recognition of jus cogens under international law.  Ultimately though, there are issues with both approaches if viewed from a broader accountability perspective.

The first difference between the serious breach and criminal responsibility regimes is the origins of each and the objective of the ILC.   The serious breach regime is clearly linked to the doctrine of State responsibility as it seeks to address the consequences when States breach those obligations perceived to arise from jus cogens norms and was thus a response to the increasing recognition of jus cogens under international law. 

In contrast to the development of the serious breach regime as a response to the increasing recognition of jus cogens norms under international law and within the specific framework of State responsibility, the origins of criminal responsibility occurred in a much broader context.  Criminal responsibility had already been contemplated as a means with which to respond to the abuse of power by States, for example when the Nuremberg Tribunal stated that ‘crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities’, this was not in the context of making findings on State responsibility​[764]​.  The term ‘criminal responsibility’ was originally employed as a ‘linguistic convenience’​[765]​ and not due to any conceptual affiliation to State responsibility, so that again it was unsurprising that Draft Article 19 was rejected​[766]​.

The second difference between Draft Articles 19 and 40 relates to the consequences when responsibility is engaged.  The mere existence of Draft Articles 19 and 40 ‘reflect that there are certain consequences flowing from the basic concepts of jus cogens norms’​[767]​ that are relevant in the context of State responsibility.  However, while the current Draft Articles aim to give effect to this statement by introducing additional consequences in Draft Article 41, no equivalent provision was made in relation to Draft Article 19 and, other than labelling the breach a crime, it is difficult to see how a principle of criminal responsibility would have been effective.

Draft Article 41 confirms that the additional consequences in breaching an obligation based on a jus cogens norm are not penal in nature.  This is in accordance with the findings of the Nuremberg Tribunal that if a State cannot commit a crime then it cannot be punished in a criminal fashion, which in turn renders moot the objective in calling the breach a crime.  It was therefore necessary for the ILC to take a quasi-civil approach to liability in drafting the serious breach regime because there had been ‘no development of penal consequences for States of breaches of these fundamental norms’​[768]​.

This last quote captures the very essence of the problem of why the State responsibility doctrine and the ILC have been unable to deal with how to make States answerable for breaching jus cogens norms.  The quote and the Draft Articles acknowledge the existence of ‘fundamental norms’, which is progressive.  Yet both the quote and the Draft Articles allude to the fact that any further protection of ‘fundamental norms’ will require further ‘developments’ in international law because, as McGoldrick points out, ‘State responsibility must be determined by reference to international law’​[769]​.  There have yet to be the requisite changes in terms of black letter law that would see the doctrine of State responsibility expand to ensure effective redress for breaches of jus cogens norms but this does not mean an expansion in terms of answerability is not possible.

There are instances where States breach international law and the response serves to label the breach a crime, if not in a strictly definitional sense then in the popular sense​[770]​.  In the decades following the end of World War Two there has been no finding of State responsibility against Germany but a combination of apologies made, reparations under the Potsdam Agreement and compensation paid to victims​[771]​ have required Germany to account for the many breaches of international law that occurred.  

Attempts to expand the State responsibility doctrine have not been successful given the limitations that arise because the doctrine has a specific and discrete objective, which is not concerned with seeking accountability from States at a broader level.  When the attempts are viewed in conjunction with an informal State practice that seeks to hold States to account at both a legal and political level, there is evidence that accountability at a broader level is possible and, as shown here, feasible under international law.  While this discussion has focused on the juridical indicators that such a concept is developing the final Chapter looks to State practice.

4.	CONCLUSION
The doctrine of State responsibility is a separate legal inquiry to the quasi-legal, sometimes moral and usually political nature of what it means to hold a State accountable.

It has been argued that throughout the ILC’s work codifying the doctrine of State responsibility, there was both implied and express acknowledgement that the increasing recognition of jus cogens under international law would need to be reflected in the Draft Articles.  The Commission contemplated using a principle of criminal responsibility, but finally settled on the serious breach regime in order to distinguish a breach of obligations arising from jus cogens norms.  Despite the reference to ‘peremptory norms’ in Draft Article 40, the consequences attached to a breach of the obligation are, by themselves, insufficient in terms of substantive recognition of the norm itself and without recognition that the breach had the potential to threaten the interests of the entire international community, and not just the invoking State, there cannot be accountability.

Chapter Four noted that the right to invoke State responsibility is restricted, there is no guarantee in providing reparation for the obligation that was breached that there will be redress for the norm (although sensibly the two will usually overlap) and that reparation under the doctrine is applied only insofar as necessary to wipe out the consequences of the breach and restore the relationship between the breaching and invoking States.  Thus, it was concluded that State responsibility and State accountability are not incompatible, they just serve separate functions.  Furthermore, there is nothing to preclude a finding of State responsibility comprising part of the matrix of responses that lead to a State being held accountable – or to coin the phrase, ‘layman’s State responsibility’​[772]​.

Given that State responsibility is an established principle of international law and forms a legal framework of State answerability it is reasonable that consideration was given to the doctrine to identify any indicators that a broader concept of State accountability is evolving.  Within the discrete legal space occupied by State responsibility it has been demonstrated that there were attempts to expand the doctrine in such a way as to suggest that broader accountability from States is desirable.

The interpretive framework constructed and applied in this Chapter to the State responsibility doctrine has shown that a more comprehensive scope of accountability is sought when norms that are in the interests of more than just States, such as human rights or jus cogens, are at stake.   In all the examples given - the adaptation of the attribution principle; contemplation of a form of criminal State responsibility; and the adoption of the serious breach regime found within the current Draft Articles – there is a clear indication that public international law has sought the development of a broader scope of State answerability than that under the State responsibility doctrine.

Thus the conclusion derived from these observations is that a broader concept of State accountability, beyond the doctrine of State responsibility, has juridical support.

The term ‘juridical support’ was interpreted in the thesis Introduction to mean there is evidence that international law either expressly acknowledges, permits by implication, or is evolving in such a way as to accommodate the concept in question.  The State responsibility doctrine expressly acknowledges that obligations based on jus cogens norms are different in terms of redress for their breach in Draft Article 40, permits other forms of redress by implication ‘to the extent that they are not regulated by these [Draft] Articles’​[773]​ and has been seen to evolve throughout the period the ILC was codifying the doctrine and beyond in order to accommodate the relevant changes in international law.
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Chapter Five aims to show the application in State practice of the interpretative framework developed in the previous Chapters.  The focus is on the modes of response from the international community when States breach jus cogens norms and whether the approach taken to holding States accountable demonstrates there is a norm of accountability, or one is evolving.  This may be evidenced in the response to States’ breaches of international law, as well as the circumstances in which States fail to respond and why.  For example, does the failure to respond in one context lead to changes that ensure that States respond in the future?

The analysis is split into a series of case studies and each case study will consider the responses or lack thereof when States breach what the ILC accept are jus cogens norms​[774]​.  The case studies given are illustrative rather than comprehensive, and the focus is on identifying States’ response to breaches of jus cogens norms.  Chapter Five will test the theoretical framework and the evaluative criteria established for measuring State accountability in Chapters One and Two.

2.	SETTING THE SCENE TO ANALYSE STATE ACCOUNTABILITY IN PRACTICE
2.1	Rationale for Individual Case Studies
Six case studies have been chosen from the last century, the period in which international law has most developed in recognition of a discrete body of fundamental norms, labelled as jus cogens.

In the first two case studies the very attainment of accountability is contentious.  The qualification of the violence against the Armenian population in Turkey in 1915 itself remains controversial whether as crimes against humanity or genocide (a term latterly applied to this atrocity since the terminology was coined by Rafael Lemkin in 1944).  The question for consideration is whether the dispute over how to classify the violence is the reason why Turkey has not been held accountable.  The second case study is from the USSR, focusing on the Holodomor famine in the 1930s.  It is stated from the outset that the USSR has never been held accountable for the alleged atrocities​[775]​, but the focus here is on whether there has been any ex post facto attempt to seek State accountability from Russia as, arguably, the continuing State of the USSR.

The third case study appears to be one of the clearest illustrations of where the international community of States has mobilised ‘in the face of criminal behaviour’​[776]​ in order to hold South Africa accountable for apartheid.

Having looked at examples in two different geographic contexts of failure and attainment of accountability, the final case-studies focus on one specific jus cogens norm.  A comparison between the invasion of the Republic of Korea in 1950, the Israeli use of aggression against Iraqi nuclear installations and the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 seeks to determine whether the response to aggression is simply the application of the collective security provisions of the UN Charter or whether the gravity has seen States adopt a broader range of measures.

2.2	Issues for Analysis
Any conceptual standard of accountability will be subject to the realities of international relations and so throughout this thesis accountability is more likely to be seen through integrating both legal and political responses, at the national and the international level.  This approach assesses accountability borne by the State as a separate entity and of individuals and organs that represent the State.

As with all aspects of international law, the scope of State accountability remains imprecise and an overview of State practice will not necessarily resolve the issue of indeterminacy definitively and, realistically, that cannot be the objective of the present analysis.  Instead the case studies aim to identify some of the traits associated with what it means to hold States accountable, which can then be used to describe the concept as it exists at present.  It is argued here that understanding the broader problems and associations that emerge, having referred to State practice, will allow a more nuanced principle of State accountability to evolve in the future, and provide a much stronger argument in the present that the concept is emerging as a principle lex lata.

In particular there are three problems that will be identified and discussed, before the way in which each issue arises and is dealt with in the case studies is then considered.

2.2.1	Determining Whether There Has Been A Breach of Jus Cogens
The first issue is who determines whether the State is liable for having breached public international law, in order that accountability is then sought for that breach.  Ideally any such determination must be impartial and unbiased, and comparable in that sense to the standard adopted by an international court.  Setting aside the practical difficulties in establishment, one solution would therefore be to establish an international court with the mandate to determine whether States have breached jus cogens norms or public international law more generally, or alternatively extending the mandate of the ICJ as has been suggested in the past​[777]​.

Given that the ICJ has been conservative in approaching its jurisdiction it may not be the most suitable forum under the law for determining violations of jus cogens norm, as seen in the East Timor Case where the erga omnes nature of the obligation was insufficient to extend jurisdiction​[778]​.

In contrast, the ICJ determined it did have jurisdiction in the Genocide Convention Case.  In its 1996 decision on the preliminary objections raised by Yugoslavia​[779]​ as the stated Respondent at that time, the Court considered that its jurisdiction to hear the case on the merits was based on Article IX of the Genocide Convention and that it was entitled to determine responsibility for any alleged breach of an obligation owed by State parties to the Convention​[780]​.  Bosnia and Herzegovina also invoked the 1949 Geneva Convention and the 1907 Hague Convention on Land Warfare as grounds for jurisdiction, which were dismissed because there was no ‘provision in the texts…conferring upon the Court jurisdiction to deal with a dispute between the parties concerning matters to which those acts relate’​[781]​.

Even though the obligations arising from the Genocide Convention, like those under the Hague and Geneva Conventions are erga omnes, it was the explicit wording of the Genocide Convention that was relied upon as the basis for jurisdiction.  The fact that the ICJ contemplated that one of the disputes that may arise under Article IX was ‘the responsibility of a State for genocide’​[782]​ was not enough in and of itself to establish jurisdiction.

The ILC under the former Special Rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz thought that the ICJ would be a suitable forum to decide on questions of criminal State responsibility​[783]​. The conceptual difference between criminal State responsibility and the broader State accountability was noted in Chapters Three and Four.  Thus, even if the ICJ’s jurisdiction was expanded upon for such a purpose this does not necessarily make it an appropriate forum for determining questions of State accountability.

In addition, the jurisdiction of the ICJ depends on State consent and in relation to contentious issues the Court will only entertain applications by States.  The risk that States would not consent to jurisdiction or that no application would be made to determine that the State was in breach defeats the object of extending jurisdiction to include all breaches of international law in order to close the gap in answerability left by the narrow scope of the State responsibility doctrine.

The ICJ would appear to be an inappropriate forum​[784]​, but it is unlikely that States would invest a separate court, analogous to a criminal court that determines the criminal liability and punishment of individuals, with the power to determine a State had violated jus cogens norms and would be subject to redress as a result​[785]​.  This is not to exclude individuals (as judges) from the accountability process altogether, and it has been argued already that bodies such as the Human Rights Committee, which is comprised of independent experts, are increasingly influential.  However, the continuing intransigence of States like the USA, which refuses to adopt the Rome Statute on the basis that it divests the Security Council of power in favour of the Prosecutor at the ICC, and due to the risk that the Court might indict US citizens​[786]​, makes the prospect of an international court to determine legal violations by the State unlikely.

To the extent that there is currently no international court with an unhindered mandate, for example pursuant to the doctrine of State immunity, to determine whether States have breached jus cogens norms the question becomes whether a political determination is possible.  This could occur in two ways: a unilateral political determination by individual States or a determination by States in concert, for example under some sort of treaty-based relationship such as NATO or through regional forms of State organisation such as the EU, or through international organisations such as the UN.

Realistically a State is not going to tolerate another State determining there was a breach of jus cogens and seeking redress on that basis.  Article 35 of the UN Charter discourages such unilateral action instead all States, whether or not they are UN Members, ‘may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly’.  The alternative to a unilateral response is that the State’s culpability is determined by a collective of States or international organisation comprised of State members.  The UN would be the most likely candidate, given that it has the greatest number of State members of any other international organisation.  This solution also raises issues.

The first issue is identifying a legal basis on which the UN could make such a determination – either political, or even quasi-judicial, in nature.  Unless the UN has the authority to determine there has been a breach, the declaration will not be credible as a basis from which to seek further redress.

Article 39 of the UN Charter could give the Security Council legal authority on the basis that a breach of the jus cogens norms on the ILC list​[787]​ has the potential to affect international peace and security.  Article 39 states that ‘the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’ and ‘make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security’​[788]​.  To the extent that breaching jus cogens norms does amount to a threat to international peace and security, the Security Council would have the indirect legal sanction to determine liability and impose measures, provided that such measures were necessary for the purpose of maintaining or restoring peace and security.  Articles 41 and 42 are equally broad in the mechanisms that may be used.

Non-aggressive means such as ‘interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations’ are preferred under Article 41.  The first significant instance where the Security Council used measures not requiring the use of force was in response to the illegal regime in Rhodesia after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence​[789]​.  In 1965 the Security Council called upon Member States not to recognise the illegal regime in Security Council Resolutions 216 and 217, which were followed in 1966 and 1968 with mandatory economic sanctions in Security Council Resolutions 232, 253 and 409.  After the independence of Zimbabwe in 1979, the Security Council removed the sanctions in Security Council Resolution 460.

Where measures not involving the use of force are insufficient Article 41 provides that ‘action by air, sea, or land forces…to maintain or restore international peace and security’​[790]​ is permitted where necessary.  One example being the establishment of the technical UN Unified Task Force (UNITAF)​[791]​ and the second UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II)​[792]​ after the ongoing civil war was deemed a threat to peace and security​[793]​.  UNITAF was empowered to use ‘all necessary means’ to allow ‘humanitarian relief operations’​[794]​, while UNOSOM II was given an extended mandate from UNOSOM I to ‘assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment’​[795]​ and in 1993 Security Council Resolution 897 restated the authority to use all necessary measures after attacks on UNOSOM II personnel.

That force is allowed illustrates the extent of authority vested in the Security Council under the UN Charter insofar that, at least at the time the UN Charter was drafted, it implies Member States considered the Security Council to be the most appropriate body to determine what constituted a threat to peace and security and what the response would be.

While a breach of jus cogens may often affect peace and security, there are instances where that will not be the case: torture, for example, can be perpetrated both as a crime against humanity, ‘when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack’​[796]​, but can also solely involve one perpetrator and one victim.  There is nothing to preclude the Security Council from finding that there was a breach of international peace and security but, realistically, this is highly unlikely to occur.

Article 27 of the UN Charter requires that a decision by the Security Council needs the agreement of only nine States, so although the authority may be strictly legal, it is obviously not representative of a universal consensus amongst the community of States.  This does not preclude the views of the Security Council being taken into account as an organ of the UN and international organisation.  Arguably there would be an incentive to rely upon the technical expertise of the Security Council on matters of peace and security if it had ever made use under Articles 46 and 47 of the UN Charter of a Military Staff Committee​[797]​.  Of course the caveat must be that the expertise of the Security Council is of little use in determining that States have breached jus cogens norms that do not threaten peace and security.

In contrast to decisions of the Security Council requiring nine votes to be adopted, Article 18 of the UN Charter provides that the General Assembly requires a two thirds majority when voting on ‘important matters’​[798]​.  Where their existence is conceded, jus cogens are recognised as norms protecting the interests of the entire international community, which arguably would bring the question of their breach into the realm of ‘important matters’.  Furthermore, the more States that comprise a consensus the more likely it is that censure will have an effect on the breaching State.  The UN was founded on the premise that individual States consider the opinion of the collective to be influential and that Chapter VII of the Charter will address the situation where individual States choose to act contrary to the interest of the collective in a way that threatens peace and security.  On the basis that, as a general rule, the interests of the international community of States are to be maintained, the greater the number of States that determine there was a breach, the more credible the determination.

As with the Security Council, there are also issues with reliance upon the General Assembly to determine the State in question had breached a jus cogens norm.

First of all, the powers of the General Assembly are not as clearly defined as the affirmative legal authority expressly given to the Security Council.  Chapter IV of the UN Charter allows the General Assembly to ‘consider’, ‘discuss’ and ‘make recommendations’ without giving any further direction on how far these contemplations may be taken but, because Chapter IV relates to ‘any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter’​[799]​, the scope of consideration will still be wider than solely issues of peace and security.

Article 12 of the UN Charter states that ‘the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation [regarding international peace and security] unless the Security Council so requests’.  However, in its Advisory Opinion Concerning the Legal Consequences on Construction of a Wall​[800]​, the ICJ noted that the practice of both the Security Council and the General Assembly had evolved so that Article 12 was not so restrictively applied that both bodies could not be dealing with the same matter.  The Court noted that the General Assembly tended to deal with matters such as the disputes’ ‘humanitarian, social and economic aspects’​[801]​ and that the competence of the Security Council pursuant to Article 24 to deal with issues relating to international peace and security was not ‘exclusive’​[802]​.

Finally, the greater the number of States within a consensus, the more difficult it is for that consensus to be reached.  However it is an important factor that any determination that a State had violated rules of jus cogens in the General Assembly would be influenced by the level of power that States are able to exercise over one another.

Setting aside the legal authority to determine that the State violated rules of jus cogens, the most significant obstacle in using UN bodies for this purpose remains political.  Whether it is the Security Council or the General Assembly, there is the risk of powerful States exercising influence, forming voting blocs, and voting in accordance with their own interests.  In other words, a cynic could expect that the same political issues that affect that daily business of the UN will not be set aside simply because the question relates to a breach of jus cogens norms.

There is clearly a stronger case for the Security Council to determine when States have breached jus cogens because the legal basis is constitutional.  However, it is submitted that it remains questionable whether it is appropriate that a few States adopt a semi-judicial role when jus cogens seek to protect the interests of the entire international community​[803]​.  Tied up in the question of determining there was a breach of jus cogens is also the question of whether the breached norm is recognised as having jus cogens status.  It is unlikely that the ongoing debate on how to define and thus distinguish jus cogens from standard norms would be relinquished for determination to the Security Council.
    
2.2.2	The Form of Redress
The second problem that arises because of the indeterminate nature of State accountability is deciding what form of redress will be most effective for that purpose.  This issue has many components to it, only some of which are raised here.

Firstly, there is the question of whether effective redress for one breach will be effective redress for another breach, especially if the same norm is involved.  For example, should an isolated act of torture by a group of rogue police officers warrant the same redress from the State compared to a sustained policy of kidnapping and torturing individuals?  This thesis has highlighted a number of times that accountability is contextual but, in practice, how useful is such a broad theoretical statement? And, are there instead certain key responses that have been proven to be effective, which could then be relied upon for State accountability purposes?

Secondly, what form of redress can be imposed on the State without punishing the individuals within that State?  The clearest illustration of why a distinction needs to be drawn is that it is often the citizens of the rogue State that are its victims, in which case it would be wrong to blindly and broadly apply redress that fails to discriminate between the State and its victims.  This is made even more difficult by the fact that the culpability of the State is usually associated with its organs and because certain individuals, not necessarily all the citizens of the State, are equally culpable in the breach, and those individuals must be punished.  What is sought in the case studies is evidence of how the balance has been or should be struck between avoiding collective punishment while still ensuring redress from the State and other culpable parties.

Thirdly, how is redress able to communicate the gravity of the breach, in particular when States have breached a jus cogens norm?  For example, would every member of the international community be entitled to compensation or only those parties directly affected by the breach?  This inquiry begs the question of whether there is a hierarchy amongst breaches of jus cogens and perhaps responses to genocide would be required to be harsher in nature than a response to an isolated act of torture.  Finally, will ‘damage’ to the entire international community be inherent in the breach of a jus cogens norm and, in contrast, would redress for the breach of an erga omnes obligations arising from the norm be conditional on identifying damage to each member of the international community?

Fourthly, and as discussed in Chapter Two, are there any limitations on the extent to which redress can be attributed to the State?  For example, when would imposing sanctions on an individual count as redress against the State and should there be some form of quantum assessment whereby only a certain percentage of the individual’s accountability counts towards the State’s accountability?  Similarly, to what extent would a payment of compensation by the culpable State to survivors of genocide be seen as redress for breaching the actual prohibition on genocide?

Finally, can redress for the purposes of accountability be implied from or co-exist with other goals in responding to the breach?  This issue is pertinent in the context of responding to an act of aggression, which will likely require an act of force either by the State that was invaded, so that the primary goal is repulsion or self-defence, or possibly under a Security Council action, in which case the goal is international peace and security.  It is suggested in anticipation of the case studies that holding the State accountable will be only one amongst a number of goals.  In which case, the challenge for the party that is responding to the breach is ‘in choosing and combining these mechanisms so as to advance the society’s goals for accountability, but to do so in a way that respects international norms’​[804]​.

The indeterminacy of State accountability is brought into stark contrast with, for example, the State responsibility doctrine due to the number of issues raised above.  The set criteria and objective of reparation in terms of State responsibility avoids the majority of the problems raised here, but it must be remembered that the doctrine addresses a discrete aspect in the broader problem of ensuring States are held to account when they breach public international law.  Because the concept of State accountability covers all other aspects of State liability it is reasonable that the number of difficulties would be much greater.

2.2.3	Imposing Redress and Deciding When Accountability Has Been Achieved
The third obstacle to State accountability is more succinctly stated and follows from the first point as to who determines that the breach has occurred.  Once it has been determined that the State breached a particular jus cogens norm, which party seeks redress and decides when the State has been held accountable.  While the previous discussion has covered most of the relevant considerations, one last point remains.

This thesis has highlighted the debate surrounding the existence and content of jus cogens, which in turn has shown that there can be no definitive conclusion that States are under a separate legal obligation to protect, maintain and ultimately respond when these norms are breached.  International law gives States the right to unilaterally respond, for example, the authority to exercise self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.  An instance when self-defence may be exercised is when the, arguably, jus cogens prohibition on aggression is breached; but the right to invoke Article 51 in those situations is not because the prohibition on aggression is based on a jus cogens norm.  The point being that there is no right or obligation to respond to breaches of jus cogens norms, in which case the issue arises in identifying who will seek redress.  Even if States are entitled to do so there is always the chance that States may not have an interest or the logistical capability to do so.  If States have no right or interest in responding, can non-State actors assume that role and, as noted in considering who determines the State had breached the law, should priority be given to collective action?





It will be argued that the widespread violence in Turkey between 1915 and 1923 that was allegedly part of a Government policy to destroy the Armenian population was not met with any effective response by States and that Turkey has not been held accountable​[806]​.  The first issue is to determine what exactly the State was liable for, because, while Turkey acknowledges that violence occurred, it continues to dispute that there was a ‘massacre’​[807]​, let alone genocide or crimes against humanity.

3.1.1	Determining Whether Turkey Breached a Jus Cogens Norm
Turkey has consistently denied any charge of genocide or crimes against humanity claiming that the acts authorised by the Ottoman authorities were in response to insurgency by the minority Armenians​[808]​.  Violence had escalated over several decades as the Ottoman Empire disintegrated, resulting in a reduction of territory and the emergence of a dominant Turkish culture and authority that in turn led to conflict between the many ethnic groups​[809]​.  While commentators identify that violence had been occurring since approximately 1895, the historical record dates the massacres from 1915​[810]​ when approximately 1.5 million Armenians were killed and deported, allegedly as part of a preconceived strategy by the Turkish State to destroy the Armenian population​[811]​.

As early as 1915 commentators, such as the historian and jurist Viscount Bryce who spoke on the matter in the House of Lords in 1915, compiled evidence that arguably shows the massacres were part of an official State policy to exterminate the Armenian population​[812]​.  In the strong words of British historian Arthur Toynbee, the massacres were carried out ‘under the cloak of legality, by cold-blooded governmental action.  These were not mass murders committed spontaneously by mobs of private people’​[813]​.

By 1915, the Ittihad Government had been in power for seven years and introduced a number of constitutional changes throughout the Balkan region, notably in areas such as Macedonia and Albania with large Armenian populations.  Three policies in particular discriminated against the Armenians.  A large-scale deportation policy of Armenians was instituted with the Temporary Deportation Law 1915​[814]​.  In 1914 deportation of the male population had begun but by 1915 had expanded to formal Government policy that included all Armenian citizens throughout the region, including in the province of Erzurum, who were then marched to camps in the south of the Ottoman Empire, in the area now known as Syria​[815]​.  The US Ambassador Henry Morgenthau was in Turkey during the violence and stated that ‘when the Turkish authorities gave the orders for these deportations, they were merely giving the death warrant to a whole race; they understood this well and, in their conversations with me, they made no particular attempt to conceal the fact’​[816]​.

The second discriminatory policy was property confiscation under the Temporary Law of Expropriation and Confiscation 1915 that confiscated all land and property of Armenians.  In addition, any property that was abandoned because the individual concerned had been deported then became the property of the State​[817]​.  The third policy involved widespread arrests and executions on charges of terrorism that were pursued under the Turkish legal system with disregard for natural justice standards​[818]​.  As a result of these three policies of deportation and discrimination, ‘at least one million Armenians were killed or death marched’​[819]​.

In the face of ongoing discrimination and without the protection of the law any population is vulnerable, as was shown subsequently in Nazi Germany where legalised persecution was the forerunner to the attempted physical destruction of the Jewish population.  The fact that the law does not allow the population to act in its own defence implicates the State, because it was the State that established such policies.

However, the relevant policies were instituted during the First World War and there is the argument that the policies were introduced because the Armenian population in the Balkan regions had strong links with the Armenian community in Russia and thus were suspected of assisting the enemy​[820]​.  Whether or not this interpretation is accurate, there were two ways to view not only the relevant Government policies but also the actual violence.  On the one hand, Turkey continues to claim the violence sought to quell ethnic uprisings. For example, a current Report by the Turkish Ministry of Culture titled ‘Armenian Allegations and the Facts’ states ‘24 April 1915 is the day, in which the Ottoman Government began to arrest the suspects of Armenian terrorism, violence and treachery’​[821]​.  From the other perspective, the violence was part of the Ittihad Government’s stated objective ‘of Ottomanizing the Empire’​[822]​ and creating a unitary Turkish society.

It is this dispute in interpretation that has meant that the debate concerning Turkey’s culpability for the Armenian violence focuses upon whether the State is liable in the first place, rather than on redress.  In 1915, the Entente Powers of Britain, France, and Russia jointly described the violence as ‘crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilization’​[823]​, while the USA separately referred to the atrocities as a campaign of racial extermination by the Ottoman Government​[824]​.  States were aware that the atrocities were occurring, they were conscious of their gravity, they associated the violence with both the State and Government policy and recognised that the violence was directed toward the Armenian population.  But such associations were insufficient to determine that Turkey was liable for breaching public international law, given that, at the time, crimes against humanity were not recognised under international law and the term genocide would not even be coined, by Raphael Lemkin, until 1944​[825]​.

When crimes against humanity were later codified under the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 6(c) included ‘murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population…or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds…whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated’​[826]​.  From the evidence cited above, the violence against the Armenians would come within this definition.  Furthermore, the fact that the term was used at the time of the massacres strengthens the case in favour of the violence amounting to crimes against humanity​[827]​, and as Schabas noted ‘the term “crimes against humanity” was itself coined to describe the massacres of the Armenians, in May 1915’​[828]​.

More controversial is the allegation that Turkey committed genocide against the Armenian population.  In 1936, and therefore before the term genocide had been coined, American historian Langer considered that ‘it was perfectly obvious that the Sultan was determined to end the Armenian question by exterminating the Armenians’​[829]​.  There is a parallel between the Sultan as an embodiment of the State seeking to destroy the Armenians and the definition that would be given to genocide in the 1948 Genocide Convention, where the requisite intent is destruction of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.

Turkey is a party to the Genocide Convention, and disputes that the violence that occurred in 1915 was genocide.  There are two aspects to the dispute: that the crime of genocide was not recognised in 1915 and it would need to be shown that the Armenians were a distinct group that were intentionally singled out for destruction by the State, rather than generalised violence involving the Turkish population.  It is understandable that Turkey would dispute its culpability for genocide but other States also claim that the violence does not satisfy the definition of genocide that subsequently was expressed in the Genocide Convention.  Without some sort of consensus amongst States that the violence was in fact genocide it would be very unlikely for any form of redress to be sought on that basis.

The UK is one example of where States have refused to recognise the violence as genocide, on the grounds that the definitional requirements under the Genocide Convention have not been met​[830]​.  As Spokesperson of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale stated, ‘in the absence of unequivocal evidence to show that the Ottoman administration took a specific decision to eliminate the Armenians under their control at the time, British governments have not recognised the events of 1915 and 1916 as "genocide"’​[831]​.  This is in contrast to former Prime Minister Winston Churchill who was of the view that the violence was part of a Government policy to wipe out the Armenian population in Turkey, and who stated ‘there is no reason to doubt that this crime was planned and executed for political reasons [because] the opportunity presented itself for clearing Turkish soil of a Christian race opposed to all Turkish ambitions’​[832]​.

The fact that in 1915 the UK, in concert with the Entente powers, used the term ‘crimes of Turkey against humanity’​[833]​ to capture the gravity of the violence does not suggest that the UK has been consistent in not labelling the violence as genocide, because the term genocide did not exist until 1944.  Indeed, the wording of the 1915 declaration describes the violence in such a way as to invoke the definition of genocide that was to come.  The declaration highlights that the victims comprise a single group, that the violence was facilitated by State authorities and that the violence included acts of murder.  It stated that​[834]​:
for about a month the Kurd and Turkish populations of Armenia has been massacring Armenians with the connivance and often assistance of Ottoman authorities. Such massacres took place in middle April at Erzerum, Dertchun, Eguine, Akn, Bitlis, Mush, Sassun, Zeitun, and throughout Cilicia. Inhabitants of about one hundred villages near Van were all murdered. In that city Armenian quarter is besieged by Kurds. At the same time in Constantinople Ottoman Government ill-treats inoffensive Armenian population.

The Armenian case highlights that there are significant political implications and pragmatic complexities, including identifying the legal breach, to be overcome before even turning to the question of how to respond and hold the State accountable.  However, given that both crimes against humanity and genocide are recognised as jus cogens norms and that at a minimum certain States (who it would be accurate to describe as having significant power in international relations in 1915) determined that Turkey had committed crimes against humanity, it is reasonable to proceed on the basis that Turkey was liable and to consider whether redress was sought from Turkey and in what form​[835]​.

3.1.2	Responding to the Breach and Seeking Redress
In 1915 the scope of recognised international crimes was limited to piracy and slavery, which meant that use of the term ‘crimes against humanity’ by the Entente Powers was a first step in creating ‘a new framework of international law’​[836]​.  Logically, future developments in international criminal law could not be anachronistically displaced and reflected in the established principles of public international law at that time.  Therefore little in the way of precedent for responding to grievous breaches of international law existed and it must also be remembered that the principle of non-intervention was fundamental in governing inter-State relations, thereby restricting the potential responses that were available to States.

A further contextual factor was that the violence occurred during the First World War and that the Entente Powers were condemning Turkey, as an enemy State​[837]​.  Criticism by States can play an effective role in international relations and it was already noted that criticism was likely to be a common response in these case studies.  Professor Tomuschat is of the opinion that criticism is viewed by States as a form of quasi-intervention, given that one State is judging another State in relation to the exercise of its sovereign power​[838]​, and that this perception lasted throughout the first half of the twentieth century (until the Cold War when criticism became a diplomatic tool with which to manage so-called East-West relations)​[839]​.  If the view is taken that criticism was only to be resorted to by States when the gravity of the situation was sufficient to warrant it, then condemning Turkey in 1915 is not dissimilar to attempting to hold Turkey to account.  This argument is less persuasive when it is recalled that Turkey was being criticised by its enemies during the First World War.  The declaration specifically refers to the ‘Allied Powers’ acting together to hold the perpetrators responsible, which links the denouncement to the broader defence of Europe by the Entente Powers.  There is nothing to preclude the criticism from achieving dual goals and from being both a condemnation of an enemy State and an attempt to hold Turkey accountable for breaching international law.

After the end of the First World War the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres between Turkey and the Entente Powers​[840]​, which sought to impose post-War sanctions, required Turkey to surrender individuals ‘responsible for the massacres committed during the continuance of the state of war on territory which formed part of the Ottoman Empire on August 1, 1914’​[841]​.  Article 230 of the Treaty provided for individual responsibility and does not mention the State, but this should not be seen as absolving Turkey.  The Entente Powers had specifically condemned the ‘crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilization’ when declaring that they would ‘hold personally responsible…all members of the Ottoman government’​[842]​.  Article 230 can therefore be interpreted as seeking accountability from the State’s organs, which has been discussed here as a contributory means for seeking redress from the State.

Although the events in 1915 are referred to specifically, the Treaty of Sèvres was drafted as a peace treaty and to address the consequences for Turkey at the end of the First World War.  There are similarities with the 1919 Treaty of Versailles that forced Germany to relinquish territory and sought to bring Kaiser Wilhelm II before a criminal tribunal, although specifically for an offence against international morality​[843]​.  Likewise, the peace treaties pertaining to the other Central Powers required each of the defeated States to give up territory​[844]​, which could be taken to imply that Article 230 was intended to seek redress for the War.  A detailed comparison of all of these treaties is not required here but the point is that accountability for one breach may need to be inferred or may even be an unintended consequence of seeking accountability for an unrelated breach.

In addition to the proposed criminal trial of individuals and confiscation of land from Turkey in Article 230, Article 88 of the Sèvres Treaty required Turkey to ‘recognise Armenia as a free and independent State’​[845]​.  It is submitted here that the specific reference to Armenia in both Articles, combined with the joint declaration of the Entente Powers condemning the massacres, indicates that the response envisaged under the Treaty of Sèvres was seeking redress for the violence in 1915.  Ultimately though, the Treaty of Sèvres was superseded by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne​[846]​, which makes no reference to Armenia whatsoever.  The potential that a reduction of territory and recognition of an Armenian State may have provided as an effective remedy to hold Turkey accountable, albeit in a political rather than a legal sense, was therefore lost.

The multiple forms of redress: through criticism, individual trials, the confiscation of territory, political humiliation by having to recognise the Armenian State, and even being associated with the first quasi-legal use of the term crimes against humanity, illustrates the gravity with which Turkey’s acts and omissions were viewed by States.  But all these responses occurred, or at least would have occurred had the Treaty of Sèvres been ratified, in the aftermath of the First World War and were imposed by the Allied Powers, which has the potential to undermine the effectiveness of the response.

The fact that the violence continued for several years suggests that the original condemnation in 1915 had little impact on Turkey and any ex post facto response could only seek some form of acknowledgement of culpability and remorse from the State​[847]​.  Given that Turkey continues to deny the violence even amounted to a massacre, it is submitted here that accountability has not been attained​[848]​.

3.1.3	Deciding Whether Turkey Was Held Accountable
Since the initial acknowledgement of the violence there has been little progress in terms of seeking accountability from Turkey for its role and the considerable lapse in time can only frustrate attempts to compile a strong evidentiary case to determine culpability one way or the other.  The fact that a greater number of States now describe the violence as genocide, including 10 out of the 28 members of NATO​[849]​, could be interpreted as a form of redress due to the stigma from being recognised as a State that committed genocide against its population.  Obviously any stigma attaches only from the perspective of those States that consider Turkey was liable for genocide.  The intervening decades have made it increasingly unlikely that formal accountability will ever be sought and the contextual factors that influenced the nature of the response in 1915 have simply been replaced by different political considerations.

An illustration of where political factors have influenced the question of holding Turkey to account is found by comparing the response made by the USA at the time of the violence with the more recent response.  In 1915, the USA condemned the massacres as a policy of racial discrimination and threats were made by then US Ambassador Morgenthau to impose diplomatic sanctions on Turkey​[850]​.  Steps were also taken to support the victims of the violence, including Senate Resolution 12 that established a day of remembrance and an act by Congress authorising funds to aid Armenian survivors​[851]​.  Scholars such as Trask even argue that the refusal by the US Senate to subsequently ratify the Treaty of Lausanne was linked to the removal of provisions from the Treaty that referred to the Armenian issue​[852]​.  All of these factors confirm that the initial reaction by the USA was that the violence occurred as part of a State policy of racial discrimination.

In 2007, Resolution 106 was introduced into the American Congress calling for the Government to clarify ‘the United States record relating to the Armenian genocide’​[853]​.  As noted, the USA had previously recognised that Turkey was liable for the violence, however former President Bush called for Congress ‘to reject [the] Resolution’.  The reason for rejecting the Resolution was not because there had been a change in the Government’s perspective on Turkey’s culpability but because the Resolution could ‘do great harm to relations with a key ally in NATO and to the war on terror’​[854]​.  The delay in seeking accountability meant that contemporary political factors were prioritised above condemning Turkey for a genocide that occurred almost a century ago​[855]​.

Turkey’s current application to join the EU also illustrates that, even though some States do not perceive that Turkey has been sufficiently held to account for its role in the Armenian violence, the political considerations that influenced accountability in the past have been replaced by new political factors preventing accountability from being sought.  In 1987, the European Parliament declared ‘the refusal by the present Turkish Government to acknowledge the genocide against the Armenian people…a[n] insurmountable obstacle to consideration of the possibility of Turkey's accession to the Community’​[856]​.  Linking Turkey’s membership with acknowledgment of the genocide appears significant, especially because such an acknowledgement by Turkey was described in terms of being ‘a profoundly humane act of moral rehabilitation towards the Armenians’​[857]​ and rehabilitation has strong associations with accountability, as was discussed in Chapter One.

The European Parliament was clear to point out, however, that acknowledgement of the genocide was not the same as Turkey being ‘held responsible’ for genocide and it emphasised that no ‘political nor legal or material claims against present-day Turkey can be derived from the recognition of this historical event as an act of genocide’​[858]​.  This is clearly an important distinction from the perspective of holding Turkey accountable because recognition that there was genocide per se does not amount to any determination that Turkey was in any way liable for genocide.  This is the case even if culpability could be implied due to the level of organisation required to coordinate a policy of eradicating over one million Armenians across such a vast geographic area.

Despite statements that Turkey should acknowledge the genocide, which the European Parliament noted in 2006 had still not occurred​[859]​, the intransigence of Turkey did not stop the EU from opening negotiations for accession in 2005.  This volte face is less surprising when it is understood that the issue of Turkey’s culpability for genocide was never in question.  In the 2007 Progress Report on Turkey’s accession, recognition of the genocide was not even raised as an issue​[860]​.

When the interpretive framework for analysing State accountability in this thesis is applied, the conclusion is that, in terms of responding to the alleged breach by Turkey, the question has never progressed beyond a determination of what breach actually occurred.  In this context, any question of seeking accountability, for what States have previously recognised as Turkey’s culpability, no longer appears likely.

3.2	Crimes Against Humanity by the USSR – Holodomor Famine 1933
This case study of alleged crimes against humanity by the USSR starts from the same proposition on which the previous case study commenced, namely the fact that the State in question has not been held accountable.  Likewise, it is anticipated that the fundamental reason why accountability has been frustrated is due to the political context.  Both presumptions are tested here but, in this case study, it is also asked whether the political change of climate after the Cold War could mean the Russian Federation (Russia) might yet be held accountable for the atrocities of the USSR.

The focus here is on the Holodomor famine in the 1930s, used as an example of an alleged crime against humanity by the Soviet Government, to determine what, if any, response followed and why​[861]​.  In addition, there is consideration of the potential for seeking accountability from Russia for the broader category of crimes against humanity alleged to have been committed by the USSR.

3.2.1	Determining Whether the USSR Committed Crimes Against Humanity
In 2006, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe noted in Resolution 1481​[862]​ that ‘the totalitarian communist regimes which ruled in central and eastern Europe in the last century, and which are still in power in several countries in the world, have been, without exception, characterised by massive violations of human rights’​[863]​.  This claim is illustrated merely by referring to the incidents associated with the USSR, including the ‘extermination of 300,000 to 500,000 Cossacks between 1919 and 1920; 690,000 people arbitrarily sentenced to death and executed as a result of the “purge” in the communist party in 1937-1938; massive assassinations of approximately 30,000 “kulaks” (rich peasantry) during the forced collectivisation of 1929-1933…and assassinations and deportations of hundreds of thousands of Polish, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians and Moldavians’​[864]​.  The Report that cites these statistics specifically linked the USSR to ‘the most violent crimes of the communist regimes like mass murder and genocide, torture, slave labour, and other forms of mass, physical terror’, all of which are breaches of norms recognised by the ILC as jus cogens​[865]​.

Just one example of the alleged crimes against humanity committed by the USSR is the Holodomor famine in the Ukraine region in 1933.  The famine was allegedly the result of the Soviet Government having confiscated the harvest​[866]​ in response to rising Ukrainian nationalism, resulting in estimates of between five and 10 million deaths​[867]​.  The specific acts and omissions by the Government included taking grain from the population, State policies that prevented people from leaving famine afflicted areas and the failure to import food during the famine​[868]​.

The notable genocide scholar Raphael Lemkin argued that the Holodomor was ‘not simply a case of mass murder…[i]t [wa]s a case of genocide’​[869]​, but the generally accepted position is that the acts and omissions by the USSR amounted to crimes against humanity.  An independent International Commission of Inquiry, which comprised legal scholars and jurists whose findings were presented to the UN Under-Secretary for Human Rights and to the Council of Europe​[870]​, concluded that there was insufficient evidence to show that the Soviet Government acted with the specific intent to destroy the Ukrainian population​[871]​.  Similarly, commentators such as Rezie have cited correspondence between the Government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic in exile and the League of Nations to support the charge of crimes against humanity by way of an ‘engineered terror famine’​[872]​ that aimed to force the collectivisation of Ukrainian farmers​[873]​.

The view that the famine was a crime against humanity is broadly held, for example, by the European Parliament​[874]​, scholars​[875]​ and the aforementioned International Commission of Inquiry.  There was recognition by the Member States of the UN in issuing a Joint Statement that ‘in the former Soviet Union millions of men, women and children fell victim to the cruel actions and policies of the totalitarian regime [including] the Great Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine (Holodomor), which took from 7 million to 10 million innocent lives and became a national tragedy for the Ukrainian people’​[876]​.  Similarly, in 2007, UNESCO adopted a resolution on ‘Remembrance of Victims of the Great Famine (Holodomor) in Ukraine’ in which it was stated that ‘the tragedy of the Great Famine (Holodomor) was caused by the cruel actions and policies of the totalitarian Stalinist regime’​[877]​.  In both examples, the USSR was cited as having caused the famine.  There has also been acknowledgement by individual States using similarly unambiguous terms for condemning the State​[878]​, typical of which is the Canadian Ukrainian Famine and Genocide Act 2008 that declares that the Holodomor was ‘deliberately planned and executed by the Soviet regime’​[879]​.  Furthermore, influential individuals such as the late Pope John Paul II stated that the famine was the result of Soviet Government policy​[880]​.  It would be difficult to gain a much more comprehensive determination by the international community that the USSR had committed crimes against humanity, and therefore breached a jus cogens norm.

However, all the statements cited above were made after the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR.  At the time of the famine in 1933, there was no formal condemnation of the USSR in relation to the famine by either individual States or the League of Nations.  The fact that the USSR was admitted as a member of the League of Nations in 1934​[881]​ and the rise in German nationalism that was distracting the attention of European States at the time are just two historical factors that are speculatively raised here as reasons for the apparent indifference to the Holodomor.  An in-depth examination of why there was no response by States is beyond this case study and it is sufficient for these purposes to note that the USSR was clearly never required to account for its actions in contributing to or causing the famine.

The discussion will instead consider the potential, now that the Cold War has ended and the political context changed, of seeking some degree of accountability from Russia, as arguably the successor State to the USSR.  The reason for contemplating the chance of delayed State accountability is that since the end of the Cold War a large proportion of States have recognised that the USSR was in some way liable for the Holodomor.  Perhaps the most logical interpretation is that the international community had political reasons for previously not criticising the USSR.  Now that the political context has changed, and if Russia is in fact the State continuing from the USSR, then it is justified to consider here whether the delayed condemnation of the USSR may be seen as a delayed attempt to seek accountability, albeit from Russia.

It is more realistic that accountability can successfully be sought after a breach where the liability of the State is not in question.  The fact that there is a consensus amongst States (except for Russia​[882]​) that the Holodomor was a crime against humanity perpetrated by the USSR distinguishes this situation from the Armenian violence, where Turkey’s denial of a genocide is shared by other States.  The difficulty in this case, however, is whether Russia can be held accountable for breaches of international law when it was the USSR that allegedly committed the breach.

The Holodomor was used as a representative charge of crimes against humanity   and the varied recognition by members of the international community cited above arguably amounts to a determination of the USSR’s culpability.  The following discussion is at a more generic level and considers the potential of holding Russia accountable for what was recognised by the Parliament of the Council of Europe in 2009 as ‘all crimes against humanity and massive human rights violations committed’​[883]​ by the USSR.

3.2.2	Determining Whether Russia Breached a Jus Cogens Norms
Many explanations can be used to justify Jorgensen’s claim that the USSR was ‘an example of international inaction in the face of criminal behaviour by a State’​[884]​, such as restrictions on accessing evidence in the country​[885]​ and the political implications that surrounded a challenge to the USSR in the context of the Cold War​[886]​.  These obstacles were largely removed at the end of the Cold War when the USSR was succeeded by what are the former Soviet States.  The question here is whether there was sufficient continuity between the USSR and Russia so that Russia could subsequently be held accountable for any crimes against humanity attributable to the USSR or whether the potential for State accountability ceased with the dismantling of the original State.

It was clearly the intention of both the Soviet and subsequent Russian Governments that Russia would be the continuing State of the USSR after its dissolution and the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States at the Alma Ata Declaration in 1991​[887]​.  This is despite the fact the Alma Alta Declaration provides that ‘with the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the USSR ceases to exist’ while the Minsk Agreement 1991 that was signed at the same time noted that the USSR ‘as a subject of international law no longer exists’​[888]​ - thus the documents that establish the Commonwealth of Independent State ‘were not strictly consistent with the continuity principle’​[889]​.  Declarations by the former Soviet, and then Russian, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev however indicated that the intention of both Soviet and Russian Governments, irrespective of the wording of the declarations above, was for ‘Russia, as a continuing State of the USSR’​[890]​.

The intended continuity between the USSR and Russia is also apparent in practical terms, for example when Russia assumed all treaty obligations incurred by the USSR and agreed to be depositary for all multilateral agreements​[891]​ and the USSR nominated Russia as its successor at the UN, to which there was no objection by any other State​[892]​.   While there is a distinction between continuity and succession generally​[893]​ - and as it relates to membership of international organisations - Shaw notes that ‘the nature and importance of the UN is such that the question of membership of that organisation is strong evidence of continuity generally’​[894]​.  

The claim that Russia is the continuing State to the USSR was viewed as legitimate by scholars such as Mullerson, Cassese and Crawford​[895]​, for several reasons.  Firstly, despite the loss of territory as the Union broke down, Russia is much bigger than any of the other States that comprised the USSR​[896]​. Secondly, when the Communist Party established the Soviet Government in 1922, it established authority over all of Russia’s territory before subsequently expanding to establish the larger Soviet territory​[897]​. Thirdly, Russia assumed responsibility for the armed forces of the USSR and 61.34% of the USSR’s assets and liabilities, compared for example to 16.37% by say the Ukraine​[898]​. Finally, Mullerson noted there has been no objection by other States to Russia as the legitimate and logical successor and continuing State of the USSR​[899]​.

The acceptance of Russia as the continuing State of the USSR has been recognised in State practice, including statements by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs on behalf of the British Government​[900]​ and by France​[901]​, and in combination with the factors noted above the case for continuation is strong.  But is continuity enough to seek accountability from the later manifestation of the State?  Analogies with Serbia’s responsibility before the ICJ and Germany’s apologies for Nazi Germany indicate there are precedents where accountability is sought, or offered in the case of Germany, from the continuing State.

Firstly, and recalling the discussion in Chapter One, was the question whether Serbia and/or Montenegro could be held responsible as States that had comprised the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the Genocide Convention Case​[902]​.  In that case, the ICJ cited recognition by the Chief Prosecutors of both Serbia and Montenegro that recognised Serbia as a successor State and the assumption by Serbia of the Republic’s international treaty obligations​[903]​.  The ICJ also noted that Serbia had accepted continuing status, while Montenegro had not​[904]​, and concluded that Serbia could be held responsible accordingly​[905]​.  

The second analogy is the apology given for the acts of Nazi Germany, after the reunification of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1990​[906]​, which was referred to in Chapter Three as a potential form of redress for the purposes of State accountability.  After World War Two Nazi Germany was divided under the terms of the Potsdam Declaration.  In 1955 the Three Allied Powers ended their occupation of the FRG so that it enjoyed ‘the full authority of a sovereign State over its internal and external affairs’​[907]​, but the UK, USA and France continued to ‘retain the rights and the responsibilities, heretofore exercised or held by them, relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole’​[908]​.  Thus, in relation to the GDR, both the Three Allied Powers and the USSR retained rights and responsibilities​[909]​ and there was recognition, at least by the former Allied Powers, that the State of Germany as a unified whole continued to exist​[910]​.

In contrast, the FRG claimed to be the successor of Germany from 1945​[911]​.  Certainly, the effect on reunification was that the GDR was, in Shaw’s words, ‘integrated’​[912]​ into the FRG.  The ‘process of absorption’​[913]​ was by virtue of the Monetary, Economic and Social Union​[914]​, the accession of the GDR under Article 23 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic as set down in Article 1 of the Treaty of 31 August 1990 Between the Federal Republic of Germany and The German Democratic Republic and pursuant to the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany 1990.  For the purposes of this discussion what is important to note is that all four former Allied powers relinquished their ‘rights and responsibilities’ on reunification to Germany ‘as a whole…sovereign State’​[915]​ and no State challenged the accession of the GDR to the FRG​[916]​.  On this basis it is argued here that any redress given by the FRG for the acts of Nazi Germany can be viewed as a delayed form of accountability and provide a precedent in relation to Russia and the USSR.

Obviously, there are points of distinction between the above analogies and this thesis does not propose to resolve the questions relating to Russia’s status as a successor or continuing State to the USSR​[917]​.  The intention is simply to highlight some of the complex issues that arise in terms of holding States accountable in practice especially where the breach in question occurs, as it often does, in the context of conflict so that there is a high chance of a change in government and even a shift of State borders.

As Mullerson noted, ‘new States’ – by which he was referring to continuing States – ‘are not born only into customary international law but also into those universal human rights treaties (which is extended here to include obligations based on jus cogens norms) which were obligatory for their predecessors’​[918]​.  It is submitted here that ‘new States’ may likewise be required to provide accountability that is left outstanding by the old State, in order to ensure such treaties and obligations remain effectual.  If the maintenance of jus cogens is as great a priority as the definition in Article 53 VCLT implies, then it is reasonable to expect that the issues highlighted above would not be allowed to prevent States from being held accountable.

There have been no formal attempts to hold Russia accountable for crimes perpetrated by the USSR, which may mean that there is insufficient legal overlap between Russia and the USSR to consider them the same State for accountability purposes.  However, one isolated illustration of where Russia is at least providing redress on behalf of the USSR, even if it cannot be said that is being held accountable on the State’s behalf, was in the case of Timofeyve v Russia​[919]​.  The European Court of Human Rights found that Russia had breached Article 6 of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights for failing to execute a judgment by a domestic Court, relating to compensation awarded to the applicant in 1992 by the Russian courts for unlawful persecution by the Soviet authorities.  The applicant claimed before the European Court of Human Rights that the failure to execute the judgment was in breach of Article 6 and Optional Protocol One.  The substantive application related to violations of the European Convention by Russia, but what is relevant for the purposes of this discussion is that compensation had been ordered against Russia where ‘the applicant had been unlawfully persecuted by the [Soviet] State’​[920]​.  This case is an isolated example but it highlights that Russia was required to at least provide redress for human rights breaches by the USSR​[921]​.

3.2.3	Forms of Redress for Delayed Accountability from Russia
To the extent the arguments above are borne out and that delayed State accountability is feasible there remains the question as to what would be an effective form of redress.  The particular limitation on the scope of remedies being that the individual protagonists and direct victims may be dead.  There are many potential forms of redress ranging from an apology to compensation for surviving victims, monuments and memorials for the dead and even property restitution where appropriate.  In addition, criticism is especially effective when the accountable State seeks the goodwill and favour of other States.

The difference in political ideology between the USSR and non-communist States meant that any criticism by non-communist States relating to the Government’s policy was unlikely to have much political impact on the USSR.  The effectiveness of criticism as a means of seeking accountability will necessarily depend on whether the State that is criticised wishes to maintain its international relations with the party making the criticism​[922]​.  The fact that post-communist Russia seeks the approval of other States can be seen in the willingness it has expressed to adhere to international human rights standards.  For example, the UN Human Rights Committee in 1995 asked Russia to ‘clarify the legal and practical consequences of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Russian Federation as an independent State on the procedure for the implementation in that country of the rights set forth in the Covenant and their enjoyment by individuals’​[923]​.  The representative for Russia responded that ‘for the first time in the history of Russian legislation, the precedence of international law was acknowledged and that the basic rights and freedoms in conformity with the commonly recognised principles and norms of international law were recognised and guaranteed’​[924]​.

Similarly, Russia expressed its commitment before the Committee on Racial Discrimination that​[925]​:
the errors made as well as the frankly illegal acts that were countenanced and directed against national groups during the existence of the USSR are now being recognised and punished. The Russian Federation is making every effort to do historical justice to illegally repressed national groups that were forced to resettle, as well as in connection with the other forms of repression that took place when the Soviet Union held sway.

Statements such as these indicate a severance from the Soviet ideology, which did not recognise the primacy of public international law, and create a standard against which Russia’s acts and omissions may be measured against.  This in turn means that criticism from other States that Russia has failed to comply with public international law will be more effective as a means of redress from Russia.  Thus, in certain circumstances, it appears that a delay may even be beneficial in seeking accountability from the State.

As noted above in discussing the case of Timofeyve v Russia​[926]​, Russia has not proceeded, after the dissolution of the USSR, with complete disregard of the wrongful activities of the Soviet authorities and has sought to make amends of its own accord.  A further example of this is the Act of the Russian Federation on the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression 1994 that concerned the rehabilitation and compensation of persons recognised as having undergone political repression, which was defined in Article 1 as ‘various measures of coercion which were employed by the State for political reasons, in the form of deprivation of life or liberty’​[927]​ and included persons directly subjected to repression during the years of Soviet rule.  Non-compliance with the Act, as it relates to persecution by the Soviet authorities, exposes Russia to criticism for failing to comply with its direct legal obligations, and indirectly failing to ensure redress for past wrongs by the USSR.

The Committee Against Torture has previously noted where Russia failed to satisfy its undertakings under the Act of the Russian Federation on the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression 1994 and the Committee required Russia to give reasons​[928]​.  The context specific nature of accountability is especially apparent here as criticism for failing to implement the Act was tempered due to ‘the economic and financial difficulties that the Russian Federation is experiencing at the present stage [which] do not always allow this Act, which is of the very greatest importance for the country, to be implemented in full’​[929]​.

As with Turkey, the USSR was not held accountable for breaching what are recognised as jus cogens norm and the political context was a principal factor.  In this case, the issue was not so much determining whether or not the State was liable but rather identifying an effective means of redress.  The use of criticism to require Russia to make amends for the acts and omissions of the USSR has potential, as noted above, but in the context of crimes against humanity and other serious breaches by the State there has been little progress.

3.3	South African Apartheid
In this case study it will be argued that the response from States to the policy of apartheid in South Africa led to the practice being abandoned and to South Africa bringing its domestic laws into conformity with international standards.  After a brief introduction to apartheid in South Africa, as in breach of several jus cogens norms, the focus will shift to concentrate on the various responses by the international community to the apartheid.  This is in order to determine if there is a link between the various responses by States, the specific objective of those responses being to end apartheid in South Africa and some form of State accountability.  The question in this case study is whether the end of apartheid was equivalent to holding South Africa accountable for apartheid.

3.3.1	South African Apartheid as the Breach of a Jus Cogens Norm
3.3.1.1	Is the Prohibition of Apartheid a Jus Cogens Norm?
Apartheid constitutes a breach of two separate jus cogens norms on the ILC list that is referred to in this thesis namely, racial discrimination and crimes against humanity.  In addition, there is a separate normative prohibition on apartheid that is recognised as jus cogens.  Article 1 of the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (the Apartheid Convention), which has 31 State signatories and 107 parties to it and thus is recognised by a large number of States​[930]​, defines apartheid as ‘a crime against humanity…violating the principles of international law’​[931]​, as does the Rome Statute of the ICC​[932]​ and the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind​[933]​.  Furthermore, Article 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination states that ‘inhumane acts resulting from the policies and practices of apartheid . . . are crimes’.  The ILC also listed apartheid as an example of an international crime that would have come within Draft Article 19​[934]​ and as an example of a ‘peremptory norm’​[935]​ in the commentary to Article 53 VCLT.

South Africa showed ‘persistent intransigence and defiance of the international community’​[936]​ in sustaining a policy of apartheid for over 40 years, which in turn has led scholars such as Charney to argue whether the State is a persistent objector​[937]​.  To interpret South Africa’s defiance of international law as persistent objection would mean that the State was not bound by the prohibition.  This in turn would seem to bring the norm’s status into question because, pursuant to Article 53 VCLT, jus cogens are recognised as non-derogable by the community of States, which would mean that South Africa was likewise bound.  Two points are noted.  First, there is little support for a persistent objector rule in public international law, for example while the ICJ refers to the principle in the Asylum Case​[938]​ and the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case​[939]​ it is indirectly and as obiter dicta only.  Second, if the persistent objector principle does exist, it only applies to customary international law and it was noted in Chapter Three that there is no agreement amongst States that jus cogens norms are also customary norms.

Apartheid is as close to being a State crime as the indeterminate nature of the concept allows.  The Apartheid Convention envisaged ‘the establishment of an international criminal jurisdiction to prosecute apartheid’​[940]​ and, in 1980, a draft statute for an international criminal court specifically to prosecute apartheid was circulated by the Commission on Human Rights​[941]​.  Criminal accountability was, however, to be limited to individuals and organisations.  States could be held responsible where apartheid ‘was committed on [the State’s] behalf, behest or benefit by a person in authority’​[942]​ but the nature of the State’s responsibility was ‘deemed to be a quasi-criminal responsibility’​[943]​.  A criminal court to try offences of apartheid never came into existence but the fact it was even contemplated confirms the seriousness with which the prohibition of apartheid was viewed by those States party to the Apartheid Convention.

3.3.1.2	The Policy of Apartheid in South Africa
It has never been in doubt that South Africa was liable for having breached what is recognised by many States as the jus cogens prohibition of apartheid.  Indeed, Article 2 of the Apartheid Convention even states that apartheid ‘include[s] similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination as practised in southern Africa’​[944]​.  An overview of the relevant State legislation further bears this point out.

In 1948 the National Party coalition took power in the general elections in South Africa and began a slow implementation of legislation that would mean the entire State was regulated by a policy of apartheid.  In terms of seeking accountability however, it is submitted that South Africa was comprised of those State organs that introduced and implemented the policy of apartheid.  For example, the relevant legislation shows that the State included ‘the Senate and the House of Assembly of the Union of South Africa’ as well as the judiciary​[945]​ because all these parties were active in the systematic legalising of racial discrimination.

The relevant State policies can be broken into two categories of discriminatory legislation being segregation and disenfranchisement, as well as legislation that breached other civil and political rights as noted below.  Segregation included the forced physical separation of races in different residential and business areas under the Group Areas Act 1950​[946]​ and Natives Laws Amendment Act 1952,
and the establishment of black homelands and regional authorities under the Bantu Authorities Act​[947]​; the creation of a national register in which every person's race was recorded under the Population Registration Act​[948]​; making it a criminal offence if a black person did not carry the designated identification under the Natives (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act​[949]​; and forced segregation in all public amenities, public buildings, and public transport with the aim of eliminating contact between whites and other races pursuant to the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act​[950]​.

Disenfranchisement was under the Separate Representation of Voters Act​[951]​, which removed all black people from the common voters' roll.  Acts of disenfranchisement reiterate the point made above in relation to identifying those parties that comprise South Africa for accountability purposes, because any portion of the population prevented from exercising the right to remove the offending government must necessarily be excluded as part of the culpable State.

Lastly, the legislation also led to human rights breaches such as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act​[952]​ that prohibited marriages between white people and people of other races in breach of Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights​[953]​; the Suppression of Communism Act​[954]​ that outlawed communism but defined the term so broadly that it covered other forms of political opposition in breach of Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act that gave the Minister of Native Affairs the power to remove blacks from public or privately owned land​[955]​ in breach of Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and the Bantu Education Act​[956]​ establishing a Black Education Department to compile a curriculum, which then Minister of Native Affairs and later Prime Minister Dr Verwoerd has been cited as stating was to prevent black Africans receiving an education that would encourage them to seek employment beyond necessary labouring skills​[957]​.

Taken in combination, these Acts and Regulations establish that South Africa breached the prohibition of apartheid through the State’s policies.  The variety in responses to the breach will show that many States, the UN and organisations such as the Organisation of African Unity likewise consider that South Africa was liable.  It will be argued here that the responses by these parties shows that, in addition to the end of apartheid, some form of accountability was sought from the State.

3.3.2	The International Community’s Response to South African Apartheid
The criticism of South Africa’s policy of apartheid came from both State and non-State actors in the international community, similar to the situation noted in the previous case study.  Che Guevara, in his capacity as the Cuban representative to the UN and in a speech before the General Assembly, stated that ‘the brutal policy of apartheid is applied before the eyes of the nations of the world’ and that ‘we speak out to put the world on guard against what is happening in South Africa’​[958]​, thus linking the oppression in South Africa with State policy.  Guevara’s words echoed the speech made by former UK Prime Minister Harold MacMillan to the South African Parliament in 1960, in which he noted ‘the wind of change is blowing’ in relation to tolerance of South Africa’s policy of apartheid.  The Winds of Change speech, as it is known, effectively marked a shift in what, relatively, had been State inaction to the consolidation of South Africa’s apartheid policies.  MacMillan described the ‘growth of national consciousness’ as ‘a political fact’​[959]​ and from the early 1960s there was indeed a significant change in the response to the apartheid.

3.3.2.1	The UN
The escalation in State responses to apartheid in the 1960s was preceded in 1944 when the question of discrimination in South Africa became the first time that human rights concerns in a particular State were raised before the General Assembly​[960]​.  By 1952, and after the repression and imprisonment of thousands of anti-apartheid protestors from the African National Congress and South African Indian Congress during the Defiance Campaign​[961]​, the UN established a Good Offices Commission to investigate discriminatory policies but only as these policies applied against the Indian population​[962]​.  The reality of the Commission however, was as a means to resolve the inter-State dispute between South Africa on the one hand and India and Pakistan on the other for alleged breaches of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights against the Indian population.

It was not until 1953 that the General Assembly specifically referred to the ‘policies of apartheid of the Government of the Union of South Africa’ as they affected all parties, not just the Indian population, contrary to the UN Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights​[963]​.  Each year there was a similarly worded Resolution in which the General Assembly would invite consultation with South Africa​[964]​, expressed its concern at the ongoing breaches of the UN Charter​[965]​, regretted the lack of response by the Government​[966]​ and finally called upon South Africa to bring its policies and conduct into line with international law​[967]​.

Eventually in 1962, after police killed black protestors in the Sharpeville massacre and at the time of the Winds of Change speech, there was a change in the nature of the response made by the General Assembly.  General Assembly Resolution 1761 had four aspects that signalled a shift to what was a more assertive response than the UN had previously taken in condemning South Africa in the past.

The first point is that while Resolution 1761 condemned the ‘policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa’ as had previously been the case, Member States were this time being called on to take active steps in response.  The General Assembly stated that South Africa had flouted ‘world public opinion’​[968]​ before calling on Member States to break off diplomatic relations, take steps to prevent South African ships using the ports of another State, boycott all South African goods and prevent passage facility to South African craft​[969]​.  The express intent in Resolution 1761 ‘to bring about the abandonment of those [apartheid] policies’​[970]​ did not preclude that South Africa might also be held accountable.  Indeed, the reference to disregarding ‘world public opinion’ implied a global consensus that the law had been breached, while calling upon all Member States to act in response can be seen as a means of seeking redress.  Thus, both limbs of State accountability as understood in this thesis would be satisfied.

The second notable feature of Resolution 1761 is that it established a Special Committee with the mandate to keep the apartheid policies of South Africa under review when the General Assembly was not in session​[971]​.  There is a parallel here between establishing a Special Committee for the purpose of monitoring South Africa and the State review mechanism by the UN’s human rights monitoring bodies, which Chapter One argued can be an effective means for accountability.

The third aspect that signals a shift in the UN’s response to apartheid is that Resolution 1761 referred to the Security Council, which from 1960 joined the General Assembly in condemning apartheid​[972]​.  After protestors were killed as a result of the ‘demonstrations and racial segregation in South Africa’ and the ‘racial policies of the Government’, and complaints were made by 29 States​[973]​, the Security Council issued its first resolution calling on South Africa to ‘abandon its policies of apartheid’​[974]​.  In 1963, and having noted an arms build up by South Africa, the Security Council joined the calls for an embargo relating to the sale of arms and ammunition​[975]​, with the express intent of ensuring international peace and security​[976]​.

The final feature of General Assembly Resolution 1761 was that it called on the Security Council to ‘consider action under Article 6 of the UN Charter’​[977]​, which provides that ‘a Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council’​[978]​.  It would be another decade before such a step was in fact considered by the Security Council, during which the General Assembly continued to condemn the apartheid policies of South Africa​[979]​.

In 1974, the General Assembly called upon the Security Council to review the relationship between the UN and South Africa, citing the ‘flagrant violation of the principles of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’​[980]​.  The Security Council did not act as permanent Members France, the UK and the USA exercised their right of veto​[981]​.  Both the USA and the UK had already ceased arms trade with South Africa in 1964.  The decision of the USA, UK and France to then veto any action under Article 6 therefore implies that those States did not consider such an extreme step by the Security Council was warranted; or that those States did not, at the time, consider apartheid as a threat to peace and security justifying a response from the Security Council; or that the USA, UK and France were influenced by other political factors.  The failure of the Security Council to respond stands in contrast to the recommendation in General Assembly Resolution 3324E that ‘the South African regime be totally excluded from participation in all international organizations and conferences under the auspices of the United Nations so long as it continues to practice apartheid’​[982]​.

The extreme step of invoking Article 6 implied that the General Assembly sought some form of penal sanction to be imposed against South Africa.  By 1977, the Members of the Security Council were likewise of the opinion that something more was required in response to apartheid because a mandatory arms embargo was placed ‘on all States’ under Security Council Resolution 418​[983]​.  This action was expressly taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter​[984]​, thus in response to threats to international peace and security, but three additional factors should be noted here.

Firstly, Resolution 418 was adopted unanimously whereas previously France, the USA and the UK had abstained from voting.  Secondly, the embargo imposed against South Africa was the second and last time sanctions would be imposed by the Security Council during the Cold War​[985]​.  Finally, then Secretary General Kurt Waldheim stated that, because apartheid was ‘a gross violation of human rights and so fraught with danger to international peace and security’, ‘a response commensurate with the gravity’​[986]​ was justified, implying that the embargo was both in response to the threat to international security and to the massive breach of human rights.

The mixed response by Member States and the delay in responding, given that apartheid legislation was enacted by 1950, show how political factors can influence State accountability, irrespective of the perceived importance of the norm.  This is the case even though many Member States had already condemned South Africa’s apartheid policy either independently or through organisations other than the UN.

3.3.2.2	Non-UN Responses
The first example of a response, other than by the UN, is the Lusaka Manifesto adopted by the Organisation of African Unity and Assembly of Heads of State in 1969​[987]​.  The Manifesto was adopted by 13 out of 14 African States present at the Conference.  Malawi did not vote in favour but was, at that time, receiving aid from South Africa; a consideration that – again – indicates how other factors can influence the accountability process​[988]​.  The Manifesto was unequivocal in its condemnation, stating that ‘South Africa should be excluded from the UN agencies, and even from the UN itself.  It should be ostracised by the world community.  It should be isolated from trade patterns and left to be self-sufficient’​[989]​.

The Manifesto is noteworthy because the strong language implied that more than just the end of apartheid was sought from South Africa.  The combination of trade, diplomatic and political isolation was so severe as to far exceed any reparation that may be imposed in terms of a finding of State responsibility, and presents a strong case that those States that signed the Manifesto intended to hold South Africa accountable.

A second illustration where the response in question appeared to actively seek accountability is the subsequent Lagos Declaration for Action Against Apartheid adopted by the Organisation for African Unity in 1977.  The World Conference, which was organised by the United Nations in co-operation with the Organisation of African Unity and the Federal Government of Nigeria, adopted the Declaration and committed ‘full support to the legitimate aspirations of the South African people’ including ‘all appropriate assistance to the oppressed people of South Africa and their national liberation movement’​[990]​.  Thus, in addition to the end of apartheid policies, a change of the State’s Government was desired.

The third non-UN response cited here was the withdrawal of South Africa from the British Commonwealth in 1961.  South Africa had earlier conducted an internal referendum in which 53% of persons allowed to vote were in favour of the State becoming a republic.  The result of the referendum was that South Africa was then required to reapply for membership, which it chose not to do after Member States of the Commonwealth - including India - indicated that they would oppose the application due to the State’s apartheid policies​[991]​.

Individual States imposed sanctions ranging from the arms embargo, imposed in accordance with the many General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions noted above, to the variety of measures taken, for example by the US under the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act​[992]​.  The US Congress overrode the veto of then President Reagan to, amongst other things, grant suspension of aircraft landing rights contrary to US treaty obligations with South Africa.  The fact that this was the first time the Presidential veto had been overridden since 1973​[993]​ provided a strong indication of the commitment from the US Congress to the measures being taken.  These measures were expressly ‘designed to bring about reforms’ and ‘the end of apartheid’​[994]​.

Sporting sanctions were imposed by individual States and the International Olympic Committee.  It is interesting to contrast South Africa’s intransigent attitude in the face of political condemnation by UN bodies with the response to the caution given by the International Olympic Committee in 1962.  Due to the State’s policies on segregation, the Olympic team could only include white athletes but the International Olympic Committee warned that this would result in South Africa being banned from the 1964 Olympic Games.  In 1963, the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee was established but this was insufficient to stop a ban being imposed on South Africa competing in the 1964 Olympic Games in Tokyo. South Africa selected a multi-racial side in advance of the 1968 Olympic Games in Mexico, but was again banned.  The ban remained in place until the Olympic Games in Barcelona in 1992​[995]​.

The use of sporting sanctions recalls the point raised in the introductory section of this Chapter as to how to hold the State accountable without also punishing the citizens of that State.  As was noted, this issue becomes more difficult to resolve given that certain individuals will be complicit in the breach and must also be required to answer for their actions.

In the case of sporting sanctions it is the individual athletes that are principally affected by the ban.  Before a multi-racial side was selected in 1968 the South African Olympic team was made up of white athletes and, because it was white citizens who had the vote and consistently kept the Government in power, there was arguably a degree of culpability.  If the view is taken that effective redress should only affect liable parties, it becomes much harder to make the case that the use of sporting sanctions was justified after 1968 when the team included disenfranchised black athletes.

3.3.3	Redress Sought After the Apartheid
Unlike the two previous case studies where the attempts at seeking redress from the State largely occurred once the breach in question was brought to an end, it was shown above that the response by the international community to apartheid in South Africa was contemporaneous.  In fact, since apartheid was ended by 1994 when the Government of National Unity was established under Nelson Mandela, and in contrast to other contexts such as those considered above where any attempt to seek redress was ex post facto, there has been relatively little subsequent intervention by the international community.

Throughout the 1990s, there was a proliferation of international tribunals and courts to hold individuals criminally accountable for grievous breaches of international law, which arguably went some way to seeking redress for the State’s participation, notably the ad hoc Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia.  This was not the approach taken post-apartheid where, instead, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established by the Government without the assistance of the international community.  The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was given a mandate by the Government of National Unity to not only determine individual accountability but ‘question whether such violations were the result of deliberate planning on the part of the State or a former State or any of their organs’ and ‘facilitate inquiries’ into ‘accountability, political or otherwise, for any such violations’​[996]​.  In its Conclusions, the Commission stated that ‘the preponderance of responsibility’​[997]​ ‘rest[s] with the State’ for the ‘gross violations of human rights’​[998]​ and recommended ‘a process that contributes to economic developments that redress past wrongs as a basis for promoting lasting reconciliation’​[999]​.

It is not within the scope of this discussion to explore the findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  Instead, the Commission’s findings are cited here because they support the argument that State accountability was attained in this case.  Several decades of measures taken by States, international organisations and other members of the international community certainly meant that the stated objective, which was the end of apartheid, was achieved.  It is submitted here that the lack of any further response by the international community after apartheid was dismantled constituted an indicator that nothing further was required by way of redress.  The findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission set up by the State amount to recognition by the State of its own culpability.  Put differently, the end of apartheid was equivalent to holding South Africa accountable for apartheid.

3.4	A Comparison of Responses to Acts of Aggression
As with apartheid, it would be anticipated that identifying acts of aggression would not be difficult, given that a definition was even agreed by the UN General Assembly in 1974​[1000]​.  Indeed, it could be assumed that the more contentious issue would be how to respond to acts of aggression while upholding the prohibition on the use of force that is a fundamental pillar of the UN system.  By comparing three instances of what is argued here to amount to aggression, from both before and after 1974, this case study aims to test the above assumptions.

Not only can acts of aggression be measured against the definition adopted by the General Assembly, but Article 39 of the UN Charter also gives the Security Council the authority to ‘determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’​[1001]​.  The Security Council can then ‘decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42’.  It thus appears that all the prerequisites required to hold a State accountable for aggression exist within the collective security provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, being the definition of the breach, the identification of the party to determine when the breach has occurred and a means and mode of seeking redress.

There are however three issues with this simplistic overview that form the framework for comparing the subsequent cases.  Firstly, the definition of aggression was only adopted by the General Assembly in 1974 so it will be considered whether there is any difference in the response to aggression before and after this time.  To the extent that there are differences in how States respond to cases of aggression, unrelated to the definition, leads to a reflection on which State, States or UN body determined that aggression occurred and/or responded accordingly.  This second issue therefore seeks to highlight the role of politics in holding States accountable for aggression.  The third issue is whether responses in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter are effective in terms of highlighting the gravity of aggression (and thus imply accountability), or whether the response by States in practice is closer to what happens when States are held responsible.

This last issue is pertinent because the definition in General Assembly Resolution 3314 states that wars of aggression gives rise to the ‘international responsibility’ of States, thus suggesting that the response will be one of standard State responsibility.  The implication that aggression would give rise to standard State responsibility appears incongruous due to the seriousness of the action involved, arguably reflected in the language of Article 5(2), which designates a war of aggression as ‘a crime against international peace’​[1002]​.  It is even more incongruous that the specific reference to ‘international responsibility’ is only in Article 5(2), which deals with wars of aggression, and not in Article 1 that defines general acts of aggression​[1003]​.  Whether or not the anomaly between the definition in Resolution 3314 and the gravity of the prohibition of aggression, as arguably a jus cogens norm, has any practical effect can be determined by referring to how States have responded to aggression in the examples analysed here.

3.4.1	The Invasion of The Republic of Korea 1950
On June 25 1950, and after failed negotiations for reunification, North Korean armed forces crossed the 38th Parallel that separated North Korea from the Republic of Korea, resulting in armed conflict.  North Korea’s actions would come within the definition of aggression in Article 3(a), as ‘an invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State’, that was later adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution 3314.

The Security Council met on the same day as the invasion and passed Security Council Resolution 82, which stated that the ‘armed attack’ by North Korea constituted a ‘breach of the peace’.  Two days later, on June 27, Security Council Resolution 83 confirmed that the attack was a ‘breach of the peace’, noted that ‘immediate and effective steps’ were therefore required ‘to secure peace and security’ and recommended that Member States provide assistance to the Republic of Korea as ‘necessary to repel the armed attack and restore peace and security’.  By July 7, the Security Council sought to coordinate the military assistance under UN authority​[1004]​ and ultimately sixteen States contributed troops to the US-led forces​[1005]​.

The response was swift, which shows the perceived gravity of the situation, but the speed with which the Security Council acted can, cynically, also be explained by the limited window of opportunity.  The Security Council was able to condemn the attack and authorise military assistance because the USSR had absented itself from the Security Council in January 1950, protesting at China’s seat being occupied by the Taiwan based Government​[1006]​.  Interestingly, no further action was taken by the Security Council after the USSR ended its protest in August 1950.

In contrast, the General Assembly did not respond until October 1950 and initially maintained its focus on restructuring the country and on ensuring the independence of Korea once the active phase of the hostilities finished, rather than on condemning the aggression​[1007]​.  By 1951, the General Assembly recognised that ‘the Security Council because of a lack of amity of the permanent members has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’​[1008]​, citing the ‘Chinese Communist intervention in Korea’​[1009]​ in 1951 as evidence of this fact.  At this time, the General Assembly affirmed that the attack was aggression rather than a breach of the peace as the Security Council had referred to, and that both North Korea and China were liable for acts of aggression.

Military action was already being undertaken in Korea pursuant to the Security Council authority, which the General Assembly called on all Member States to support.  In addition, the General Assembly voted to have two prominent individuals use good offices in order to ensure ‘the achievement of UN objectives in Korea by peaceful means’​[1010]​.  The reference to good offices was very much in keeping with the traditional emphasis on peaceful dispute settlement, which was an understandable route for the General Assembly insofar as it had not previously faced a situation of such severity that would have provided a precedent in terms of what to do.  Thus, in order to explore how best to respond to such an egregious act of aggression, the General Assembly established a Collective Measures Committee to ‘consider additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression’​[1011]​.

The Report of the First Committee was adopted by the General Assembly and recommended that all Member States apply an embargo on arms and all related commodities against both China and North Korea​[1012]​.  There was a further response specifically directed at China for its role in assisting North Korea from 1951 onwards​[1013]​.

A Special Committee was established in 1950 to consider the question of China’s representation in the General Assembly, which was due to report back in 1951, just after China first gave support to North Korea​[1014]​.  Immediately after adopting Resolution 500 and the additional measures to be taken against China and North Korea, the General Assembly passed Resolution 501 taking note of the Special Committee’s Report​[1015]​, but any further consideration was postponed.  It was not until 1961 that the General Assembly voted to once again deliberate on the question of China’s representation​[1016]​.

To the extent that postponing consideration of China’s representation at the UN was a means to hold China accountable for aggression by imposing a form of political isolation, and not just a manifestation of the Cold War politics at the UN, it was certainly severe and expressed the disapproval of those Member States that voted accordingly.  Likewise, North Korea had been subject to criticism by both the General Assembly and, for a time, the Security Council.  North Korea was also the object of military force led by the USA and subject to an arms embargo until the end of the conflict in 1953​[1017]​.  In both cases the international community of States had made it known in the strongest possible terms and with as solid a consensus as could be expected in the context of the Cold War, that the actions by North Korea and China were not to be tolerated.

The lack of a definition of what amounts to aggression did not prevent the Security Council and the General Assembly from agreeing that North Korea and China had acted in a way that both threatened international security and breached the peace.  Furthermore, what was justified in response was more than the standard responses for settling disputes between States.  It seems clear that the political context played a major role in how States were able to respond.

For instance, as early as 1951, the Security Council removed the question of aggression in Korea from the list of matters with which it was seized​[1018]​, and the General Assembly remained active in the matter while the conflict continued.  Removal of the matter from the Security Council’s agenda ensured that the General Assembly was able to stay seized in the matter, and not breach Article 12 of the UN Charter, which does not permit the General Assembly to make recommendations when the Security Council is exercising its duty.  It is argued here, however, that it was unlikely, once the USSR resumed its seat, that the Security Council would have been able to act given the likelihood that either the USA or the USSR, depending on the proposed action, would have exercised the veto power.

It will be shown that the UN has used more assertive language and taken more extreme measures when responding to aggression in subsequent years, but it is submitted that the response in 1950 to the use of aggression against the Republic of Korea was significant.  The combination of criticism by the UN bodies, military force, the arms embargo and, arguably, political isolation from the UN sought more than to simply hold the States in question responsible.  It is thus, submitted that the motivation of the UN Member States was, at least in part, to protect the interests of the international community.

3.4.2	Aggression Against Iraqi Nuclear Installations 1981
The second example of responses to aggression is taken from the period after the UN General Assembly adopted the definition of aggression in Resolution 3314, and relates to the Israeli air strike on the Osiraq nuclear reactor in Iraq on 7 June 1981.

Commentators including D’Amato continue to argue as to the legal validity of Israel’s actions​[1019]​.  Such an analysis is in contrast to the clear position taken by the UN Security Council at the time of the attacks that the air strikes were illegal​[1020]​.

The Security Council stated, on 19 June 1981, that the attacks were in ‘clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct’​[1021]​.  However, a determination that the attacks were in violation of international law is not the same as determining that Israel had committed an act of aggression.  The Security Council could have referred to the definition of aggression adopted by the General Assembly.  Instead the wording used and the consequences listed in Resolution 487 imply that the Security Council was not prepared to treat the breach differently to other breaches of public international law that come within the standard scope and rules of State responsibility.

The fact that Resolution 487 was adopted unanimously is doubtless due to the specific wording adopted by the Security Council.  In comparison to the condemnation of Israel by the General Assembly that will be discussed more substantially below, the Security Council focused upon the attack itself.  Security Council Resolution 487 strongly condemned ‘the military attack by Israel’, and in comparison General Assembly Resolution 36/27 strongly condemned ‘Israel for its…acts of aggression’.  This difference in wording is further reflected in terms of the specific consequences sought by each UN body.  On this basis, it is argued here that it was the General Assembly that was instrumental in seeking State accountability from Israel, as opposed to the Security Council, which acted in satisfaction of its mandate to protect international peace and security.

The Security Council was ‘deeply concerned about the danger to international peace and security’ that resulted from the instability of the nuclear reactor due to the attack.  To address this concern the Security Council called ‘upon Israel to refrain in the future from any such acts or threats thereof’​[1022]​.  In addition to non-recognition of the breach, the Security Council also noted that ‘Iraq was entitled to appropriate redress’​[1023]​ although it did not state that it was Israel’s responsibility to provide compensation.  Non-recognition and compensation for the damage caused are two of the consequences required from States for internationally wrongful acts​[1024]​.   As already noted, the consequences when a State’s responsibility is engaged can also be effective in holding the State accountable.

In terms of redress for breaching the jus cogens prohibition of aggression however, it is submitted that there must be some sort of recognition that the breach is graver than standard breaches of public international law.  The question is whether specifically referring to the attacks as aggression and invoking the definition, as the General Assembly did, is sufficient in terms of recognition.

In its first resolution on the matter the General Assembly labelled the attacks as ‘armed Israeli aggression’​[1025]​, and noted that Israel had refused to comply with Security Council Resolution 487.  In comparison with Resolution 487, the General Assembly was unequivocal in its condemnation of Israel’s ‘threats to repeat such attacks’ and its ‘premeditated and unprecedented act of aggression in violation of the Charter of the UN and the norms of international conduct, which constitutes a new and dangerous escalation in the threat to international peace and security’​[1026]​.

In the same way that the tone of condemnation by the General Assembly was in stark contrast to that of the Security Council, so too were the proposed consequences that arguably exceeded the standard responses to an internationally wrongful act.  Firstly, and as with the Security Council’s non-recognition of the breach, the General Assembly gave a solemn warning to cease and desist from future attacks.  Secondly, all States (not just Member States) were called upon not to supply Israel with the necessary equipment for such attacks.  Thirdly, a plea was made to the Security Council to take ‘effective enforcement action to prevent Israel from further endangering international peace and security’​[1027]​.  This plea was in response not just to Israel’s aggression but also to its ‘continued policies of expansion, occupation and annexation’​[1028]​.  Israel’s aggression toward Iraq may have been the catalyst, but the General Assembly was seeking redress from Israel for all ‘acts of aggression against Arab countries’​[1029]​.  Finally, the definition of aggression in General Assembly Resolution 3314 was drawn on and it was demanded that Israel ‘in view of its international responsibility for acts of aggression pay prompt and adequate compensation’.  Unlike Security Council Resolution 487 that referred generally to redress without requiring that it was Israel’s responsibility, the General Assembly demanded that Israel pay compensation and that it be ‘adequate compensation for the material damage and loss of life suffered’​[1030]​.

The General Assembly would repeat its condemnation in Resolutions that were worded as equally strongly in 1982, 1983, 1984 and 1985​[1031]​ and which all noted ‘with deep concern Israel’s continued refusal to comply’ with the Resolutions passed by both UN bodies​[1032]​.  The refusal by the Security Council to take any enforcement action however undermined the impact of these statements, which is apparent given Israel’s failure to comply and intransigence.  By 1987 the General Assembly no longer referred to the attacks on Iraq, instead focusing on the broader risk of Israel’s nuclear armament.  It is interesting to note that in the last of the Resolutions condemning Israel’s aggression against Iraq, the General Assembly called upon ‘all States and organisations…to discontinue cooperating’​[1033]​.  The General Assembly appears to have tried to overcome its lack of enforcement powers, and undoubtedly its frustration in being unable to address what was perceived by the Members as a grave breach, by maximising the impact of non-cooperation with Iraq.  In calling on all States and organisations, the General Assembly was also clarifying that it considered that all States and organisations had an interest in maintaining the prohibition of aggression.

Certainly the gravity of Israel’s actions was not only noted by States.  Within two months of the attack, the International Atomic Energy Agency, as ‘the agency, under the aegis of the United Nations…responsible for international activities concerned with the peaceful uses of atomic energy’​[1034]​, condemned the attacks as aggression.  The International Atomic Energy Agency took the additional step of suspending any cooperation between the International Atomic Energy Agency and Israel​[1035]​.

By the time of Israel’s attack on the Osiraq nuclear reactor, Resolution 3314 had been adopted by the General Assembly. Thus, there was an accepted standard for condemning an attack as an act of aggression.  Despite this, political factors led to a difference in opinion between the Security Council and the General Assembly as to whether the acts were to be classified as aggression and as to what the response to the attacks should be.  There is a contrast between the Security Council criticising the ‘illegal attacks’ and the General Assembly strongly condemning the aggression by Israel, but possessing a limited capacity to enforce the measures taken in response.  This example clearly raises questions as to the utility of both bodies in responding to acts of aggression during the Cold War and the legitimacy of the permanent-Member system, but these debates will not be resolved here.  Instead, one last example seeks to determine if the impact of the political context on the responses to acts of aggression has lessened after the Cold War.

3.4.3	The Invasion of Kuwait 1990
It will be argued here that the response by the Security Council to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 illustrates a significant change in its political framework.  This is even before Russia succeeded to the seat of the USSR on the Security Council in January 1992 and the end of the Cold War in 1991 with the collapse of the USSR​[1036]​.  In particular, it is noted that an effective reaction by the Security Council was not prevented by any tension between Member States.  Furthermore, and the reason the response was so effective, is that the Security Council was able to bring the attack to an end and, to some extent at least, hold Iraq accountable for the breach.

The Security Council responded to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on the very same day, 2 August 1990, and in a similar fashion to both the invasion of Korea and that Israeli attack discussed above, to ‘condemn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait’ as ‘a breach of international peace and security’​[1037]​.  Security Council Resolution 660 called upon Iraq to withdraw its troops and begin negotiations with Kuwait​[1038]​.  As already seen, non-recognition and steps to bring about the peaceful settlement of the dispute are the standard consequences when States commit an internationally wrongful act.  Thus, there was little evidence to distinguish the initial response by the Security Council as specifically reacting to the breach of the jus cogens prohibition on aggression.

This point is strengthened by recalling that within two days of the invasion of the Republic of Korea, the Security Council recommended that all Member States ‘furnish such assistance’ ‘as necessary to repel the armed attack and restore peace and security’​[1039]​.  In contrast, it would take the Security Council almost four months before it considered that the situation in Kuwait warranted the use of armed force​[1040]​.

In the interim, the Security Council imposed a number of measures not involving the use of armed force, in accordance with Article 41 of the UN Charter.  ‘All States’ were to impose economic sanctions, implement an embargo on arms and related commodities being sent to Iraq and to refrain from providing any assistance by way of undertaking or financial assistance except for humanitarian purposes​[1041]​.

When Iraq purported to annex Kuwait, the Security Council called upon ‘all States, international organisations and specialized agencies’ not to recognise the annexation​[1042]​.  The reference to ‘all States’ was in keeping with the stated purpose of the UN to ‘ensure that States which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security’​[1043]​.  In addition, it is submitted that the reference to ‘all States, international organisations and specialized agencies’​[1044]​ not recognising the annexation, illustrates that more than just Member States of the UN were considered to be affected by the attacks and have an interest in redress accordingly.

In a series of Resolutions unanimously adopted by the Security Council​[1045]​ over the next four months, the sanctions imposed against Iraq were confirmed and expanded upon​[1046]​.  For example, in Resolution 670 the Security Council decided that all States were to forbid aircraft to use air space or landing facilities, except for humanitarian purposes.  Security Council Resolution 670 is notable because the measures called for were to be implemented irrespective of whether to do so would be in breach of ‘any existing rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement’​[1047]​.  The term ‘such measures’ in Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter was obviously being interpreted very broadly by the Security Council in the circumstances, insofar as it perceived that permissible measures may have required States to breach their treaty obligations.  This point, too, implies the gravity with which Iraq’s actions were viewed, although, at this stage, the only express reference made to aggression was in the context of violence toward diplomatic officials and premises as being ‘in flagrant violation of [Iraq’s] international obligations which strike at the root of international relations’​[1048]​.

In contrast, the General Assembly had used the term ‘aggression’ in reference to the invasion​[1049]​.  Throughout the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq, and during the resulting conflict, the General Assembly also adopted two Resolutions that would condemn the invasion of Kuwait and ‘Iraqi authorities and occupying forces for their serious violations of human rights…in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenants on Human Rights, other relevant human rights instruments and the relevant instruments of humanitarian law’​[1050]​.  The lower profile of the General Assembly in this case, in contrast to the other two examples considered previously, can be understood in light of the active and ongoing role being played by the Security Council and in light of the restriction under Article 12 of the UN Charter discussed above​[1051]​.  Given the use of force that was then sanctioned and implemented against Iraq there appeared little use for any further measures to be taken by the General Assembly at that time.

By November 1990 the severity of the measures adopted and not involving armed force were deemed to be insufficient in responding to Iraq’s ongoing occupation of Kuwait and failure to comply with the Security Council’s demands.  Security Council Resolution 678 thus authorised ‘all necessary means’ to restore international peace and security and implement the prior relevant Resolutions by all Member States cooperating with Kuwait.  Military intervention into Kuwait commenced in January 1991 with a coalition of 27 States and after a six week period of grace was given to Iraq for compliance​[1052]​.  The legitimacy of Resolution 678, in the sense that the use of force was not breaching Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, was established because of Iraq’s failure to comply with the previous Security Council Resolutions calling for the State to withdraw from Kuwait, because the invasion was a threat to international peace and security and because the action was authorised by the Security Council pursuant to its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter​[1053]​.

The use of force against Iraq by the coalition forces was short lived as Iraq, through its Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister, communicated to the Security Council on 27 February 1991 its intent to comply with the Security Council’s prior Resolutions​[1054]​.  The Security Council demanded, still pursuant to Chapter VII, that Iraq not only comply with those Resolutions but that it also rescind the annexation of Kuwait, ‘accept its liability under international law for any loss, damage or injury’ and comply with its obligations under the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law​[1055]​.  The references to what are effectively restitution and reparation are, as already noted, provided for under General Assembly Resolution 3314, which defines aggression and states what the consequences of aggression, as an internationally wrongful act, are.  However, it is the manner in which these and the other demands made by the Security Council were satisfied that suggests that something more was sought than just the maintenance of international security, a formal and sustainable cease fire or even the engagement of Iraq’s international responsibility.

Firstly, not only was there to be restitution of the border between Iraq and Kuwait but the States were required to submit to the deployment of a UN observation unit to monitor the demilitarized zone.  In addition, Iraq’s compliance with several of its international obligations were to be monitored, including its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which Iraq ratified in 1969.  Iraq was also invited to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction 1972, which, at that time, it had only signed​[1056]​.  Finally, Iraq was to allow organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross access in order to determine the whereabouts and well-being of detainees.

All of these forms of oversight were related, to some degree, to Iraq’s internal affairs.  Thus there is the argument that in exercising its power under Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter, the Security Council infringed Article 2(7), which prohibits intervention ‘in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State’.  However, Article 2(7) also states that it the principle of non-intervention is not to ‘prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII’.  The line between prejudicing the application of Chapter VII and abusing the power under Articles 41 and 42 will not be resolved here.  Suffice it is to note that to the extent that the Security Council did impinge upon Iraq’s internal affairs pursuant to the terms of Security Council Resolution 686, then it is argued that this was tolerated because other States considered that Iraq’s actions justified such a response.

Secondly, the measure of compensation adopted by the Iraqi Compensation Commission, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 687, did not follow the guidance of either the Hull Formula of ‘prompt, adequate and effective’ compensation or Article 2(2) of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States that calls for ‘appropriate’ compensation when a State causes property to be lost​[1057]​.  Nor was compensation only sought to the extent necessary to ensure full reparation for the internationally wrongful act in accordance with rules of State responsibility.  Instead, Iraq’s contribution was ‘based on a percentage of the value of its exports of petroleum’​[1058]​.  The figure reached was ‘to take into account the requirements of the peoples of Iraq’​[1059]​; yet the level of payment required from Iraq eventually led the State to incur such significant levels of debt that by 2003 Iraq had to be ‘exonerated’ in order to finance the State’s reconstruction​[1060]​.

Finally, Iraq was required to subject the destruction of all its nuclear, chemical, biological and missile weapons to international supervision by a Special Commission established for this purpose and by the International Atomic Energy Agency.  The embargo that had been imposed under Security Council Resolution 661 was to continue and in addition, Iraq was to undertake that in the future it would not ‘use, develop, construct or acquire’ any such weapons.  There is a parallel here between the measures taken against Germany and Japan after World War Two in dismantling the war making capacity of both States, which has been highlighted previously as an example of one of the cumulative mechanisms use to hold the respective State accountable​[1061]​.

The response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait is remarkable.  On the one hand, there was seldom any direct reference by the Security Council to the invasion as aggression and the Council was consistent in noting that the response was in accordance with the powers given to it under Chapter VII to ensure international peace and security.  On the other hand, the combination of responses, mostly initiated by the Security Council, almost always acting unanimously, was clearly the most severe of the three examples discussed here and thus the example most likely to be an illustration of State accountability for breaching the jus cogens prohibition on aggression.

3.4.4	Conclusions on State Accountability for Aggression
The presumption at the start of these comparative case studies was that the main issue in terms of accountability for aggression would be the nature of redress.  This was on the basis that the General Assembly has adopted a definition of aggression, which can be used to measure a State’s belligerent acts against.  Yet these examples indicate, particularly in the Cold War context and in relation to the Security Council, that determining whether an attack amounts to aggression is not straightforward.

Of itself, the reluctance to use the term implies that an act of aggression is of greater severity than a belligerent act that does not meet the threshold stated in General Assembly Resolution 3314.  The strong language used by the General Assembly to condemn Israel for its attack on the Iraqi nuclear installations bears this point out.

The reason that aggression is considered to be a more serious breach by States is because the interests of the entire international community are at threat, which in turn is why the prohibition on aggression was included by the ILC on its list of recognised jus cogens norms​[1062]​.  The reason that aggression undermines the interests of the entire international community is that it poses a threat to international peace and security, which the Security Council is vested with a mandate to protect.  It is therefore ironic that in the examples examined in this section, it was the Security Council, rather than the General Assembly, that was reluctant to label the respective attacks as aggression both before and after a definition was adopted in Resolution 3314.  The political context was however a significant factor in terms of how the Security Council responded, as illustrated by both the careful wording used in responding to the attack by Israel and the short period of involvement in the example of Korea.  The influence of Cold War political tensions between States was even more apparent when a comparison was made to the response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.  The last case study was significantly different because it was primarily the Security Council that responded to the attack and because it involved the use of force pursuant to Article 41 of the UN Charter.

There were three issues for consideration raised at the start of these case studies and the three examples discussed above have allowed some conclusions to be drawn.

Firstly, there appeared to be no difference in terms of the response to aggression from before and after General Assembly Resolution 3314 was adopted in 1974.  The difference in response in the examples given appeared as a result of decreased political tensions between Permanent Members of the Security Council toward the end of the Cold War.  Notably, the response to the invasion of Kuwait was more in keeping with the Security Council’s mandate to protect international peace and security, rather than protecting the individual political interests of Security Council Members.

Thus, and in relation to the second issue, political factors have proven remarkably influential in State accountability for aggression, at least as it is sought by the Security Council.  The impact of politics on the Security Council was most apparent in these case studies, because it was the Security Council that was unable to achieve a consensus of response.  This was in comparison to the General Assembly which was active in condemning the respective States, despite the much greater number of States involved.

The final point confirms one of the propositions in this thesis, which is that accountability will involve a range of responses.  In all three examples the response to aggression was not merely measures involving the use of force, but included criticism from States and non-State actors, embargoes and other forms of reparation in keeping with the fact that aggression is also an internationally wrongful act.  It was the combined effect of these measures that indicate accountability was being sought, and that made the response harsher than if redress was on the basis that the State’s responsibility was engaged.

As only three cases have been studied here, the conclusions above are necessarily tentative.  Further case studies would inevitably provide a more comprehensive picture of State practice provides a direction for future study.

Just one example of a useful comparative study would be the lack of an active response by the UN to the invasion of Iraq by the US led forces in 2003, that was also referred to in Chapter One.  The legality of the invasion is disputed​[1063]​.  For instance, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has stated that the invasion was illegal​[1064]​ and Russia, France and China issued a joint statement that Resolution 1441 which was subsequently relied on by the US-led coalition ‘excludes any automaticity in the use of force’​[1065]​.  Yet, neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly responded to the invasion of Iraq.  One possible reason may relate to the cost that would be incurred, for example economic sanctions could have led to retaliatory policies by the USA while in practical terms the cost of mounting an attack against the USA was, and is, prohibitive.  A second suggestion is that there was no State that could coordinate a response as the USA did in relation to Korea and Iraq in 1990.  An alternative explanation might be that there were attempts to seek some form of accountability beyond the UN framework.  An example would be criticism of the USA by individual States and human rights bodies that could be interpreted as a form of ‘reputational accountability’ whereby maintaining the USA’s reputation as a defender of democracy rather than an aggressor in international relations is an ‘incentive’ for the USA to defend its actions​[1066]​.

All of these suggestions are untested and further analysis would be needed to determine the reasons why there has been little direct reaction to the US led invasion of Iraq.  In turn, this and other case studies would allow a determination of the extent to which there are common attributes amongst the political factors that currently influence State practice in seeking accountability; in the same way that the response, if any, to breaches of aggression by the Security Council during the Cold War was predictable.

4.	CONCLUSION
The primary objective in this Chapter was to determine whether there is an informal practice in holding States accountable for breaching jus cogens norms.

The case studies in Chapter Five suggest that there is indeed an ad hoc practice whereby States that breach jus cogens norms are made to account for their actions, notably in relation to the apartheid in South Africa.  The argument that accountability was attained is not as strong in the three comparative examples of State aggression, but, when the General Assembly and the Security Council did respond, there was a correlation between the gravity of the breach and the nature of the redress, especially following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.  The many issues that can frustrate attempts at seeking State accountability were apparent from all the case studies, but were particularly highlighted in the examples pertaining to alleged crimes against humanity perpetrated by the USSR and alleged genocide committed by Turkey.

On the basis that an informal, albeit inconsistent, practice of State accountability could be seen as occurring, some consideration was needed as to whether State accountability in practice is the same as State accountability as theorised in the first part of this thesis.  In particular, the evaluative characteristics adopted in Chapter Two for the purpose of conceptualising State accountability are recalled here.

Firstly, it was proposed that holding a State accountable would require more than reparation for the breach of the State’s obligations owed to another State.  In other words, a combination of the General Assembly and the Security Council condemning Iraq’s actions, the US-led coalition that invaded Kuwait and engaged in combat with against Iraqi troops, the severe compensation regime imposed and the ongoing monitoring of Iraq’s weapon capabilities were argued to far exceed the consequences if Kuwait had sought to engage Iraq’s responsibility before the ICJ.

The second proposed criterion was that accountability may be legal, political and even moral, which was arguably the case when South Africa ended its policy of apartheid after decades of intransigence.  The cynical view would be that accountability was political as South Africa had no choice but to end apartheid or continue to face isolation by the community of States.  A more optimistic interpretation is that the sustained abhorrence by the entire international community eventually encouraged South Africa to accept and understand that apartheid undermined fundamental human rights.

The final two criterion were that accountability was most likely when a variety of responses was employed, provided they were not illegal.  In all the case studies, whether or not accountability was achieved, redress was sought in a number of ways including criticism, sanctions, military force, forms of oversight, reparations, non-recognition of the breach and even the criminal trial of liable individuals after the Armenian massacres in Turkey, although this had very little impact in terms of the State’s accountability in that case.

In addition to the evaluative criteria that were proposed as characteristics of conceptual State accountability, three issues were raised at the start of Chapter Five that specifically pertain to what the concept means in practice.  These were: what party is to determine the occurrence of a breach, what form is redress to take and what party is to implement redress and determine when the State is held accountable.  The final remarks address these issues with reference to the examples used here.

While the Security Council and General Assembly were primary players in determining whether a State had breached public international law, a broader consensus was sought from States in responding to the breach.  For example, all State parties and even non-States actors were called upon to respond to apartheid in South Africa and to the use of aggression by Korea and Iraq​[1067]​.

Although the preference for a consensus amongst States can be seen as a link with the principle of collective security, rather than with accountability, the Foucauldian framework of analysis being used in this thesis invites a broader interpretation.  It is submitted here that international peace and security does not need to relate solely to military security or peaceful State borders and can include other collective interests of the entire international community​[1068]​.  Insofar as such an approach is taken, those instances where States expressly determine and respond to a threat to international peace and security may also, in certain circumstances, be interpreted as a determination and response because there had been a breach of jus cogens norms.
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1.	INTRODUCTION
The concept of State accountability has yet to crystallise into an established legal principle but this thesis has shown that there is legal space into which such a norm may evolve.  The legal space referred to here does not require the creation of new rules or the relinquishing of established doctrines in public international law – it is simply a readjustment of already existing principles to ensure that States are held accountable for breaching jus cogens norms.  This thesis has sought to rationalise the subject matter by applying an interpretative framework to view the ad hoc practice of States and implied juridical support for increased answerability from States, as an evolving principle of State accountability.

In the context of referring to the study and development of public international law, Hammer claimed that ‘the goal need not be the creation of a norm per se but rather the delineation of factors that merit consideration by the international system’​[1069]​, a claim which captures the motivation behind this study.  This thesis did not aim to show that the normative content of international law has or has not expanded or to clarify what the normative content of jus cogens is.  To adopt such an approach and argue that State accountability is lex lata would have failed to recognise the reality that States breach international law, irrespective of whether the law in question was recognised by States as jus cogens.

Instead the goal was for greater consideration of the issues that arise in making States answerable for breaching public international law.  Issues such as the nature of redress, what accountability means in reality, and whether the State for accountability purposes is any different to the State as defined under the Montevideo Convention were all analysed here.  In so doing, this thesis argued that a concept of State accountability may evolve in the future and gave some indication as to what its characteristics might be.

The issues referred to above were not just legal considerations.  On the basis that the thesis was not concerned so much with pure legal theory as it was with the potential evolution of public international law, a mix of methodologies and perspectives, notably the approaches of Foucault and Koskenniemi, was justified.  While there are benefits in viewing State accountability strictly as a legal construct, namely, the legitimacy that attaches when a principle is considered a norm of public international law, there is also the danger that the concept would then be unworkable in terms of its application​[1070]​.

Evidence of State accountability was therefore sought in terms of both State practice and juridical support, notably from amongst the different international courts and tribunals, but also from academic scholars and from the practice and opinion of international organisations and other non-State actors, including the UN and its human rights monitoring bodies.  The overview of juridical support and State practice was persuasive in showing that the concept exists in a fragmentary and indeterminate form and perhaps lex feranda - and it also showed that State accountability is not lex lata at this moment in time.  In other words, this thesis has identified more of a paradigmatic shift during the twentieth century in how the international community responds when States breach international law, rather than a determinate legal concept.

The risk when a theory or concept is attempted to be moulded into a legal principle is apparent with reference to both rules of jus cogens and the doctrine of State responsibility.  While both principles have far greater normative standing than a concept of State accountability, their effectiveness in the maintenance and protection of public international law was shown here to be limited.  That statement is not a criticism; rather it is an observation that where a theoretical concept assumes a legal form, its utility will be constrained in accordance with that form.  In turn there is the risk that any issue that falls outside the subject scope of the particular doctrine will not be addressed.  This begs the question of whether it would in fact be desirable to find that State accountability is evolving lex lata, given the parameters that would be placed on State accountability as a legal principle.

One example of a potential limitation could be where a legal principle of State accountability dictated that only the UN Security Council could determine whether or not the State in question had breached a jus cogens norm.  The political factors that influence the Security Council in exercising its powers under the UN Charter were noted throughout the case studies in Chapter Five.  Should a determination of liability for accountability purposes likewise be frustrated then the whole objective in broadening the scope of legal redress from States under public international law is thus defeated.  In contrast, if State accountability is not restricted by its legal form then another party, such as the UN General Assembly may respond.

Before making any final remarks on whether it is preferable that the concept of State accountability remains, at this time, lex feranda, it is appropriate to first give an overview of the arguments developed in the thesis, the conclusions drawn and the conceptual characteristics of State accountability that have emerged throughout the discussion.

2.	THESIS OVERVIEW
The thesis was effectively broken into two parts, with the first part (Chapters One and Two) dealing with the theoretical substance that underpins State accountability and the second (Chapters Three, Four and Five) seeking out evidence of juridical support and State practice that would indicate at what evolutionary stage the concept currently rests.

Chapter One argued that there is sufficient consensus to define accountability as both a determination of liability and redress, independent of cultural and other subjective influences.  The State, for accountability purposes, was understood as the structural framework that allowed the breach to occur rather than just an inflexible application of the elements contained in Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention.  Chapter Two brought the constituent elements together to argue that State accountability could be conceptualised as an interpretive framework, which could then be used to determine the extent to which there is already an ad hoc or informal practice of holding States accountable.  It could also be used to identify whether a broader understanding of redress than the one which already exists with the scope of reparation under the doctrine of State responsibility, is viable from a juridical perspective within international law.

Chapter Three identified that the State accountability concept was not incompatible with the doctrines of State immunity or individual criminal  accountability and that, in both cases, examples were emerging that support a more ambitious approach to ensuring that redress is comprehensive when the breach in question is perceived as grievous or as contravening fundamental principles.

These very fundamental principles, arguably encapsulated as jus cogens norms, were precisely those shown to provide the link between the concept of State accountability and the argument that it has normative potential.  It is submitted that States, the international courts, international organisations and even public international law have sought to accommodate an indeterminate concept of State accountability by, for example, allowing accountability to take on non-legal characteristics.  Furthermore, it is submitted that this flexibility occurs when redress is sought because it is a jus cogens norm that was breached.

Chapter Four took the argument forward in terms of looking for juridical support for the concept within international law. In order to do so however, the discussion had to be taken back and the question had to be asked as to why accountability was even an issue when the doctrine of State responsibility already exists.  The concept was shown to be different from the doctrine of State responsibility.  At the same time, it was noted that the ILC had attempted, in codifying the doctrine, to cover much of the ground to which State accountability theoretically applies.  Attempts to expand the doctrine by either introducing a principle of criminal State responsibility or a more conservative serious breach regime were indicators that a broader and more comprehensive conceptualisation of State redress has some juridical support.

Finally, Chapter Five looked at the practical viability of holding States accountable for breaching jus cogens norms, as the concept is understood here, when there is clearly neither such a principle under international law nor a formal framework similar to that of the State responsibility doctrine and the ICJ.  While a perfect model of State accountability clearly does not exist, there were sufficient indications in State practice that allow some formative characteristics of the concept to be articulated.  The obstacles that were shown in seeking State accountability do not preclude its existence; they simply confirm the nebulous and evolving nature of the concept.

3.	THESIS CONCLUSIONS
Five conclusions are drawn from the analysis and these will be considered separately before turning to the characteristics of State accountability that have emerged in State practice.

3.1	State Accountability Has No Normative Standing
State accountability has no normative standing in international law. There is thus no institutional form on which to analyse and judge any State practice.  On the one hand this means that, as with the analysis in this thesis that was taken from a Foucauldian perspective, contextually relevant factors can be taken into account and accountability is thus not measured against a strict legal standard.  On the other hand, without a determinate legal form, there is the risk that States may justify less beneficently motivated actions on the grounds of seeking State accountability.

To adopt the language of Koskenniemi​[1071]​, it was the conceptual indeterminacy of State accountability that allowed its empirical reality to be determined.  Due to this conceptual indeterminacy however, the finding must be that there is a stronger argument for State accountability as lex feranda, rather than as lex lata.

3.2	State Practice is Indicative Rather than Determinative of State Accountability
A lack of consistency does not undermine a finding that there is an ad hoc practice occurring and that such a practice constitutes evidence that States are held accountable.  The changing reasons why States attempt, or not, to hold other States accountable illustrate that practice cannot, by itself, be determinative.  In particular, the case studies highlighted the significant influence that political factors may have, as seen in the contrasting responses made by the Security Council that were linked with Cold War tensions between Member States.

One of the benefits of adopting a Foucauldian methodology in the thesis was that the dominance of States in constructing and implementing international law was a highly relevant factor, but the role played by non-State parties was not overlooked.  The UN as an international organisation, and particularly the Security Council, was key in responding to acts of aggression by Iraq, Israel and Korea while the increasing role of the international courts has been highlighted throughout.  It has also been noted that human rights oversight bodies, such as the Human Rights Council, have an important part to play in terms of requiring States to justify any failure to uphold their obligations under instruments such as the ICCPR, as discussed in Chapters One and Two.

State practice is authoritative in the conclusions reached in this thesis but, where non-State actors were able to ‘force a clarification of State practice or have a State affirm its position regarding a [evolving] norm because of external pressure’, this was taken into account​[1072]​.  Ultimately, although inconsistency in State practice has shown that the concept is indeterminate, this does not mean that State accountability does not exist​[1073]​.

3.3	State Accountability is a Legal, Political and Moral Concept
The third conclusion relates to the characteristics that will be attributed to the concept in the next section. State accountability is not strictly legal and it has been argued here to currently hold political and even moral characteristics.  In other words, where legal accountability is not feasible at this time, political (and to a lesser extent moral) accountability may be sought.

The relationship between the three forms of accountability can be illustrated in two ways.  Firstly, accountability can be viewed as a circle and total accountability would be represented by the full space of this circle.  The area of the circle however may be tripartite, with thirds signifying moral, political and legal accountability – although the relative proportion of representation may vary.

An international lawyer that advocates Kelsen’s pure theory of law would most probably argue that State accountability should be entirely legal.  However, this thesis has shown that such an outcome is currently unlikely, given that State practice was shown here to be heavily influenced by political factors, and because State accountability is a concept and not a legal principle.  Thus, it is submitted that to varying degrees State accountability will be a mix of legal, political and moral accountability.

The second way to illustrate the relationship between the forms of accountability is by referring to the case study of South African apartheid.  Chapter Five argued that South Africa was held accountable, but only after having noted the variety of responses and their cumulative impact over several decades.  Legal accountability was clearly sought in the sense that South Africa’s domestic laws were deprecated and the State was called on to conform with the UN Charter​[1074]​, and ultimately the end of apartheid policies showed there was a degree of legal accountability.  However, given that South Africa’s intransigence continued for many years, it was clear that attempts to hold the State legally accountable were, for a long period, ineffective.  Concurrent with the international community‘s attempts to ensure South Africa’s compliance with the law, there were various other responses to apartheid and it is argued here that these mechanisms led to varying degrees of political and moral accountability.  Individual States and regional organisations criticised and sought to isolate South Africa in its international relations as a means of political accountability.  The use of sporting sanctions and trade embargos communicated to the State and its citizens that apartheid was ethically unsustainable, in the opinion of the greater international community, as a form of moral accountability.

On the basis that State accountability is not strictly legal, it means the concept can be understood as holding the State accountable as a separate entity for having breached public international law (rather than being held accountable for any breach by the State’s organs) without having to resolve issues such as the mens rea of an inanimate entity, the impossibility of a State physically acting or electing not to, and the notion of imprisoning or punishing a State.  As shown, such issues have thus far proven insurmountable when State accountability is viewed through the lens of criminal responsibility as a legal principle.

3.4	State Accountability Represents a Continuum of Answerability
State accountability is determined contextually and thus can be conceived of as a continuum of answerability.  Depending on both the context and the breach, the nature of accountability will alter and, just as there is no one standard of evil, there can be no one standard of redress.  There is thus no reason to suggest that the State has not been held accountable if every member of a rogue government that had abused its power and breached public international law was brought to criminal trial, which is theoretically possible with the International Criminal Court​[1075]​.  Alternatively, the reduction of a State’s territory, war-making logistical capacity and suspension from military treaties can likewise be seen as accountability; Professor Tomuschat is of the opinion that such was the case in holding Germany accountable after the Second World War​[1076]​.  Ultimately the response might not even be described in terms of seeking accountability at all and the attainment may be an unintended by-product.  Such a scenario is more likely to unfold where the prohibition of aggression is breached and where the response is thus to secure international peace and stability, as was the case in the examples of Korea and Iraq in 1990.  A point that this thesis did not have the space to consider but which is relevant here is that the growth in transitional justice mechanisms adopts the very same approach, whereby the nature of redress will depend on the context in which that redress is sought​[1077]​.
 
3.5	State Accountability is Sought on the Basis of a Norm’s Substance, Not Its Jus Cogens Status
The jus cogens status of a norm had little direct bearing, in the case studies undertaken here, on whether States responded when such norms were breached.  That is not to say that the content of the norm was irrelevant, rather that any express recognition of the norm as jus cogens, for example by the ILC or before one of the international courts, was incidental.

It is not contended that the concept of jus cogens is superfluous to this discussion.  To the contrary, this thesis identified that much of the juridical support for a broader concept of answerability that is currently provided for under public international law is evidenced by the international courts, international organisations and academic scholars referring to jus cogens.  It is therefore submitted that the idea that a body of norms exists to protect the interests of the international community as a whole, and which must be maintained accordingly, is the catalyst for an increasing State accountability practice and that jus cogens is used to rationalise and articulate the phenomenon.

All the case studies given in this thesis relied on the definition of jus cogens norms given by the ILC, rather than advancing a novel normative construct or attempting to resolve any of the debates as to either the content or source of such norms.  It was noted in Chapter Three that the reader did not need to agree with the idea of jus cogens norms in order to continue to follow the discussion.  Through the examination of State accountability in practice there was potential to assist in either proving or disproving the existence of jus cogens norms if it could be shown that the reason for responding to a particular breach is the recognition of the norm as having jus cogens status.  The strongest evidence of accountability in practice was where the underlying norm is on the ILC’s list of jus cogens norms - but that is different to (and not indicative of) States seeking accountability on the basis that the norm is recognised as jus cogens.

The fact that a norm is recognised as jus cogens has had little impact in terms of State practice.  There may be additional motives in responding other than seeking redress from the breaching State, as arguably was the case in the rapid response by the Security Council to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait given that States have a significant interest in protecting Kuwait’s oil and petroleum resources​[1078]​.  Where States are responding to large scale breaches of human rights and are acting to protect the interests of more than just States, it is usually without express regard to the strict jus cogens designation of the norm that is being breached.  For example, neither General Assembly Resolution 3314, which defined aggression, nor the Apartheid Convention use the term ‘peremptory’ or jus cogens norm but both refer to the respective breach as a crime to illustrate the gravity involved.  As a matter of fact, in the example of the violence against Armenians, it was seen that identifying exactly what norm was breached can hinder rather than assist the pursuit of accountability.

4.	CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE ACCOUNTABILITY
Relying on a combination of Foucauldian methodology, juridical contemplation and State practice, this thesis has identified a concept of State accountability and has argued that it is evolving so that States are made to answer when they breach public international law.  Specifically, State accountability is not the same as State responsibility, collective security or criminal State responsibility, although it was argued in Chapters Three, Four and shown in Chapter Five that the former two doctrines may also be a means for holding States accountable.

State accountability does not have normative standing and the indeterminate nature of the concept has been noted from the outset of this thesis.  However, a number of characteristics have emerged from the discussion that gives some clarity to the concept’s current form.

4.1	A Mix of Motivations
In none of the case studies undertaken was there evidence that the party that determined liability and imposed redress, usually the UN, was expressly seeking to hold the State in question accountable.  The nebulous nature of the concept makes it difficult to articulate at a theoretical level, let alone in practice.  It is almost inevitable, therefore, that an objective of State accountability will be either unintended, it may, for example, be the maintenance of international security in the Middle East that is sought; or implied so that the stated goal may be compensation for the victims of persecution by the Soviet regime; or even incidental and the aim was to bring the policy of apartheid to an end.

4.2	A Mix of Accountability Seekers
Unlike collective security, which is principally the domain of the Security Council, and the State responsibility doctrine, which resolves inter-State disputes, State accountability is the concern of all members of the international community.  The General Assembly may provide the most credible determination of a State’s liability, due to its concentration of State representation.  It has been shown however that the general public, international organisations and other States are all influential in seeking answers from States when they are perceived to have breached public international law.  This was illustrated in Chapter Two when a link was made between international and domestic criticism of the USA’s detention facilities in Guantánamo Bay Cuba and the Executive Order signed by President Obama in January 2009 for closure of the facility by January 2010​[1079]​.

The only caveat, in terms of determining liability, which arises out of pragmatism, is that some sort of safeguard is required to prevent a concept of State accountability from being abused in the same way that President D’Escoto of the UN General Assembly considered to have occurred with the R2P doctrine, as discussed in Chapter Two​[1080]​.  To avoid the concept of State accountability from being brought into disrepute, it is submitted that States should not be allowed to make a determination of liability unilaterally and that a collective determination system is needed.

The logistics involved in formally establishing such a determination mechanism would be significant, and were noted by Special Rapporteur James Crawford as prohibitive in the context of codifying the State responsibility doctrine​[1081]​.  Furthermore, the dangers of overly bureaucratising the process of accountability have been recognised above.  It is argued here that based on sufficient evidence in the representative case studies in Chapter Five, the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council are able to fulfil this function when the political will exists.  What is required is a stronger commitment to State accountability instead of a greater range of tools with which to implement the concept.

4.3	A Mix of Responses
Not only is the concept of State accountability legal, political and moral in nature, so too are the forms of redress that may be used.  The case studies highlighted a range of responses.

These include the more traditional responses when States breach public international law, such as the forms of reparation when a State’s responsibility is engaged, the application of collective security and the use of means, both involving and not involving force, under Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter.

Non-traditional means of redress were also identified through the application of the interpretive framework constructed in Chapters One and Two, including criticism and condemnation as a form of ‘reputational accountability’​[1082]​ and stigmatisation, sporting sanctions (as imposed on South Africa) and political isolation (such as the case of China at the UN after it assisted North Korea).  Other mechanisms, which did not feature as strongly in the case studies in Chapter Five, may include the use of Universal Peer Review and Human Rights Council monitoring, as well as the criminal trials of individual State leaders.

It is the cumulative effect of the redress imposed on a State that establishes that the response is more than it would be if it were the State’s responsibility that had been engaged; secondly, that the gravity of breaching what is recognised as a jus cogens norm is acknowledged; and ultimately, that the State has been held accountable.

5.	STATE ACCOUNTABILITY: MOVING FROM LEX FERANDA TO LEX LATA?
Impunity is the unavailability of redress under international law, as discussed in Chapter One.  It is therefore inappropriate to talk about impunity when States breach jus cogens, because this thesis has shown that a practice exists of holding States accountable.  A more accurate description, however, would add the appropriate caveats, which are that the practice of accountability is ad hoc and that the nature of redress is not always legal.

There is little doubt that public international law has undergone radical change in the past century, but one development that has yet to crystallise as a legal principle is a broader conception of State accountability.  However, the recognition, for example, of a category of norms that are sometimes described as jus cogens indicates that the interests of more than just States have proven influential both in the development and implementation of public international law.  Furthermore, if State accountability is understood as a sometimes legal and – probably in part – political response, which recognises that the acts or omissions of a State had the potential to affect the interests of the entire international community, there is both State practice and juridical indicators signalling that the concept is evolving into a legal principle.

It was noted from the outset of this Conclusion that there are costs involved if State accountability evolves as a legal norm.  Therefore, instead of ‘making legal culture more dense’​[1083]​ by arguing for the normative recognition of State accountability, this thesis utilised State accountability as an interpretive framework in order to respond to an ‘opportunit[y] for increasing the possibility for politics, for contestation of the outcomes and procedures of the existing legal regime’​[1084]​.
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